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Corruption Levels (corruption + level)
Selected AbstractsExcess Risk Premia of Asian BanksINTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2000Jianping (J.P.) Mei This paper develops a framework for gauging the risks of emerging market banks by using stock market data. Employing a multifactor asset pricing model that allows for time-varying risk premia, we find the presence of large excess risk premia on Asian bank stocks, especially in those markets affected by the Asian financial crisis. We find that the excess risk premia appear to be negatively related to the degree of economic freedom of a country but positively related to its corruption level. Thus, our findings are consistent with the view that crony capitalism in Asia may have distorted the market mechanism or the systematic risk exposure of banks. This suggests that the excess risk premium provides useful information on risk exposure for opaque banking systems where quality accounting information is not available. [source] Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment Attractiveness in AsiaASIAN POLITICS AND POLICY, Issue 2 2009Jung-Yeop Woo There have been debates on how political corruption may affect foreign direct investment (FDI) attractiveness. Some scholars argue that corruption increases economic uncertainty due to arbitrariness and thereby affects FDI negatively. On the other hand, another group of scholars contends that corruption leads to greater FDI because it can create a business environment that is more friendly to foreign investors. In this article, we empirically test the relationship between the level of corruption and FDI attractiveness in eight non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) using data for the perceived corruption level (according to the International Country Risk Guide data set) available from Political Risk Services, a private international investment risk service company, for 1984,2004. The analysis reveals that corruption in non-OECD countries in Asia generally harms FDI attractiveness. [source] CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS: A STRUCTURAL BREAKS APPROACHECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2008ANDERS OLOFSGÅRD In this paper we look at the impact of broad policy reforms on the levels of corruption. We use a structural break approach to identify country-specific time periods in which significant shifts in corruption levels take place. We then correlate these times of change with a set of covariates with specific focus on the impact of democratization, and trade and equity market liberalization. We find robust support for the hypothesis that episodes of reduction in corruption levels tend to be correlated with democratization and equity market liberalization. [source] Corruption and environmental policies: what are the implications for the enlarged EU?ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2006Lorenzo Pellegrini Abstract The paper discusses the prescription of EU environmental regulations for new member states. It has been argued that these countries should be allowed looser directives as a way to take into consideration their lower income levels and correspondingly different priorities. The paper estimates the determinants of environmental policies' stringency. We find that corruption levels are the most important factor in explaining the variance in environmental policies in the enlarged EU. Most notably, differences in corruption levels across countries appear to be more important than income differences. Thus, it is argued, lower environmental standards in new member states are not necessarily implied by lower income levels, but they are more likely to reflect low institutional quality. We argue that harmonization of environmental policies at the EU level can be a way to tackle this problem, and we provide a further rationale for new members states to adjust to existing EU environmental directives. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Nonergodic Corruption Dynamics (or, Why Do Some Regions within a Country Become More Corrupt than Others?)JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2006RANDAL J. VERBRUGGE Two key aspects of corruption are strategic complementarity (the greater the prevailing level of corruption, the more likely is a particular agent to engage in it) and localized interactions (officials typically interact repeatedly with a small group of other officials, their colleagues). This paper builds a simple model with these two features, which studies the evolution of corruption. Over time, local networks of corruption (or honest behavior) endogenously emerge, and otherwise identical regions can end up with divergent corruption levels. Anti-corruption policies are studied. [source] |