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Corporate Transparency (corporate + transparency)
Selected AbstractsThe Change in Corporate Transparency of Korean Firms After the Asian Financial Crisis: an analysis using analysts' forecast dataCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007Jinho Chang Using analysts' forecast error and forecast dispersion of firms covered by the I/B/E/S database, this study examines the change in information asymmetry of Korean firms around the financial crisis of 1997. Results show that the information asymmetry of Korean firms is lower after the financial crisis than before, implying that corporate transparency did, in effect, improve with the change in business environment. In addition, this study finds that chaebol firms have higher information asymmetry than non-chaebol firm, and also that the corporate transparency improvement of chaebol firms is not higher than that of non-chaebol firms in the post-crisis period despite the reforms particularly targeted to chaebol firms after the financial crisis. [source] Does Corporate Transparency Contribute to Efficient Resource Allocation?JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2009JERE R. FRANCIS ABSTRACT This paper examines whether a country's corporate transparency environment, which includes the quality of accounting information, contributes to efficient resource allocation. Based on a cross-country study of 37 manufacturing industries in 37 countries, we provide three pieces of related evidence. First, we find the contemporaneous correlations in industry growth rates across country pairs are higher when there is a greater level of corporate transparency in the country pairs, after controlling for country-level economic and financial development. Second, we find the influence of transparency on these correlations is stronger when country pairs are at similar levels of economic development (GDP). Finally, when we control for the level of transparency explained by a country's institutions in place, we find that residual transparency (unexplained by country-level factors) is associated with industry-specific growth rates. Taken together, the results are consistent with corporate transparency facilitating the allocation of resources across industry sectors. [source] The Change in Corporate Transparency of Korean Firms After the Asian Financial Crisis: an analysis using analysts' forecast dataCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007Jinho Chang Using analysts' forecast error and forecast dispersion of firms covered by the I/B/E/S database, this study examines the change in information asymmetry of Korean firms around the financial crisis of 1997. Results show that the information asymmetry of Korean firms is lower after the financial crisis than before, implying that corporate transparency did, in effect, improve with the change in business environment. In addition, this study finds that chaebol firms have higher information asymmetry than non-chaebol firm, and also that the corporate transparency improvement of chaebol firms is not higher than that of non-chaebol firms in the post-crisis period despite the reforms particularly targeted to chaebol firms after the financial crisis. [source] Revisiting the corroboration effects of earnings and dividend announcementsACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2006Louis T. W. Cheng D82; G14; M41 Abstract Using a unique market setting in Hong Kong, where (i) all firms release earnings and dividend information in the same announcement; (ii) corporate transparency is low; (iii) dividend income is non-taxable and (iv) corporate ownership is highly concentrated, we re-examine the corroboration effects of earnings and dividends. We use the control firm approach to avoid the return estimation bias resulting from observation clustering. We also add in variables and use econometric procedure to control for the potential impacts of earnings management, special dividends and heteroskedasticity. Our findings show that there exists a corroboration effect between the jointly announced signals. [source] Does Corporate Transparency Contribute to Efficient Resource Allocation?JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2009JERE R. FRANCIS ABSTRACT This paper examines whether a country's corporate transparency environment, which includes the quality of accounting information, contributes to efficient resource allocation. Based on a cross-country study of 37 manufacturing industries in 37 countries, we provide three pieces of related evidence. First, we find the contemporaneous correlations in industry growth rates across country pairs are higher when there is a greater level of corporate transparency in the country pairs, after controlling for country-level economic and financial development. Second, we find the influence of transparency on these correlations is stronger when country pairs are at similar levels of economic development (GDP). Finally, when we control for the level of transparency explained by a country's institutions in place, we find that residual transparency (unexplained by country-level factors) is associated with industry-specific growth rates. Taken together, the results are consistent with corporate transparency facilitating the allocation of resources across industry sectors. [source] Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to CrisisJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2008E. Han Kim In the last months of 1997, the value of the Korean currency lost over half its value against the dollar, and the ruling party was swept from power in presidential elections. One of the fundamental causes of this national economic crisis was the widespread failure of Korean companies to earn their cost of capital, which