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Corporate Management (corporate + management)
Selected AbstractsThe network of global corporations and elite policy groups: a structure for transnational capitalist class formation?GLOBAL NETWORKS, Issue 1 2003William K. Carroll This study situates five top transnational policy,planning groups within the larger structure of corporate power that is constituted through interlocking directorates among the world's largest companies. Each group makes a distinct contribution towards transnational capitalist hegemony both by building consensus within the global corporate elite and by educating publics and states on the virtues of one or another variant of the neo,liberal paradigm. Analysis of corporate,policy interlocks reveals that a few dozen cosmopolitans , primarily men based in Europe and North America and actively engaged in corporate management , knit the network together via participation in transnational interlocking and/or multiple policy groups. As a structure underwriting transnational business activism, the network is highly centralized, yet from its core it extends unevenly to corporations and individuals positioned on its fringes. The policy groups pull the directorates of the world's major corporations together, and collaterally integrate the lifeworld of the global corporate elite, but they do so selectively, reproducing regional differences in participation. These findings support the claim that a well,integrated global corporate elite has formed, and that global policy groups have contributed to its formation. Whether this elite confirms the arrival of a transnational capitalist class is a matter partly of semantics and partly of substance. [source] Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 1 2003Robert A. Kagan How and to what extent does regulation matter in shaping corporate behavior? How important is it compared to other incentives and mechanisms of social control, and how does it interact with those mechanisms? How might we explain variation in corporate responses to law and other external pressures? This article addresses these questions through an study of environmental performance in 14 pulp and paper manufacturing mills in Australia, New Zealand, British Columbia, and the states of Washington and Georgia in the United States. Over the last three decades, we find tightening regulatory requirements and intensifying political pressures have brought about large improvements and considerable convergence in environmental performance by pulp manufacturers, most of which have gone "beyond compliance" in several ways. But regulation does not account for remaining differences in environmental performance across facilities. Rather, "social license" pressures (particularly from local communities and environmental activists) and corporate environmental management style prod some firms toward better performance compliance than others. At the same time, economic pressures impose limits on "beyond performance" investments. In producing large gains in environmental performance, however, regulation still matters greatly, but less as a system of hierarchically imposed, uniformly enforced rules than as a coordinative mechanism, routinely interacting with market pressures, local and national environmental activists, and the culture of corporate management in generating environmental improvement while narrowing the spread between corporate leaders and laggards. [source] Incentive schemes for executive officers when forecasts matterMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 5 2010Joaquim Vergés This paper develops a new perspective on results-based incentive schemes for non-CEO managers. It shows that it is possible to establish incentive schemes that take into account both the actual output obtained and the forecast figure previously established as a target, without the negative consequences derived from the perverse loop of hiding-ratchet effects. A general linear two-staged scheme is proposed. In addition, relevant properties of this incentive system are stated that show how principals (corporate management) may determine the expected forecasting behavior of agents (executive officers) by suitably choosing the scheme parameters according to a simple set of rules. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Real estate and corporate valuation: an asset pricing perspectiveMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 7 2001Liow Kim Hiang Property is a significant asset in the balance sheets of some Singapore industrial/commerce firms and hotel corporations. In this research, we take on the task of examining the relationship between real estate and stock market valuation of these business firms from an asset pricing perspective. Specifically, the real estate sensitivity of ,property-intensive', non-real estate stocks is investigated in both a three-index (market, sector and property) of stock returns and in an arbitrage pricing theory (APT) framework. The APT model is further recast as a multivariate non-linear regression model with across-equation restrictions. Using weekly returns on ,property-intensive' stocks in the period 1989,1998 and three shorter-sample periods, iterated non-linear seemingly regression techniques (ITNSUR) are employed to obtain joint estimates of stock sensitivities and their associated APT risk ,prices'. The ,real estate' sensitivity is found to be systematic and priced in the APT sense of corporations being paid an ex ante premium for bearing property market risk in investing and owning properties in two of the three sample periods (1989,1991, 1992,1994). The empirical results provide some support that property is a factor in corporate valuation, and is broadly consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. The implications for portfolio and corporate management are examined. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] A cross-national study of corporate governance and employment contractsBUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 3 2008Roberto García-Castro Corporate governance (CG) can be seen to operate through a ,double agency' relationship: one between the shareholders and corporate management, and another between the corporate management and the firm's employees. The CG and labour management of firms are closely related. A particularly productive way to study how CG affects and is affected by the employment relationship has been to compare CG across countries. The contributions of this paper to that literature are threefold. (1) An integration of aspects of the labour management literature in the CG debate. (2) Based on a sample of about 1000 firms from 31 countries, we find evidence of complementarities between the CG and the labour management of firms. Extreme cases, in general, outperform mixed cases. (3) Firm differences within countries are more important than scholars have assumed so far. We present the results of the study and implications for future research and for practice. [source] Trust, reputation and corporate accountability to stakeholdersBUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 1 2001Tracey Swift This paper explores the relationship between accountability, trust and corporate reputation building. Increasing numbers of corporations are mobilising themselves to put more and more information out into the public domain as a way of communicating with stakeholders. Corporate social accounting and stakeholder engagement is happening on an unprecedented scale. Rather than welcoming such initiatives, academics have been quick to pick faults with contemporary social auditing and reporting, claiming that in its current form it is not about demonstrating accountability at all, but rather about building corporate reputation. Academics argue that ,accountability should hurt', that if accountability is an enjoyable process, then the organisation isn't doing it right. For organisations that are currently engaging with stakeholders and ostensibly becoming more transparent about their corporate social performance, this kind of critique is likely to be bewildering. This paper argues that central to the notion of accountability and to contemporary social accounting practice is the concept of trust. Accountability is based upon a distrust of corporate management, whereas corporate reputation building is about strategically seeking to establish trust in stakeholder relationships in order to negate formal accountability requirements. Using a split trust continuum, the paper seeks to explain and synthesise what seem to be two very different paradigms of organisational transparency. [source] Redesigning Corporate Governance Structures and Systems for the Twenty First CenturyCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2001Robert A.G. Monks How a corporation is governed has become in recent years an increasingly important element in how it is valued by the market place. McKinsey & Company in June 2000 published the results of an Investor Opinion Survey of attitudes about the corporate governance of portfolio companies. The survey gathered responses about investment intentions from over 200 institutions who together manage approximately $3.25 trillion in assets. Ranging from 17 per cent in the US and Britain to over 27 per cent in Venezuela, investors placed a specific premium on what was called "Board Governance". To put this into perspective, consider how greatly sales would have to increase, expenses be cut and margins improved to achieve a comparable impact on value. "For purposes of the survey, a well governed company is defined as having a majority of outside directors on the board with no management ties; holding formal evaluations of directors; and being responsive to investor requests for information on governance issues. In addition, directors hold significant stockholdings in the company, and a large proportion of directors' pay is in the form of stock options." This correlation of governance with market value by one of the most respected consulting companies in the world creates the foundations of a new language for management accountability. McKinsey has great credibility as a value-adding advisor to corporate managements. Governance is not a cause or a theology for McKinsey; it is an important element in the value of an enterprise. By getting the opinion of what we call Global Investors with portfolios of holdings on every continent, McKinsey has importantly impacted the cost of capital for all corporations henceforth. Admittedly, McKinsey's criteria of "board governance" are blunt. "Every organization attempting to accomplish something has to ask and answer the following question," writes Harvard Business School professor Michael C. Jensen in the introduction to his recent working paper: "What are we trying to accomplish? Or, put even more simply: When all is said and done, how do we measure better versus worse? Even more simply: How do we keep score... . I say long-term market value to recognize that it is possible for markets not to know the full implications of a firm's policies until they begin to show up.... Value creation does not mean succumbing to the vagaries of the movements in a firm's values from day to day. The market is inevitably ignorant of many of our actions and opportunities, at least in the short run...". Surprisingly little attention is paid to what we all intuitively know, that talented people are not entirely motivated by financial compensation. Directors therefore must pay special attention to creating an appropriate environment for stimulating optimum management performance. [source] Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with InvestorsJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2010John Martin A small group of academics and practitioners discusses four major controversies in the theory and practice of corporate finance: ,What is the social purpose of the public corporation? Should corporate managements aim to maximize the profitability and value of their companies, or should they instead try to balance the interests of their shareholders against those of "stakeholder" groups, such as employees, customers, and local communities? ,Should corporate executives consider ending the common practice of earnings guidance? Are there other ways of shifting the focus of the public dialogue between management and investors away from near-term earnings and toward longer-run corporate strategies, policies, and goals? And can companies influence the kinds of investors who buy their shares? ,Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? What role have equity ownership and financial incentives played in the past performance of U.S. companies? And are there ways of improving the design of U.S. executive pay? ,Can the principles of corporate governance and financial management at the core of the private equity model,notably, equity incentives, high leverage, and active participation by large investors,be used to increase the values of U.S. public companies? [source] | ||||||||||