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Contractual Agreements (contractual + agreement)
Selected AbstractsContractual agreements for coordination and vendor-managed delivery under explicit transportation considerationsNAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 5 2006egül Toptal Abstract We consider the coordination problem between a vendor and a buyer operating under generalized replenishment costs that include fixed costs as well as stepwise freight costs. We study the stochastic demand, single-period setting where the buyer must decide on the order quantity to satisfy random demand for a single item with a short product life cycle. The full order for the cycle is placed before the cycle begins and no additional orders are accepted by the vendor. Due to the nonrecurring nature of the problem, the vendor's replenishment quantity is determined by the buyer's order quantity. Consequently, by using an appropriate pricing schedule to influence the buyer's ordering behavior, there is an opportunity for the vendor to achieve substantial savings from transportation expenses, which are represented in the generalized replenishment cost function. For the problem of interest, we prove that the vendor's expected profit is not increasing in buyer's order quantity. Therefore, unlike the earlier work in the area, it is not necessarily profitable for the vendor to encourage larger order quantities. Using this nontraditional result, we demonstrate that the concept of economies of scale may or may not work by identifying the cases where the vendor can increase his/her profits either by increasing or decreasing the buyer's order quantity. We prove useful properties of the expected profit functions in the centralized and decentralized models of the problem, and we utilize these properties to develop alternative incentive schemes for win,win solutions. Our analysis allows us to quantify the value of coordination and, hence, to identify additional opportunities for the vendor to improve his/her profits by potentially turning a nonprofitable transaction into a profitable one through the use of an appropriate tariff schedule or a vendor-managed delivery contract. We demonstrate that financial gain associated with these opportunities is truly tangible under a vendor-managed delivery arrangement that potentially improves the centralized solution. Although we take the viewpoint of supply chain coordination and our goal is to provide insights about the effect of transportation considerations on the channel coordination objective and contractual agreements, the paper also contributes to the literature by analyzing and developing efficient approaches for solving the centralized problem with stepwise freight costs in the single-period setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006 [source] Modeling the Korean Chonsei Lease ContractREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2003Brent W. Ambrose Chonsei is a unique Korean lease contract in which the tenant pays an up,front deposit, typically about 40 to 80% of the value of the property, with no requirement for periodic rent payments. At the contract maturation, the landlord then returns the nominal value of the deposit. Since there is no legal obligation on the part of the landlord to deposit the money in an escrow account, the principal default risk associated with the chonsei contract falls on the tenant. We discuss the development and popularity of this contractual agreement in the context of the public policy initiatives, historical and institutional settings surrounding the Korean housing and housing finance market. We develop a contingent,claims model that recognizes the compound options embedded in the chonsei contract. Theoretical predictions are confirmed by an empirical analysis using monthly data from 1986 to 2000. Our analysis shows that the chonsei contract is an indigenous market response to economic conditions prevalent in Korea. [source] Kaiser Permanente Community Partners Project: Improving Geriatric Care Management PracticesJOURNAL OF AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOCIETY, Issue 5 2003Susan M. Enguidanos MPH This article describes a geriatric care management project that is testing whether geriatric care management plus a brief purchase of service (POS) intervention will lower medical costs, improve satisfaction with care, increase care plan adherence, and improve perceived quality of life. Kaiser Permanente members aged 65 and older who were eligible for geriatric care management and consented to participate in the study were randomized to one of four study groups: information and referral via mail, telephone care management, geriatric care management, or geriatric care management with POS capability. The POS intervention provides up to $2,000 of designated, paid services including in-home supportive services, transportation, respite, or medical equipment within the first 6 months of care management enrollment. Approximately 1,400 senior members were referred to the geriatric care management program, and 451 were randomly assigned to one of the four study groups. Those enrolled in the geriatric care management program were significantly more likely to be ethnic minorities and have lower income than the general Kaiser Permanente senior enrollment. Barriers encountered in implementing the POS intervention included establishing contractual agreements between Kaiser Permanente and private and community agencies, locating adequate and sufficient community agencies to provided needed services, monitoring service contracts, and delaying use of the POS benefit. [source] Contractual agreements for coordination and vendor-managed delivery under explicit transportation considerationsNAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 5 2006egül Toptal Abstract We consider the coordination problem between a vendor and a buyer operating under generalized replenishment costs that include fixed costs as well as stepwise freight costs. We study the stochastic demand, single-period setting where the buyer must decide on the order quantity to satisfy random demand for a single item with a short product life cycle. The full order for the cycle is placed before the cycle begins and no additional orders are accepted by the vendor. Due to the nonrecurring nature of the problem, the vendor's replenishment quantity is determined by the buyer's order quantity. Consequently, by using an appropriate pricing schedule to influence the buyer's ordering behavior, there is an opportunity for the vendor to achieve substantial savings from transportation expenses, which are represented in the generalized replenishment cost function. For the problem of interest, we prove that the vendor's expected profit is not increasing in buyer's order quantity. Therefore, unlike the earlier work in the area, it is not necessarily profitable for the vendor to encourage larger order quantities. Using this nontraditional result, we demonstrate that the concept of economies of scale may or may not work by identifying the cases where the vendor can increase his/her profits either by increasing or decreasing the buyer's order quantity. We prove useful properties of the expected profit functions in the centralized and decentralized models of the problem, and we utilize these properties to develop alternative incentive schemes for win,win solutions. Our analysis allows us to quantify the value of coordination and, hence, to identify additional opportunities for the vendor to improve his/her profits by potentially turning a nonprofitable transaction into a profitable one through the use of an appropriate tariff schedule or a vendor-managed delivery contract. We demonstrate that financial gain associated with these opportunities is truly tangible under a vendor-managed delivery arrangement that potentially improves the centralized solution. Although we take the viewpoint of supply chain coordination and our goal is to provide insights about the effect of transportation considerations on the channel coordination objective and contractual agreements, the paper also contributes to the literature by analyzing and developing efficient approaches for solving the centralized problem with stepwise freight costs in the single-period setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006 [source] Evidence that the terms of petroleum contracts influence the rate of development of oil fieldsOPEC ENERGY REVIEW, Issue 1 2002Mustafa Bakar Mahmud This paper presents evidence that the main determinant of the rate of development of Libya's crude oil upstream activities, from 1961 to 1999, was the terms of the petroleum contractual agreements, which existed between the state and the international oil industry during that period, and that US sanctions against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya failed to affect this rate of development. In keeping with other Members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Libya has, over three decades, been a key player in helping to regulate global production levels of oil and gas. However, the economic and political strengths and weaknesses of individual Members of OPEC vary widely and it is inevitable that the stresses arising from adherence to OPEC policies will vary proportionately to these strengths and weaknesses. It is instructive, therefore, to analyse how successfully Libya has exploited its own petroleum resources. The results are thought-provoking and send signals to the superpowers of the futility of economic sanctions against countries whose political policies they find distasteful. Further, the analysis highlights the need for OPEC Members to be fully informed of the significance of the terms of the petroleum agreements they employ in their countries. [source] |