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Credit Crisis (credit + crisis)
Selected AbstractsFrom Great Depression to Great Credit Crisis: similarities, differences and lessonsECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 62 2010Miguel Almunia Summary The Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Credit Crisis of the 2000s had similar causes but elicited strikingly different policy responses. While it remains too early to assess the effectiveness of current policy, it is possible to analyse monetary and fiscal responses in the 1930s as a natural experiment or counterfactual capable of shedding light on the impact of current policies. We employ vector autoregressions, instrumental variables, and qualitative evidence for 27 countries in the period 1925,39. The results suggest that monetary and fiscal stimulus was effective -- that where it did not make a difference it was not tried. They shed light on the debate over fiscal multipliers in episodes of financial crisis. They are consistent with multipliers at the higher end of those estimated in the recent literature, and with the argument that the impact of fiscal stimulus will be greater when banking systems are dysfunctional and monetary policy is constrained by the zero bound. --- Miguel Almunia, Agustín Bénétrix, Barry Eichengreen, Kevin H. O'Rourke and Gisela Rua [source] US Credit Crisis and Spillovers to AsiaASIAN ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW, Issue 2 2009Morris GOLDSTEIN F41; F34; F31; F37 We review key highlights of the global credit crisis. We then consider how financial turmoil in the largest advanced economies might be transmitted to East Asia. The focus is on foreign trade links, international capital flows, currency market pressures and mismatches, financial sector fragilities, and countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy actions. We introduce a set of vulnerability indicators and explore whether an ordinal ranking of East Asian economies according to these vulnerability indicators seems to be related to the cross-country differences in estimated slowdowns of economic growth during the crisis. Finally, we discuss how Asian economies might encourage the adoption of a stronger regulatory and supervisory framework in the USA and whether some Asian economies and the USA might pursue a more "balanced" growth strategy after the crisis. [source] Geographies of Financialization in Disarray: The Dutch Case in Comparative PerspectiveECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Issue 1 2010Ewald Engelen abstract The securitization crisis that started in mid-2007 has demonstrated that we are indeed living in a "global financial village" and are all subject to the vagaries of financialization. Nevertheless, the fallout from the credit crisis has not been homogeneous across space. That some localities were hit harder than others suggests that there are distinct geographies of financialization. Combining insights from the "varieties of capitalism" literature with those from the literature on "financialization studies," the article offers a first take on what may explain these different geographies on the basis of an informal comparison of the trajectories of financialization and their political repercussions in the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. The article ends with some reflections on how economic geography could be enriched by combining comparative studies on institutionalism and financialization, while its distinct research focus,detailed spatial analysis endowed with a well-developed sensitivity for geographic variegation,may help overcome the methodological nationalism of much comparative institutionalism. [source] James Rogers and the Bristol slave trade*HISTORICAL RESEARCH, Issue 192 2003Kenneth Morgan This article examines the business failure of James Rogers, a large Bristol slave trader, within the context of the operation of the late British slave trade in west Africa, on the Middle Passage, and in the Caribbean. Based on a large cache of surviving manuscripts, the article shows that the credit crisis of 1793 led to the demise of Rogers's mercantile career but also that his business collapse stemmed from over-extending his slave trading activities, from relatively poor profit levels, and from attempts to expand his trading portfolio in the eighteen months before the national financial crash. [source] Financial Regulation: What Should Be Done?JOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2008James S. Sagner The 2007 credit crisis is making us take a second look at regulating the financial sector. Has regulation failed? And what will be the impact on future merger and acquisition activity? © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Building Administrative Capacity: Lessons Learned From ChinaPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 6 2009King Kwun Tsao Professor Ali Farazmand's seminal article on "Building Administrative Capacity for the Age of Rapid Globalization: A Modest Prescription for the Twenty-First Century" is a powerful and comprehensive treatise on the nature and characteristics of governance and public administration,indeed, a manifesto for action. The content is rich and the scope is wide. The timely discussion offers operational concepts that can be used to analyze and remedy the economic and political ills that have resulted from many years of ideologically charged laissez-faire capitalism, including the current global credit crisis and financial meltdown (Friedman and Friedman 1990; Krugman 2007) that have affected governments and governance capacity worldwide. [source] China's Exchange Rate Policy, Its Current Account Surplus and the Global Imbalances,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 541 2009W. Max Corden This article is stimulated by current criticisms of Chinese exchange rate policy. The concern is really about China's current account surplus. The article discusses the factors that determine the surplus, and the reasons why the surplus increased sharply from 2005. The international implications of China's surplus and growth are discussed, and how it has affected the world real interest rate, and through that the US current account deficit. The surplus has had various international relative price effects, which have produced both gainers and losers. Finally, the surplus played only a small part in determining the world credit crisis. [source] Securitisation and Financial Stability,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 536 2009Hyun Song Shin A widespread opinion before the credit crisis of 2007/8 was that securitisation enhances financial stability by dispersing credit risk. After the credit crisis, securitisation was blamed for allowing the ,hot potato' of bad loans to be passed to unsuspecting investors. Both views miss the endogeneity of credit supply. Securitisation enables credit expansion through higher leverage of the financial system as a whole. Securitisation by itself may not enhance financial stability if the imperative to expand assets drives down lending standards. The ,hot potato' of bad loans sits in the financial system on the balance sheets of large banks rather than being sold on to final investors, since the aim of financial intermediaries is to expand lending in order to utilise slack in balance sheet capacity. [source] Securitisation and Banks' Net Interest Margins,THE ECONOMIC RECORD, Issue 274 2010JOSHUA KIRKWOOD This article develops a theoretical model of the effect of securitisation on banks' net interest margins (NIMs). The model incorporates a dual role for securitisation. The direct effect accounts for the influence of securitisation on banks' funding costs. The indirect effect recognises that the development of securitisation markets made it possible for mortgage originators to compete with banks, which contributed to a decline in banks' market power and a fall in their NIMs. In estimating the model econometrically, this article finds evidence that both the direct and indirect effects worked to reduce Australian banks' NIMs prior to the onset of the credit crisis. [source] US Credit Crisis and Spillovers to AsiaASIAN ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW, Issue 2 2009Morris GOLDSTEIN F41; F34; F31; F37 We review key highlights of the global credit crisis. We then consider how financial turmoil in the largest advanced economies might be transmitted to East Asia. The focus is on foreign trade links, international capital flows, currency market pressures and mismatches, financial sector fragilities, and countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy actions. We introduce a set of vulnerability indicators and explore whether an ordinal ranking of East Asian economies according to these vulnerability indicators seems to be related to the cross-country differences in estimated slowdowns of economic growth during the crisis. Finally, we discuss how Asian economies might encourage the adoption of a stronger regulatory and supervisory framework in the USA and whether some Asian economies and the USA might pursue a more "balanced" growth strategy after the crisis. [source] |