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Corruption
Terms modified by Corruption Selected AbstractsINSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIONECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2009FILIPE R. CAMPANTE We investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We propose a model of incumbent behavior that features the interplay of two effects: a horizon effect, whereby greater instability leads the incumbent to embezzle more during his short window of opportunity, and a demand effect, by which the private sector is more willing to bribe stable incumbents. The horizon effect dominates at low levels of stability, because firms are unwilling to pay high bribes and unstable incumbents have strong incentives to embezzle, whereas the demand effect gains salience in more stable regimes. Together, these two effects generate a non-monotonic, U-shaped relationship between total corruption and stability. On the empirical side, we find a robust U-shaped pattern between country indices of corruption perception and various measures of incumbent stability, including historically observed average tenures of chief executives and governing parties: regimes that are very stable or very unstable display higher levels of corruption when compared with those in an intermediate range of stability. These results suggest that minimizing corruption may require an electoral system that features some re-election incentives, but with an eventual term limit. [source] POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACYECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2008TOKE S. AIDT This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re-elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy. [source] CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS: A STRUCTURAL BREAKS APPROACHECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2008ANDERS OLOFSGÅRD In this paper we look at the impact of broad policy reforms on the levels of corruption. We use a structural break approach to identify country-specific time periods in which significant shifts in corruption levels take place. We then correlate these times of change with a set of covariates with specific focus on the impact of democratization, and trade and equity market liberalization. We find robust support for the hypothesis that episodes of reduction in corruption levels tend to be correlated with democratization and equity market liberalization. [source] POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTSECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2008JAMES E. ALT This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself. [source] PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MEASURE OF CORRUPTION, ILLUSTRATED WITH ITALIAN DATAECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2005Miriam A. Golden Standard cross-national measures of corruption are assembled through surveys. We propose a novel alternative objective measure that consists of the difference between a measure of the physical quantities of public infrastructure and the cumulative price government pays for public capital stocks. Where the difference is larger between the monies spent and the existing physical infrastructure, more money is being siphoned off to mismanagement, fraud, bribes, kickbacks, and embezzlement; that is, corruption is greater. We create this measure for Italy's 95 provinces and 20 regions as of the mid-1990s, controlling at the regional level for possible differences in the costs of public construction. [source] ECONOMIC TRENDS: CORRUPTION: East African Bribery IndexAFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN: ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL SERIES, Issue 7 2010Article first published online: 1 SEP 2010 No abstract is available for this article. [source] CORRUPTION: 2009 Global BarometerAFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN: ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL SERIES, Issue 5 2009Article first published online: 3 JUL 200 No abstract is available for this article. [source] THE 1998 OECD CONVENTION: AN IMPETUS FOR WORLDWIDE CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONSAMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2000BARBARA CRUTCHFIELD GEORGE First page of article [source] CORRUPTION AND CORPORATE FINANCE PATTERNS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVEPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008Julan Du Corruption contributes to a more prevalent and higher degree of corporate equity ownership concentration and more reliance on bank financing in raising external finance. It argues that corporate governance under corrupt governments is particularly poor. Firm management, taking advantage of political capital acquired through bribery, is especially powerful in expropriating from outside investors. Ownership concentration and reliance on bank financing are means of mitigating the corporate governance problem under a corrupt government. [source] INSTITUTIONALIZED CORRUPTION AND PRIVILEGE IN CHINA'S SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSISPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2005Ke Li First a Walrasian equilibrium in a market economy is computed; then we consider the effects on welfare when a privileged group is chosen to work as high-level administrators. Finally, we allow for explicit collusion between administrators by introducing an administrator's agent who acts in the interests of all the administrators. The model shows that in equilibrium (fixed point) the degree of corruption, the degree of division of labour and productivity are interdependent. [source] CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC CONTRACTING AUCTIONS: THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY IN BIDDING PROCESSESANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2006Frédéric Boehm ABSTRACT,:,The paper discusses corruption in public auctions and the role of transparency as a tool to prevent it. First, we analyse where corruption occurs, emphasizing the importance of considering the whole process, from deciding whether to contract-out to implementing the contract. We then analyse the effects of corruption on public auctions and argue that corruption undermines their stated aims. Second, we discuss the ways transparency can mitigate corruption and possible trade-offs regarding competition and efficiency. As an instrument, we focus on the Integrity Pact, a tool developed by Transparency International, and analyse cases in Argentina (school supplies) and Colombia (telecommunications), where transparency helped to prevent corruption and collusion and, furthermore, was able to enhance competition. We conclude with some policy implications. [source] ECONOMIC FREEDOM VERSUS POLITICAL FREEDOM: CROSS-COUNTRY INFLUENCES ON CORRUPTION,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 2 2005RAJEEV K. GOEL Using a well-known index of corruption, this paper examines the determinants of corruption for a large sample of countries. Specifically, the present study brings empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether economic freedom or political freedom serves as a deterrent to corrupt activity. In particular, does greater economic freedom or greater political freedom yield a more ,clean' society? Our results show that greater economic freedom seems to matter more in this regard. Examining different components of economic freedom, we find that not all these components are equally effective in reducing corruption. For instance, monetary policy seems to have a stronger influence on the level of corrupt activity in a country than fiscal policy. Robustness of these findings is checked and policy implications are discussed. [source] Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations by Raymond Fisman and Edward MiguelDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 3 2009Raghav Gaiha First page of article [source] Corruption in emergency procurementDISASTERS, Issue 4 2008Jessica Schultz Corruption in emergency procurement reduces the resources available for life-saving operations, lowers the quality of products and services provided, and diverts aid from those who need it most., It also negatively influences public support for humanitarian relief, both in the affected country and abroad. This paper aims to unpack and analyse the following question in order to mitigate risk: how and where does corruption typically occur, and what can be done? Suggested strategies reflect a multi-layered approach that stresses internal agency control mechanisms, conflict-sensitive management, and the need for common systems among operators. [source] Inflation, Inflation Variability, and CorruptionECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2004Miguel Braun We present a model where agents can inflate the cost of goods needed to start an investment project and inflation variability increases monitoring costs. We show that inflation variability can lead to higher corruption and lower investment. We document a positive relationship between corruption and inflation variability in a sample of 75 countries. The effect is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, other controls, and 2SLS estimation. The results are economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in inflation variance from the median increases corruption by 12 percent of a standard deviation and reduces growth by 0.33 percentage points. Our paper highlights a new channel through which inflation reduces investment and growth, thus bridging the perception gap over the costs of inflation between economists and the public. We also find evidence that political competition reduces corruption and that corruption is pro-cyclical. [source] Corruption, Income Distribution, and GrowthECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2000Hongyi Li This paper uses an encompassing framework developed by Murphy et al. (1991, 1993) to study corruption and how it affects income distribution and growth. We find that (1) corruption affects income distribution in an inverted U-shaped way, (2) corruption alone also explains a large proportion of the Gini differential across developing and industrial countries, and (3) after correcting for measurement errors, corruption seems to retard economic growth. But the effect is far less pronounced than the one found in Mauro (1995). Moreover, corruption alone explains little of the continental growth differentials. In countries where the asset distribution is less equal, corruption is associated with a smaller increase in income inequality and a larger drop in growth rates. [source] Corruption and Entrepreneurship: How Formal and Informal Institutions Shape Small Firm Behavior in Transition and Mature Market EconomiesENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 5 2010Vartuhí Tonoyan This article explores the determinants of corruption in transition economies of the post-Soviet Union, Central-Eastern Europe, and Western industrialized states. We look in-depth at the East,West gap in corruption, and why entrepreneurs and small business owners become engaged in corrupt deals. Part of the answers lie in the country-specific formal and informal institutional make-up. The likelihood of engaging in corruption is influenced by the lower efficiency of financial and legal institutions and the lack of their enforcements. Also, viewing illegal business activities as a widespread business practice provides the rationale for entrepreneurs to justify their own corrupt activities. Moreover, closed social networks with family, friends, and national bureaucrats reduce the opportunism of the contracting party of the corrupt deal, thus providing breeding grounds for corruption. [source] Corruption and environmental policies: what are the implications for the enlarged EU?ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2006Lorenzo Pellegrini Abstract The paper discusses the prescription of EU environmental regulations for new member states. It has been argued that these countries should be allowed looser directives as a way to take into consideration their lower income levels and correspondingly different priorities. The paper estimates the determinants of environmental policies' stringency. We find that corruption levels are the most important factor in explaining the variance in environmental policies in the enlarged EU. Most notably, differences in corruption levels across countries appear to be more important than income differences. Thus, it is argued, lower environmental standards in new member states are not necessarily implied by lower income levels, but they are more likely to reflect low institutional quality. We argue that harmonization of environmental policies at the EU level can be a way to tackle this problem, and we provide a further rationale for new members states to adjust to existing EU environmental directives. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Corruption and Anti-Money-Laundering Systems: Putting a Luxury Good to WorkGOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2009J.C. SHARMAN Systems of laws, regulations, and institutions developed to counter money laundering provide powerful tools for fighting corruption. Currently, however, the potential benefits anti-money-laundering (AML) systems can provide in fighting corruption go largely unrealized, especially in developing countries. This mismatch poses a puzzle: Why are developing countries failing to best capitalize on their expensive AML systems by using them to fight corruption? The article is built on three core claims. The first claim is that it is logical to use AML systems for anti-corruption purposes because of a pronounced overlap in the standards required for each and the rising costs of the former. The second section demonstrates specifically how AML systems could significantly augment anti-corruption efforts, focusing on the importance of financial intelligence, asset confiscation, and international cooperation. Finally, although powerful outsiders have successfully diffused AML systems among developing countries, a lack of "ownership" in the latter explains why these systems are often established only as tokens to enhance international legitimacy and reputations. [source] "Grabbing Hand" or "Helping Hand"?: Corruption and the Economic Role of the StateGOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2007JONATHAN HOPKIN This article seeks to disentangle which features of government intervention are linked to corruption and which are not, by distinguishing between the government roles of regulator, entrepreneur, and consumer. It finds that the degree of regulation of private business activity is the strongest predictor of corruption, and that high levels of public spending are related to low levels of corruption. There is no evidence of direct government involvement in production having any bearing on corruption. It is concluded that advanced welfare capitalist systems, which leave business relatively free from interference while intervening strongly in the distribution of wealth and the provision of key services, combine the most "virtuous" features of "big" and "small" government. This suggests that anti-corruption campaigners should be relaxed about state intervention in the economy in general, but should specifically target corruption-inducing regulatory systems. [source] Corruption in Africa , Part 1HISTORY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 5 2009John Mukum Mbaku As Africans struggled against colonial exploitation, there was near universal agreement among the freedom fighters and other nationalists that one of the most important determinants of poverty in the colonies was the control of the instruments of economic and political governance by foreign interlopers, all of whose objectives were in conflict with those of the Africans. Colonial institutional arrangements were primarily instruments for the exploitation of Africans and their resources. Europeans came to Africa to maximize metropolitan objectives and hence, established within each colony, institutional arrangements that enhanced their ability to exploit Africans and their resources for the benefit of the metropolitan economies. With their comparative advantage in the employment of military and police force, the Europeans were able to impose on the African colonies laws and institutions that enhanced their objectives but significantly impoverished Africans. Hence, independence was considered critical not only to the elimination of the psychological effects of foreign occupation but also to the empowerment of Africans and the enhancement of their ability to take full control of their governance systems. First, independence was expected to expel the European interlopers from the continent and allow the in-coming African leaders to rid their societies of the exploitative, despotic and non-democratic institutions that had been brought to the colonies by the Europeans. In the post-independence period, Africans were expected to have full control of their own destiny, allocate their own resources, and generally take responsibility for the design and implementation of policies affecting their own welfare. Second, the new leaders were then expected to engage all relevant stakeholder groups in each country in democratic constitution making to develop and adopt locally focused, participatory, inclusive and politically and economically relevant institutional arrangements. Finally, Africa's post-independence leaders were expected to use public policy as an instrument for the effective eradication of mass poverty and deprivation. [source] State, Corruption, and Criminalisation in ChinaINTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL, Issue 169 2001Guilhem Fabre Given the decentralisation and opening-up that China has been experiencing since 1979, the rise of corruption and the criminal economy can be attributed to the increased opportunities observable at macro-economic level and a context of relative impunity for the most serious offences. Functionalist and culturalist interpretations of this corruption fail to take account of its political dimension, which is not simply a matter of its instrumentalisation in the struggle between ruling factions. Contrary to the situation prevailing in certain democratic developing countries, criminals in China do not have the option of becoming state representatives, but certain state representatives, notably at local level, are well placed to make choices to the advantage of criminal circles, as happens in Mexico, and so share in the illicit gains. [source] Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and TradeINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2000Wayne Sandholtz Though corruption poses fundamental challenges to both democratic governance and market economies, political science research has only recently begun to address corruption in a comparative context. In this article we explain variation in the perceived level of corruption (defined as the misuse of public office for private gain) across fifty countries. We propose a set of hypotheses that explain variation in corruption levels in terms of domestic political-economic structure, democratic norms, integration into the international economy, and Protestant religious affiliation. Levels of corruption, we propose, are higher: (1) the lower the average income level, (2) the greater the extent of state control of the economy, (3) the weaker are democratic norms and institutions, (4) the lower the degree of integration in the world economy, and (5) the lower the share of the population with Protestant religious affiliation. The data analysis broadly confirms our predictions: in the multivariate regression, each of the