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Corporate Disclosure (corporate + disclosure)
Selected AbstractsThe Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards Board after the Implementation of CLERP 9AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 42 2007CHRISTINE JUBS This paper traces the establishment of the reconstituted Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) as a result of the CLERP (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004, and its progress in developing auditing standards that are "in the public interest". The paper canvasses the composition of the AUASB, its transparency and due process, its relationship with the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board and the Financial Reporting Council, and its resourcing and attitude to researching issues of importance in auditing. The paper discusses methods that might be used to provide evidence of the efficacy of the reforms to auditing standard-setting. [source] The Association Between Web-Based Corporate Performance Disclosure and Financial Analyst Behaviour Under Different Governance RegimesCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2007Walter Aerts In this study, we assert and test that the determination of corporate performance communication and financial analysts' earnings forecasting work are closely intertwined processes. The resulting endogeneity in capital markets' information dissemination and use is strongly influenced by a country's governance regime. Results from simultaneous equation regressions show significant interrelationships between financial analysts' activities and corporate disclosure transparency for North American firms. Moreover, analyst following underlies corporate disclosure, which ultimately leads to a reduction in the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts. In contrast, capital markets' information dynamics for continental European firms are much weaker. [source] Impact of earnings performance on price-sensitive disclosures under the Australian continuous disclosure regimeACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2009Grace Chia-Man Hsu M40; M48 Abstract This study examines the relation between accounting earnings and the frequency of price-sensitive corporate disclosure under Australia's statutory continuous disclosure requirements. Despite low litigation threats and excepting loss-making firms, results show that firms with earnings declines (bad news) are more likely to make continuous disclosure than firms with earnings increases (good news). This suggests that market forces and regulators' scrutiny are sufficient to induce a ,bad news' disclosure bias. This study also examines the ,materiality' requirement under the continuous disclosure requirements and finds a positive relation between disclosure frequency and the magnitude of earnings news. The earnings,return correlation is positively associated with disclosure frequency for the financial services industry. [source] Pay Without Performance: Overview of the IssuesJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2005Lucian A. Bebchuk In their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, the authors of this article provided a comprehensive critique of U.S. executive pay practices and the corporate governance processes that produce them, and then offered a number of proposals for improving both pay and governance. This article presents an overview of their analysis and proposals. The authors' analysis suggests that the pay-setting process in U.S. public companies has strayed far from the economist's model of "arm's-length contracting" between executives and boards in a competitive labor market. In place of this conventional model, which is standard in corporate law as well as economics, the authors argue that managerial power and influence play a major role in shaping executive pay, and in ways that end up imposing significant costs on investors and the economy. The main concern is not the levels of executive pay, but rather the distortion of incentives caused by compensation practices that fail to tie pay to performance and to limit executives' ability to sell their shares. Also troubling are "the correlation between power and pay, the systematic use of compensation practices that obscure the amount and performance insensitivity of pay, and the showering of gratuitous benefits on departing executives." To address these problems, the authors propose three kinds of changes: 1)increases in transparency, accomplished in part by new SEC rules requiring annual corporate disclosure that provides "the dollar value of all forms of compensation" (including "stealth compensation" in the form of pensions and other post-retirement benefits) and an analysis of the relationship between the past year's pay and performance, as well as more timely and informative disclosure of insider stock purchases and sales; 2)improvements in pay practices, including greater use of "indexed" stock and options to limit "windfalls," tougher limits on executives' freedom to sell shares, and greater use of "clawback" provisions in bonus plans that would force executives to return pay for performance that proves to be temporary; and 3)improvements in board accountability to shareholders, including limits on the use of staggered boards and granting shareholders the right to nominate directors and propose changes to governance arrangements in the corporate charter. [source] EVIDENCE THAT GREATER DISCLOSURE LOWERS THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITALJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2000Christine A. Botosan The effect of corporate disclosure on the cost of equity capital is a matter of considerable interest and importance to both corporations and the investment community. However, the relationship between disclosure level and cost of capital is not well established and has proved difficult