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Corporate World (corporate + world)
Selected AbstractsBusiness Group Affiliation, Firm Governance, and Firm Performance: Evidence from China and IndiaCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2009Deeksha A. Singh ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study seeks to understand how business group affiliation, within firm governance and external governance environment affect firm performance in emerging economies. We examine two aspects of within firm governance , ownership concentration and board independence. Research Findings/Insights: Using archival data on the top 500 Indian and Chinese firms from multiple data sources for 2007, we found that group affiliated firms performed worse than unaffiliated firms, and the negative relationship was stronger in the case of Indian firms than for Chinese firms. We also found that ownership concentration had a positive effect on firm performance, while board independence had a negative effect on firm performance. Further, we found that group affiliation , firm performance relationship in a given country context was moderated by ownership concentration. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study utilizes an integration of agency theory with an institutional perspective, providing a more comprehensive framework to analyze the CG problems, particularly in the emerging economy firms. Empirically, our findings support, as well as contradict, some of the conventional wisdom, and suggest useful avenues for future research. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study shows that reforms in general and CG reforms in particular are effective in emerging economies, which is an encouraging sign for policy makers. However, our research also suggests that it may be time for India and China to stop the encouragement for the empire building through group formation in the corporate world. For practioners, our findings suggest that firms need to balance the need for oversight with the need for advice, while selecting independent directors. [source] Comparing Mutual Fund Governance and Corporate GovernanceCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2006Robert F. Radin Governance of public corporations in the United States has operated under the agency model with regulatory strengthening since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. With this foundation in place, boards are empowered to utilise their power and influence and can effectively monitor the actions of management, intervening where necessary. In effect, the rules of engagement embodied in the structure and the law guide interactions and empowerment. The governance model of the mutual funds industry, representing over 8 trillion dollars, is often viewed as a mirror of the corporate world, but upon closer analysis is found to have significant structural differences that dilute the authority of directors. The two models are compared and analysed with recommendations made to strengthen the oversight of mutual funds. [source] Corporate Governance in Germany: the move to shareholder valueCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2001Florian Schilling The paper offers an inside view of the German corporate governance model, based on interviews with over 100 members of supervisory- (Aufsichtsrat) and executive-boards (Vorstand) of major German corporations. The traditional supervisory board with its large size of 20 members, one half elected by the employees, reflects the strong consensus orientation of the German corporate world. This system worked well in times of long innovation cycles and largely separate, national capital markets. It is coming under increasing pressure to adapt to the demands of a fast changing globalised capital market.Keywords: Corporate governance in Germany, supervisory board, codetermination, board composition, professionalisation of boards [source] The great "say on pay" debateJOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2009LuAnn Bean With the recent political changes, some analysts predict a stronger "say on pay" movement in the corporate world,with shareholders demanding the right for a nonbinding vote on the CEO's compensation. But what's really likely to happen? And what should you do right now? © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Blogs and Wikis in the corporate worldPROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (ELECTRONIC), Issue 1 2007Christina K. Pikas Moderator This session will explore the various ways companies can and should use these collaborative tools. [source] | ||||||||||