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Credit Market (credit + market)
Terms modified by Credit Market Selected AbstractsMoral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit MarketsECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2004In-Uck Park This paper studies the impact of credit markets on optimal contracting, when the agent's "interim preference" over upcoming contracts is private information because personal financial decisions affect it via the wealth effect. The main result is a severe loss of incentive provision: equilibrium contracts invariably cause the agent to shirk (i.e., exert minimal effort) if the agent's private financial decision precedes moral hazard contracting. The basic intuition is that committing on another private variable, other than the effort level, exposes the parties to further exploitation of efficient risk-sharing by relaxing the incentive constraint that was binding ex ante, unless the risk-sharing was fully efficient to begin with. [source] Credit Markets With Differences in Abilities: Education, Distribution, and GrowthINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2000José De Gregorio This article presents an endogenous growth model in which credit markets affect time allocation of individuals with different educational abilities. Credit markets allow the more able to specialize in studying and the less able to specialize in working. This specialization can increase growth and welfare. This article also shows that in economies with high (low) levels of education abilities, the opening of credit markets induces a more disperse (equal) income distribution. The role of intergenerational transfers in overcoming the absence of credit markets is also discussed, as well as other forms of credit markets imperfections. [source] Rural Banking and Landless Labour Households: Institutional Reform and Rural Credit Markets in IndiaJOURNAL OF AGRARIAN CHANGE, Issue 4 2002V.K. Ramachandran Financial liberalization is a key component of programmes of orthodox structural adjustment. Financial reforms include, among other things, the removal of controls on interest rates and the abolition of programmes of directed credit. Here the effect of financial sector reform on rural banking and rural credit transactions in India is examined, with particular reference to landless labour households. First, the trends in selected indicators of rural banking at the national level over the last 30 years are reviewed. Secondly, longitudinal data for a village in Tamil Nadu are used to examine changes in patterns of indebtedness and credit transactions among landless labour households. It is argued that the exploitation of landless labour households in the credit market has intensified with the introduction of financial reforms. Lastly, the policy envisaged as an alternative to the formal credit sector in the countryside , the establishment of micro,credit projects , is examined critically. [source] Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit MarketsTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2004Jan Bouckaert We show that competing banks relax overall competition by inducing borrowers to switch lenders. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclosing borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to poach their first-period market. Disclosure of borrower information increases the rival's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market. [source] Credit Markets With Differences in Abilities: Education, Distribution, and GrowthINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2000José De Gregorio This article presents an endogenous growth model in which credit markets affect time allocation of individuals with different educational abilities. Credit markets allow the more able to specialize in studying and the less able to specialize in working. This specialization can increase growth and welfare. This article also shows that in economies with high (low) levels of education abilities, the opening of credit markets induces a more disperse (equal) income distribution. The role of intergenerational transfers in overcoming the absence of credit markets is also discussed, as well as other forms of credit markets imperfections. [source] Investment and Finance in de novo private firms: Empirical Results from the Czech Republic, Hungary and PolandTHE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 1 2000Andrzej Bratkowski In this paper we use a survey of 281 Czech, Hungarian and Polish newly-established small private firms in order to shed some light on the constraints these firms face in the credit market. The results of our survey show that imperfections in capital markets in Central European economies do not seem to actually inhibit the growth of new private firms. Credit markets do exist for de novo private firms in the three Central European transition economies studied, and they provide quite a large amount of financing from an early stage of the existence of firms. Financial intermediation works reasonably well as far as de novo private firms are concerned: loss-making de novo firms have a lower probability of getting credit than profitable ones. Banks protect themselves against the risk of a deteriorating pool of borrowers by requiring collateral for their loans. We do not find convincing evidence concerning the existence of adverse selection. Loss-making firms are not ready to pay higher interest rates than profitable firms and are not more likely to ask for credit than profitable firms. [source] EQUILIBRIUM LENDING MECHANISM AND AGGREGATE ACTIVITY,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2010Cheng Wang We construct a model of the credit market where financial contracting is subject to costly state verification and moral hazard. The economy's aggregate activity and its equilibrium lending mechanism are determined jointly. We analyze how changes in the model's exogenous variables, including the returns of the economy's investment projects and the supply of loans, affect the economy's aggregate output and the types of the credit through which investment is funded. [source] Welfare-improving adverse selection in credit markets,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2002James Vercammen A model of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard in a competitive credit market is developed and used to show that aggregate borrower welfare may be higher in the combined case than in the moral-hazard-only case. Adverse selection can be welfare improving because in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model, high-quality borrowers cross subsidize low-quality borrowers. The cross subsidization reduces the overall moral hazard effort