for researchers to quantify. As described in this article, the author's 1997 study (published in The Accounting Review) was the first to measure and detect a direct relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. After examining the annual reports of 122 manufacturing companies, the author concluded that companies providing more extensive disclosure had a lower (forward-looking) cost of equity capital (measured using Value Line forecasts with an EBO valuation formula that derives from the dividend discount model). For companies with extensive analyst coverage, differences in disclosure do not appear to affect cost of capital. But for companies with small analyst followings, differences in disclosure do appear to matter. Among this group of companies, the firms judged to have the highest level of disclosure had a cost of equity capital that was nine-percentage points lower than otherwise similar firms with a minimal level of disclosure. Closer analysis of some of the specific disclosure practices also suggests that, for small firms with limited analyst coverage, there are benefits to providing more forward-looking information, such as forecasts of sales, profits, and capital expenditures, and enhanced disclosure of key non-financial statistics, such as order backlogs, market share, and growth in units sold. In closing, the article also discusses an interesting new study (by Lang and Lundholm) that suggests there is an important distinction between effective corporate disclosure and "hyping the stock." The findings of this study show that while higher levels of disclosures are associated with higher stock prices, sudden increases in the frequency of disclosure are viewed with skepticism. [source] A Study of Corporate Disclosure Practice and Effectiveness in Hong KongJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1 2001Simon S. M. Ho The recent economic turmoil in Asia has led to a wider recognition of the importance of corporate transparency and disclosures in financial dealings. The objective of this study is to provide comprehensive and up-to-date evidence of current practice and perceived effectiveness of corporate disclosure of listed companies in an emerging economy,Hong Kong. The study compares the perceptions of chief financial officers (CFOs) and financial analysts about a variety of information flow, disclosure and capital market efficiency issues. It also seeks to determine whether there is a perceived need for increased financial reporting regulations and to what extent this and other alternative means might improve market functioning. While both subject groups believed that a majority of firms only adopt a conservative one-way disclosure strategy and the existence of a communication gap, analysts perceived a much higher need than CFOs for increased financial reporting regulations. Neither group thought that enhancing disclosure requirements alone would suffice to close this gap. Instead, they suggested an improvement in the quality of the communication and disclosure processes through means such as choosing more appropriate communication media, formulating a more proactive disclosure strategy, enhancing investor relationship, and voluntarily reporting more information desired by users. [source] Social Networks and Corporate GovernanceEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2008Avanidhar Subrahmanyam G30; G34 Abstract We analyse frameworks that link corporate governance and firm values to governing boards' social networks and innovations in technology. Because agents create social networks with individuals with whom they share commonalities along the dimensions of social status and income, among other attributes, CEOs may participate in board members' social networks, which interferes with the quality of governance. At the same time, social connections with members of a board can allow for better evaluation of the members' abilities. Thus, in choosing whether to have board members with social ties to management, one must trade off the benefit of members successfully identifying high ability CEOs against the cost of inadequate monitoring due to social connections. Further, technologies like the Internet and electronic mail that reduce the extent of face-to-face networking cause agents to seek satisfaction of their social needs at the workplace, which exacerbates the impact of social networks on governance. The predictions of our model are consistent with recent episodes that appear to signify inadequate monitoring of corporate disclosures as well as with high levels of executive compensation. Additionally, empirical tests support the model's key implication that there is better governance and lower executive compensation in firms where networks are less likely to form. [source] Environmental reporting in Australia: current practices and issues for the futureBUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Issue 6 2002Dr. Roger L. Burritt This briefing addresses a number of current practices in environmental reporting in Australia. It is limited to consideration of mandatory and voluntary initiatives at the national level (rather than state or territory levels). Three initiatives are explored. Two of these are mandatory requirements,section 299 corporate disclosures required under the 2001 Corporations Act and section 516 disclosures by Commonwealth government organizations under the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. One other initiative is voluntary,Public Environmental Reporting,and is aimed at all organizations. Links with the Global Reporting Initiative are considered, followed by a brief comment on incentives and users of environmental reports. The briefing concludes by raising three issues that need to be addressed in the future,sustainable development; education, training and communication; and environmental accounting. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||