independent variables is significant in the direction we expect. [source] Corruption, Culture and Transferability: What Can Be Learned From Australia?JOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2001Peter Larmour The Asian financial crisis is often blamed on ,corruption'. International banks and aid donors now promote technical assistance and training in corruption prevention, referring to the international best practice of Independent Commissions Against Corruption in Hong Kong or Sydney. However, it is often also argued that what counts as corruption is culturally specific, and that the incidence of petty corruption is related to low salaries. So lessons drawn from corruption prevention in Australia, for example, may not be transferable to other countries with different cultures and levels of income. This paper reflects on the experience of designing and teaching a course on corruption prevention for officials from developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It considers what counts as ,corruption', identifies different approaches towards prevention, and draws some conclusions about the transferability of Australian expertise. [source] Controlling Corruption in Hong Kong: From Colony to Special Administrative RegionJOURNAL OF CONTINGENCIES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2001Jack M. K. Lo Corruption has been a perennial problem in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong of the post-war years represented what appeared to have become an intractable case of a society in which corruption was entrenched as part of political, economic and social life. This paper seeks to delineate the experience of Hong Kong's fight against corruption in the midst of a rapidly changing political and social environment. After describing the context in which the Hong Kong anti-corruption programme is set, this paper identifies the critical policy decisions that account for the programme's success and the lessons Hong Kong has learned from the campaign. It ends by highlighting some of the current issues and problems that arise from the changing circumstances of Hong Kong's development. [source] Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in ProcurementJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2006Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt, that is, willing to "sell" his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent's incentives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding conveys value to the agent's decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed. [source] Corruption, Politics, and Societal Values in TanzaniaJOURNAL OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2000Bruce Heilman [source] Textual Corruption in the Civil Rights CasesJOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY, Issue 2 2009GEORGE RUTHERGLEN The Civil Rights Cases1 do not quite rival Plessy v. Ferguson2 for notoriety as the decision that most clearly confirmed the failure of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow. Yet the Civil Rights Cases did far more than Plessy to limit federal power to address the continuing consequences of slavery. They declared unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875 insofar as it prohibited discrimination in public accommodations operated by private parties. Congress passed that act under its powers to enforce the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, but the Court held the act unconstitutional on the ground that private discrimination was neither a badge or incident of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment nor a manifestation of state action under the Fourteenth. Although the Court's holding under the Thirteenth Amendment was effectively overruled by the Warren Court,3 its holding under the Fourteenth Amendment continues to be influential, supporting a decision of the Rehnquist Court striking down the Violence Against Women Act.4 [source] And the Beat Goes On: Further Evidence on Voting on the Form of County Governance in the Midst of Public CorruptionKYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 1 2009Gökhan R. Karahan SUMMARY ,Operation Pretense,' an FBI sting operation conducted in Mississippi during the 1980s, uncovered widespread corruption among the state's county supervisors. The revelations prompted the Mississippi legislature to authorize including on the November 1988 ballot a measure asking voters whether they favored switching to a more centralized ,unit system' of county governance or instead retaining the decentralized ,beat system' then in place in all but two of the state's 82 counties. We examine voters' decisions to participate in that election, in which 47 counties returned majorities for the unit system and 35 counties opted for the status quo. Controlling for participation in the 1988 presidential race and other relevant factors, we find that turnout rates for the beat-unit choice were positively correlated with supervisor corruption. We also find that the corrupt counties' higher voter turnouts were driven mainly by supporters of the corruption-prone beat system. [source] Corruption, Productivity and SocialismKYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 2 2003Geoffrey Wyatt Summary The level of productivity is correlated across countries with measures of (lack of) corruption, but this appears to be due to a common association of these variables with measures of civil infrastructure, here measured by a combination of governance indexes labelled ,rule of law' and ,government effectiveness'. New instruments based on the size- and spatial-distributions of cities within the countries of the world were constructed in order to explore the causal relationships between civil infrastructure and productivity. Civil infrastructure accounts for a substantial fraction of the global variation in output per worker across countries. Within this empirical pattern there is a systematic deviation associated with the current and former socialist states, which have both lower productivity and inferior civil infrastructure than would be predicted for otherwise similar non-socialist states. However, for a given level of the index of civil infrastructure these states are also shown to have a higher level of productivity than otherwise similar non-socialist states. The unconditionally low productivity of socialist states is attributed entirely to the indirectly deleterious effects that socialism had on civil infrastructure, which more than offset its directly positive effect on output. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||