effects, and the resulting gain in welfare may more than offset the welfare loss stemming from distorted investment choices. The analysis focuses on pooling equilibria because model structure precludes separating equilibria. [source] Rural Banking and Landless Labour Households: Institutional Reform and Rural Credit Markets in IndiaJOURNAL OF AGRARIAN CHANGE, Issue 4 2002V.K. Ramachandran Financial liberalization is a key component of programmes of orthodox structural adjustment. Financial reforms include, among other things, the removal of controls on interest rates and the abolition of programmes of directed credit. Here the effect of financial sector reform on rural banking and rural credit transactions in India is examined, with particular reference to landless labour households. First, the trends in selected indicators of rural banking at the national level over the last 30 years are reviewed. Secondly, longitudinal data for a village in Tamil Nadu are used to examine changes in patterns of indebtedness and credit transactions among landless labour households. It is argued that the exploitation of landless labour households in the credit market has intensified with the introduction of financial reforms. Lastly, the policy envisaged as an alternative to the formal credit sector in the countryside , the establishment of micro,credit projects , is examined critically. [source] Financial Markets, Development and Economic Growth: Tales of Informational AsymmetriesJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 3 2004Salvatore Capasso Abstract., The development of financial systems is very often characterised by the development of innovative financial contracts which allow a more efficient allocation of resources and a higher level of capital productivity and economic growth. By exploiting the microeconomic theory of the optimal financial contract under asymmetric information, economists have recently managed to shed new light on the well studied issue of the relationship between financial market development and economic growth. This paper reviews the most recent progress of this literature which shows that the amount of information asymmetry in the credit market and the degree of heterogeneity between borrowers (typically firms) and lenders (typically workers or savers) determine the nature of the financial system. Differences in endowments and in the level of information distribution can give rise to very different financial contracts which affect, and in turn are affected, by capital accumulation and growth. [source] The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with RationingJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 6 2008XAVIER FREIXAS banking; rationing; monetary policy This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major implications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy (magnitude effect), and second, it shows that banks' liquidity positions condition their reaction to monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect). [source] Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan RepaymentJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 8 2007MARTIN BROWN credit market; information sharing; relationship banking How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show,in a laboratory credit market,that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third-party enforceable and lending is dominated by one-shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships. [source] Credit Market Failures and PolicyJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2009ENRICO MINELLI In a simplified version of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model of the credit market we characterize optimal policies to correct market failures. Widely applied policies, notably interest-rate subsidies and investment subsidies, are compared to the theoretical optimum. [source] The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance Institutions,JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2007J. Jordan Pollinger Microentrepreneurs have considerable difficulty accessing capital from mainstream financial institutions. One key reason is that the costs of information about the characteristics and risk levels of borrowers are high. Relationship-based financing has been promoted as a potential solution to information asymmetry problems in the distribution of credit to small businesses. In this paper, we seek to better understand the implications for providers of "microfinance" in pursuing such a strategy. We discuss relationship-based financing as practiced by microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the United States, analyze their lending process, and present a model for determining the break-even price of a microcredit product. Comparing the model's results with actual prices offered by existing institutions reveals that credit is generally being offered at a range of subsidized rates to microentrepreneurs. This means that MFIs have to raise additional resources from grants or other funds each year to sustain their operations as few are able to survive on the income generated from their lending and related operations. Such subsidization of credit has implications for the long-term sustainability of institutions serving this market and can help explain why mainstream financial institutions have not directly funded microenterprises. We conclude with a discussion of the role of nonprofit organizations in small business credit markets, the impact of pricing on their potential sustainability and self-sufficiency, and the implications for strategies to better structure the credit market for microbusinesses. [source] Local Banks Efficiency and EmploymentLABOUR, Issue 3 2008Patrizia Ordine We argue that if banks are not efficient in monitoring the borrowers in the presence of asymmetric information, credit market imperfections have real effects. We estimate dynamic equations using system generalized method of moments (GMM) for bank loans and employment on panel data for Italian firms. The system GMM estimates indicate that the impact of credit market on employment is higher where the local financial market is less developed, asymmetric information is widespread, bank managers are less efficient in assessing the firms' solvency and do not use appropriate methods to evaluate the borrowers' payback capacity. [source] RETHINKING ENDOGENOUS MONEY: A CONSTRUCTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN HORIZONTALISTS AND STRUCTURALISTSMETROECONOMICA, Issue 4 2004Giuseppe FontanaArticle first published online: 7 OCT 200 ABSTRACT Beyond a widespread agreement on the idea that ,loans create deposits' and ,deposits make reserves', there is much controversy in the endogenous