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Coordination Problems (coordination + problem)
Selected AbstractsContractual agreements for coordination and vendor-managed delivery under explicit transportation considerationsNAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 5 2006egül Toptal Abstract We consider the coordination problem between a vendor and a buyer operating under generalized replenishment costs that include fixed costs as well as stepwise freight costs. We study the stochastic demand, single-period setting where the buyer must decide on the order quantity to satisfy random demand for a single item with a short product life cycle. The full order for the cycle is placed before the cycle begins and no additional orders are accepted by the vendor. Due to the nonrecurring nature of the problem, the vendor's replenishment quantity is determined by the buyer's order quantity. Consequently, by using an appropriate pricing schedule to influence the buyer's ordering behavior, there is an opportunity for the vendor to achieve substantial savings from transportation expenses, which are represented in the generalized replenishment cost function. For the problem of interest, we prove that the vendor's expected profit is not increasing in buyer's order quantity. Therefore, unlike the earlier work in the area, it is not necessarily profitable for the vendor to encourage larger order quantities. Using this nontraditional result, we demonstrate that the concept of economies of scale may or may not work by identifying the cases where the vendor can increase his/her profits either by increasing or decreasing the buyer's order quantity. We prove useful properties of the expected profit functions in the centralized and decentralized models of the problem, and we utilize these properties to develop alternative incentive schemes for win,win solutions. Our analysis allows us to quantify the value of coordination and, hence, to identify additional opportunities for the vendor to improve his/her profits by potentially turning a nonprofitable transaction into a profitable one through the use of an appropriate tariff schedule or a vendor-managed delivery contract. We demonstrate that financial gain associated with these opportunities is truly tangible under a vendor-managed delivery arrangement that potentially improves the centralized solution. Although we take the viewpoint of supply chain coordination and our goal is to provide insights about the effect of transportation considerations on the channel coordination objective and contractual agreements, the paper also contributes to the literature by analyzing and developing efficient approaches for solving the centralized problem with stepwise freight costs in the single-period setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006 [source] Non-inferior Nash strategies for routing control in parallel-link communication networksINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, Issue 4 2005Yong Liu Abstract We consider a routing control problem of two-node parallel-link communication network shared by competitive teams of users. Each team has various types of entities (traffics or jobs) to be routed on the network. The users in each team cooperate for the benefit of their team so as to achieve optimal routing over network links. The teams, on the other hand, compete among themselves for the network resources and each has an objective function that relates to the overall performance of the network. For each team, there is a centralized decision-maker, called the team leader or manager, who coordinates the routing strategies among all entities in his team. A game theoretic approach to deal with both cooperation within each team and competition among the teams, called the Non-inferior Nash strategy, is introduced. Considering the roles of a group manager in this context, the concept of a Non-inferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analysing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the various users. This strategy is applied to derive the optimal routing policies for all users in the network. It is shown that Non-inferior Nash strategies with a team leader is effective in improving the overall network performance. Various types of other strategies such as team optimization and Nash strategies are also discussed for the purpose of comparison. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Application of genetic algorithm for scheduling and schedule coordination problemsJOURNAL OF ADVANCED TRANSPORTATION, Issue 1 2002Prabhat Shrivastava The problems on scheduling and schedule co-ordination usually have conflicting objectives related to user's cost and operator's cost. Users want to spend less time to wait, transfer and travel by public buses. Operators are interested in profit making by lesser vehicle operating cost and having a minimum number of buses. As far as level of service is concerned users are interested in lesser crowing while operators are concerned with maximizing profit and thus to have higher load factors. In schedule co-ordination problems transfer time plays an important role. Users are interested in coordinating services with in acceptable waiting time whereas operators prefer to have lesser services and want to meet higher demands, which invariably increases waiting time. These problems have multiple conflicting objectives and constraints. It is difficult to determine optimum solution for such problems with the help of conventional approaches. It is found that Genetic Algorithm performs well for such multi objective problems. [source] Contract Formalization and Governance of Exporter,Importer RelationshipsJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 3 2008Preet S. Aulakh abstract Exporting relationships between manufacturers and foreign importers pose unique coordination problems because, on the one hand, transactions are recurrent and both firms make non-trivial relationship-specific investments, but at the same time, the exchange partners maintain separate legal entities with individual profit claims. This study examines the role of contracts as a governance mechanism in these relationships that are neither market-based discrete transactions, nor can be governed through ownership-based hierarchies. Drawing upon recent research on contract law and interorganizational relationships, we develop and empirically test a model that incorporates both the antecedents and performance implications of the nature of contract governing exporter,importer relationships. [source] Rural market imperfections and the role of institutions in collective action to improve markets for the poorNATURAL RESOURCES FORUM, Issue 1 2008Bekele Shiferaw Abstract Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have liberalized markets to improve efficiency and enhance market linkages for smallholder farmers. The expected positive response by the private sector in areas with limited market infrastructure has however been very limited. The functioning of markets is constrained by high transaction costs and coordination problems along the production-to-consumption value chain. New kinds of institutional arrangements are needed to reduce these costs and fill the vacuum left when governments withdrew from markets in the era of structural adjustments. One of these institutional innovations has been the strengthening of producer organizations and formation of collective marketing groups as instruments to remedy pervasive market failures in rural economies. The analysis presented here with a case study from eastern Kenya has shown that marketing groups pay 20,25% higher prices than other buyers to farmers while participation was also positively correlated with adoption of improved dryland legume varieties, crops not targeted by the formal extension system. However the effectiveness of marketing groups is undermined by external shocks and structural constraints that limit the volume of trade and access to capital and information, and require investments in complementary institutions and coordination mechanisms to exploit scale economies. Successful groups have shown high levels of collective action in the form of increased participatory decision making, member contributions and initial start-up capital. Failure to pay on delivery, resulting from lack of capital credit, is a major constraint that stifles competitiveness of marketing groups relative to other buyers. These findings call for interventions that improve governance and participation; mechanisms for improving access to operating capital; and effective strategies for risk management and enhancing the business skills of farmer marketing groups. [source] Bilateral coordination and motor sequencing in Brazilian children: preliminary construct validity and reliability analysisOCCUPATIONAL THERAPY INTERNATIONAL, Issue 2 2009Ana Amélia Cardoso Abstract This study examined aspects of reliability and validity of the bilateral coordination and motor sequencing items of the Assessment of Motor Coordination and Dexterity (AMCD) for Brazilian children ages 4, 6 and 8 years old. The AMCD aims to identify children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD). A total of 84 children were evaluated. Among the 35 items piloted, all but one presented interrater reliability above 0.80 and 16 (45.7%) items presented intraclass correlation coefficient over 0.60 for test,retest reliability. Most items were sensitive to age difference and only items involving ball handling exhibited significant gender differences. As a result, this section of the AMCD could be reduced to the 20 items that were found to be reliable and more discriminative for age-related differences. This study advances on the development of the AMCD, but a limitation was the noninclusion of children with DCD. Future research should investigate whether the selected items are useful in differentiating the motor skills of children with and without coordination problems. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Leadership based on asymmetric informationTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2010Mana Komai Rational players, unconstrained by contracts or formal authority, choose to follow a better-informed leader, whose action reveals part of her information. If the leader satisfies a credibility condition, then the unique nondegenerate equilibrium solves distinct shirking and coordination problems and achieves the first best. If credibility fails, as is more likely for a large organization, then followers ignore the leader, and equilibria are very inefficient. Appointing multiple leaders, or a high-cost leader, can restore credibility. If players invest privately in information, then a leader often appears endogenously. The equilibrium concept is an original extension of sequential equilibrium to continuous states. [source] | |||||||||||||