contributed to massive shareholder losses and calls for corporate governance reform. Among the worst performers, and hence the main targets of governance reform, were family-controlled Korean business groups known as chaebol. Besides pursuing growth and size at the expense of value, such groups were notorious for expropriating minority shareholders through "tunneling" activities and other means. The reform measures introduced by the new administration were a mix of market-based solutions and government intervention. The government-engineered, large-scale swaps of business units among the largest chaebol,the so-called "big deals" that were designed to force each of the groups to identify and specialize in a core business,turned out to be failures, with serious unwanted side effects. At the same time, however, new laws and regulations designed to increase corporate transparency, oversight, and accountability have had clearly positive effects on Korean governance. Thanks to reductions in barriers to foreign ownership of Korean companies, such ownership had risen to about 37% at the end of 2006, up from just 13% ten years earlier. And in addition to the growing pressure for better governance from foreign investors, several newly formed Korean NGOs have pushed for increased transparency and accountability, particularly among the largest chaebol. The best governance practices in Korea today can be seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The improvements in governance achieved by such companies,notably, fuller disclosure, better alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, and more effective oversight by boards,have enabled many of them to meet the global standard. And the governance policies and procedures of POSCO, the first Korean company to list on the New York Stock Exchange,as well as the recent recipient of a large equity investment by Warren Buffett,are held up as a model of best practice. At the other end of the Korean governance spectrum, however, there continue to be many large chaebol-affiliated or family-run companies that have resisted such reforms. And aided by the popular resistance to globalization, the lobbying efforts of such firms have succeeded not only in reducing the momentum of the Korean governance reform movement, but in reversing some of the previous gains. Most disturbing is the current push to allow American style anti-takeover devices, which, if successful, would weaken the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control. [source] A Study of Corporate Disclosure Practice and Effectiveness in Hong KongJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1 2001Simon S. M. Ho The recent economic turmoil in Asia has led to a wider recognition of the importance of corporate transparency and disclosures in financial dealings. The objective of this study is to provide comprehensive and up-to-date evidence of current practice and perceived effectiveness of corporate disclosure of listed companies in an emerging economy,Hong Kong. The study compares the perceptions of chief financial officers (CFOs) and financial analysts about a variety of information flow, disclosure and capital market efficiency issues. It also seeks to determine whether there is a perceived need for increased financial reporting regulations and to what extent this and other alternative means might improve market functioning. While both subject groups believed that a majority of firms only adopt a conservative one-way disclosure strategy and the existence of a communication gap, analysts perceived a much higher need than CFOs for increased financial reporting regulations. Neither group thought that enhancing disclosure requirements alone would suffice to close this gap. Instead, they suggested an improvement in the quality of the communication and disclosure processes through means such as choosing more appropriate communication media, formulating a more proactive disclosure strategy, enhancing investor relationship, and voluntarily reporting more information desired by users. [source] Customers' values, beliefs on sustainable corporate performance, and buying behaviorPSYCHOLOGY & MARKETING, Issue 6 2007Christy M. Collins Sustainable corporate performance (SCP) requires balancing a corporation's economic, social, and environmental performance. This research explores values, beliefs about the importance of SCP, and buying behaviors of supermarket customers from within a stakeholder framework. Beliefs about the importance of SCP (both social and environmental, but not economic) were found to be related to values. Also, it was found that customers' environmentally responsible buying behaviors were related to their beliefs about the importance of environmental SCP. However their socially responsible buying was not related to their beliefs about the importance of social SCP. Responsible buying behavior may be facilitated by providing reliable information about environmental and social aspects of products. Marketing professionals have a central role to play in moving towards a greater level of corporate transparency and sustainability. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Transparency and International Portfolio HoldingsTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2005R. GASTON GELOS ABSTRACT Does country transparency affect international portfolio investment? We examine this question by constructing new measures of transparency and by making use of a unique microdata set on portfolio holdings of emerging market funds around the world. We distinguish between government and corporate transparency. There is clear evidence that funds systematically invest less in less transparent countries. Moreover, funds have a greater propensity to exit nontransparent countries during crises. [source] |