money literature over the workings of the reserve market, the credit market and the financial markets. In this paper a constructive interpretation of the debate between horizontalists and structuralists is suggested and their arguments are taken forward by showing that these controversial issues can be explained rigorously once a single-period,continuation framework is adopted. [source] IS A GOVERNMENTAL MICRO-CREDIT PROGRAM FOR THE POOR REALLY PRO-POOR?THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 2 2008EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM I32; I38; H43; H81 It is argued that without collateral the poor often face binding borrowing constraints in the formal credit market. This justifies a micro-credit program, which is operated by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies to provide the poor with preferential credit. The present paper examines poverty targeting and the impact of the micro-credit program. It is found that the program is not very pro-poor in terms of targeting. The nonpoor account for a larger proportion of the participants. The nonpoor also tend to receive larger amounts of credit compared to the poor. However, the program has reduced the poverty rate of the participants. The positive impact is found for all three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures. [source] Investment and Finance in de novo private firms: Empirical Results from the Czech Republic, Hungary and PolandTHE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 1 2000Andrzej Bratkowski In this paper we use a survey of 281 Czech, Hungarian and Polish newly-established small private firms in order to shed some light on the constraints these firms face in the credit market. The results of our survey show that imperfections in capital markets in Central European economies do not seem to actually inhibit the growth of new private firms. Credit markets do exist for de novo private firms in the three Central European transition economies studied, and they provide quite a large amount of financing from an early stage of the existence of firms. Financial intermediation works reasonably well as far as de novo private firms are concerned: loss-making de novo firms have a lower probability of getting credit than profitable ones. Banks protect themselves against the risk of a deteriorating pool of borrowers by requiring collateral for their loans. We do not find convincing evidence concerning the existence of adverse selection. Loss-making firms are not ready to pay higher interest rates than profitable firms and are not more likely to ask for credit than profitable firms. [source] Back to the future: Futures margins in a future credit default swap index futures marketTHE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 1 2007Hans N. E. Byström The introduction of exchange-traded credit default swap (CDS) index futures is eminent and this development in the credit market is the subject of this article. A theoretically appealing and practically implementable approach to computing accurate futures margins based on extreme value theory is suggested. The approach is then exemplified with a study of the increasingly popular iTraxx Europe CDS index market. Although this market is not organized through an exchange and is not a futures market, the empirical results together with an arbitrage argument nonetheless suggest margin levels in a future exchange-traded CDS index futures market computed using extreme value theory to be superior to those computed using the traditional normal distribution or the actual historical distribution. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 27:85,104, 2007 [source] MORAL HAZARD AND LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS IN ITALY AFTER THE LAW N. 142/2001ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2008Francesco REITO ABSTRACT,:,Instead of focusing on the difference between a labour-managed (LMF) and a profit maximizing firm (PMF) in terms of final out-come and occupation, this paper considers the actual possibility for a firm to be financed from outside. A simple case of moral hazard in the credit market is analyzed. A bank, for limited funds, can finance one of two potential firms, a LMF or a PMF, both with similar project size. The Italian case is taken into account: the law n. 142/2001 has equalized the position of workers and members of a LMF as (own) firm creditors during a liquidation. This has an effect on the structure of creditors priorities in case a firm goes bankrupt and, in particular, on money-lenders likelihood of getting their loans back. It is argued that, before the law, the LMF had in general an advantage on the PMF, from banks viewpoint, for it faced a lower moral hazard problem on effort contribution. After the law, even though the direct consequence seems to be a draw back in LMF credit-worthiness, the model shows that, on given conditions, this type of firm remains more competitive as a bank borrower. [source] Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit MarketsECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2004In-Uck Park This paper studies the impact of credit markets on optimal contracting, when the agent's "interim preference" over upcoming contracts is private information because personal financial decisions affect it via the wealth effect. The main result is a severe loss of incentive provision: equilibrium contracts invariably cause the agent to shirk (i.e., exert minimal effort) if the agent's private financial decision precedes moral hazard contracting. The basic intuition is that committing on another private variable, other than the effort level, exposes the parties to further exploitation of efficient risk-sharing by relaxing the incentive constraint that was binding ex ante, unless the risk-sharing was fully efficient to begin with. [source] The Effects of Screening and Monitoring on Credit Rationing of SMEsECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 2 2008Mariarosaria Agostino In this paper, we seek to empirically assess which determinants of the capability and incentives of banks to screen and monitor firms are significant in explaining credit rationing to Italian SMEs. After testing for the presence of non-random selection bias and the potential endogeneity of some determinants of interest, the probit model results we obtain suggest that the average banking size and the multiple banking relationship phenomenon are statistically significant factors affecting credit rationing, presumably through their impact on the aforementioned banks' capability and incentives. Other potential determinants of banks' incentives to monitor and screen, such as local banking competition and firm' capacity to collateralize, are