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Contracting Parties (contracting + party)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting42%
Law and Criminology28%
Humanities and Social Sciences28%

Selected Abstracts

Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Parties

AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Issue 2 2009
Sandra K. Miller
First page of article [source]

Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2004
Martin Brown
We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are initiated with private offers and the parties share the gains from trade equally. Low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship, wielding a powerful effect on contract enforcement. Successful long-term relations exhibit generous rent sharing and high effort (quality) from the very beginning of the relationship. In the absence of third-party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. If contracts are third party enforceable, rent sharing and long-term relations are absent and the vast majority of trades are initiated with public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. [source]

The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2002
Ilya Segal
The paper studies the implementation problem, first analyzed by Maskin and Moore (1999), in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism. We develop a first-order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem, paralleling Mirrlees's (1971) first-order analysis of standard mechanism design problems. We use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold-up and risk-sharing models. In particular, we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts, such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts (where only one agent sends a message). [source]

Multi-national corporations and agricultural development: a study of contract farming in the Indian Punjab

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 2 2002
Sukhpal Singh
This paper examines the rationale, practice and implications of contract farming under the MNCs in vegetable crops in the Indian Punjab from the new institutional economics perspective. It is found that the MNCs deal with relatively large producers, their contracts are biased against the farmer, and the contract crops perpetuate many of the existing problems of the farming sector like high chemical input intensity, unstable future incomes, and social differentiation, though contracting has led to higher farm incomes and labour employment, especially for women. There is an inherent contradiction in the objectives of the contracting parties and that of the local economy and suitable institutions and organisations are not present in the state. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

The basis of the remoteness rule in contract

LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2008
Andrew Robertson
There is increasing support in the contract literature for the view that the remoteness rule is essentially concerned with identifying an implicit allocation of risk made by the contracting parties. This paper argues that the remoteness doctrine is more accurately seen as a method by which the courts allocate risks which the contracting parties have failed to allocate, rather than an interpretative rule. Through analysis of the principles and their application in the recent case-law in England, Canada and Australia, the paper shows that the identification of an implicit allocation of risk does not and cannot determine remoteness cases in contract. The justice of the remoteness rule is not based on the notion that the defendant undertook responsibility for the risk in question, but on a concern that the defendant should have a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks that might arise from breach and take action to avoid them. [source]

THE KANTIAN ARGUMENT FOR CONSEQUENTIALISM

RATIO, Issue 1 2009
Michael Otsuka
A critical examination of Parfit's attempt to reconcile Kantian contractualism with consequentialism, which disputes his contention that the contracting parties would lack decisive reasons to choose principles that ground prohibitions against harming of the sort to which non-consequentialists have been attracted.1 [source]

Corruption and Entrepreneurship: How Formal and Informal Institutions Shape Small Firm Behavior in Transition and Mature Market Economies

ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 5 2010
Vartuhí Tonoyan
This article explores the determinants of corruption in transition economies of the post-Soviet Union, Central-Eastern Europe, and Western industrialized states. We look in-depth at the East,West gap in corruption, and why entrepreneurs and small business owners become engaged in corrupt deals. Part of the answers lie in the country-specific formal and informal institutional make-up. The likelihood of engaging in corruption is influenced by the lower efficiency of financial and legal institutions and the lack of their enforcements. Also, viewing illegal business activities as a widespread business practice provides the rationale for entrepreneurs to justify their own corrupt activities. Moreover, closed social networks with family, friends, and national bureaucrats reduce the opportunism of the contracting party of the corrupt deal, thus providing breeding grounds for corruption. [source]