never significant. However, when we split the sample according to the level of competition in credit markets, we find that the estimated marginal effects of all significant determinants of interest are larger in absolute value than those obtained when using the whole sample. [source] Housing, credit and the euro: the policy responseECONOMIC OUTLOOK, Issue 4 2003John Muellbauer HM Treasury produced its long-awaited assessment of the five economic tests in June, having signalled the basic decision months in advance. The Treasury sees important impediments to adopting the Euro in UK housing and credit markets, and makes some proposals for further investigation and policy. In this paper, John Muellbauer considers the policy options. [source] Welfare-improving adverse selection in credit markets,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2002James Vercammen A model of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard in a competitive credit market is developed and used to show that aggregate borrower welfare may be higher in the combined case than in the moral-hazard-only case. Adverse selection can be welfare improving because in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model, high-quality borrowers cross subsidize low-quality borrowers. The cross subsidization reduces the overall moral hazard effort effects, and the resulting gain in welfare may more than offset the welfare loss stemming from distorted investment choices. The analysis focuses on pooling equilibria because model structure precludes separating equilibria. [source] Credit Markets With Differences in Abilities: Education, Distribution, and GrowthINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2000José De Gregorio This article presents an endogenous growth model in which credit markets affect time allocation of individuals with different educational abilities. Credit markets allow the more able to specialize in studying and the less able to specialize in working. This specialization can increase growth and welfare. This article also shows that in economies with high (low) levels of education abilities, the opening of credit markets induces a more disperse (equal) income distribution. The role of intergenerational transfers in overcoming the absence of credit markets is also discussed, as well as other forms of credit markets imperfections. [source] Consumer Credit Risk and PricingJOURNAL OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2006DARRYL E. GETTER Previous academic studies viewed borrower rejection as a sign of market imperfections in the consumer credit markets, but this view was based upon the assumption that differences in the levels of borrower creditworthiness could not be accurately identified. Today, it is possible to differentiate between types of borrowers, and riskier borrowers can participate in credit markets if they are willing to pay relatively higher borrowing costs. Hence, a more critical issue concerning the performance of these markets should be whether loan prices correctly reflect the level of borrower credit risk. This paper reexamines consumer participation in credit markets looking specifically at issues related to the pricing of borrowers of different credit risk. [source] How Credit Access Has Changed Over Time for U.S. HouseholdsJOURNAL OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2003ANGELA C. LYONS The financial industry made a number of efforts throughout the 1990s to provide additional borrowing opportunities to households traditionally constrained by the credit markets. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), this study investigates the degree to which household liquidity constraints relaxed between 1983 and 1998. The gap between actual and desired borrowing is estimated. The findings indicate that the ability of all households to obtain their desired debt levels increased after 1983 and most dramatically between 1992 and 1998. The findings hold true across all households regardless of permanent earnings, age, gender, or race. Those experiencing the greatest gains in credit access were black households and households with low permanent earnings. [source] On the Use of CollateralJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 2 2000Giuseppe Coco This paper surveys existing explanations for the pervasive use of collateral in credit markets and relates them to the empirical evidence on the subject. Collateral may be used as a screening or an incentive device in markets characterized by various forms of asymmetric and biased information. The evidence is incompatible with the use of collateral as a signal of projects' quality, while broadly consistent with explanations based on its incentive properties and asymmetric evaluation of projects. [source] Heterogeneity in informal sector mitigation of micro-enterprise credit rationingJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 5 2007David W. Mushinski Abstract Economists have observed that informal credit markets may mitigate micro-entrepreneurial rationing in formal credit markets. While informal credit markets may have that effect, the uniformity and magnitude of the mitigation is not apparent. We analyse micro-enterprise credit rationing on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in the United States. We find that micro-entrepreneurs have virtually no access to formal credit markets and that informal credit markets have differential impacts on micro-entrepreneurs' rationing in formal credit markets. Informal markets appear to ease credit rationing the most for the mid-size micro-enterprises in our sample, with the smallest and largest micro-enterprises still facing severe rationing constraints. We also find that micro-enterprises of all sizes face a positive probability of credit rationing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in EuropeJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 6 2010RONALD E. SHRIEVES international banking; market integration; shareholder protection We hypothesize that fundamental features that distinguish European capital markets have predictably influenced emerging national differences in bank capitalization and loan growth. Using bank-level data from 13 European countries, 1998 to 2004, we find evidence of positive effects of "equity-friendly" market features on bank capitalization and positive effects of both "equity-friendly" and "credit-friendly" market features on loan growth. The findings are strongest in small banks and in banks with cooperative charters. Our results suggest that ongoing and prospective integration of European banking markets is mitigated by relatively static features of the equity and credit markets on which banks rely. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||