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Contracting Costs (contracting + cost)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

The Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure: Evidence from France, Germany and the UK

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2006
Antonios Antoniou
G20; G32 Abstract We examine the determinants of the debt maturity structure of French, German and British firms. These countries represent different financial and legal traditions that may have implications on corporate debt maturity structure. Our model incorporates the factors representing three major theories (tax considerations, liquidity and signalling, and contracting costs) of debt maturity. It also controls for capital market conditions. The results confirm the applicability of most theories of debt maturity structure for the UK firms. However, the evidence from France and Germany are mixed. Overall the findings suggest that the debt maturity structure of a firm is determined by firm-specific factors and the country's financial systems and institutional traditions in which it operates. [source]

Goodwill impairment as a reflection of investment opportunities

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2009
Jayne M. Godfrey
M41; C21; D23 Abstract We exploit a unique opportunity to examine whether goodwill impairment write-offs reflect firms' investment opportunities during the first years of the US goodwill impairment accounting regime. We find that impairment write-offs are negatively associated with firms' underlying investment opportunities. We also find associations between goodwill impairment write-offs and traditionally applied leverage, firm size and return on assets variables, although the leverage and firm size results are less robust. The results support the International Accounting Standards Board and Financial Accounting Standards Board contention that an impairment test regime can reflect firms' underlying economic attributes, while simultaneously indicating that managers use discretion to reduce contracting costs. [source]

WHY MOST FIRMS CHOOSE LINEAR HEDGING STRATEGIES

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2009
Dennis Frestad
Abstract I investigate the efficiency of alternative hedging strategies of nonfinancial firms facing hedgeable price risk, unhedgeable quantity risk, and financial contracting costs in low-profit events. The analysis suggests that variance-minimizing hedging strategies are very close in economic terms to optimal, value-maximizing hedging strategies for most firms. Furthermore, the marginal gains from shifting to nonlinear hedging strategies are often small enough to be neglected. These results illuminate some puzzling findings in survey studies of firms' hedging practices and suggest an alternative view on firms' selective hedging practices termed "cautious selective hedging." [source]

Public-private partnerships in Canada: Theory and evidence

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 1 2008
Aidan R. Vining
It focuses primarily on infrastructure projects and addresses three questions: 1) What goals do governments expect to achieve through P3s? 2) How effective are P3s likely to be at delivering value to governments and citizens? 3) What lessons can be derived from the use of P3s? The article reviews the government's intended social goals for P3s and evaluates how effective P3s have been in fulfilling them. It then formulates a more comprehensive framework and outlines a "positive theory" perspective of P3s that takes into account the divergent goals of the partners , profit maximization goals of private-sector participants and the political goals of the public sector. The article evaluates and summarizes the findings and implications of ten Canadian P3s. The appropriate test of success, from a social (normative) perspective, is whether P3s have lower total social costs, including production costs and all of the transaction costs and externalities associated with the project. The ten case studies indicate that the potential benefits of P3s are often outweighed by high contracting costs due to opportunism generated by goal conflict. These costs are particularly high when construction or operating complexity is high, revenue uncertainty (use-risk) is high, both of these risks have been transferred to the private-sector partner, and contract management effectiveness is poor. In infrastructure projects, it rarely makes sense to try to transfer large amounts of risk to the private sector. Sommaire: Le présent article élabore une théorie et examine la mise en ,uvre et la performance de partenariats des secteurs public/privé canadiens (P3). Il se penche essentiellement sur des projets d'infrastructure et aborde quatre questions : 1) quels objectifs les gouvernements prévoient-ils atteindre en ayant recours aux P3 ? 2) Dans quelle mesure les P3 seront efficaces à fournir de la valeur aux gouvernements et aux citoyens ? 3) Quelles leçons peut-on tirer des P3? L'article passe en revue les justifications normatives avancées par le gouvernement pour les P3 et examine leur efficacité. Ensuite, il formule un cadre normatif plus exhaustif. Puis, il présente les grandes lignes d'une perspective de «théorie positive» des P3 en tenant compte des objectifs divergents des partenaires : à savoir, les objectifs de maximisation des profits pour les participants du secteur privé et les objectifs politiques du secteur public. Par la suite, l'article passe en revue et évalue dix études de cas de P3 canadiens. Le test du succès, selon une perspective (normative) sociale, consiste à déterminer si les P3 ont des coûts sociaux totaux inférieurs, y compris les coûts de production, et tous les coûts de transactions et coûts externes associés au projet. Les dix études de cas indiquent que les avantages potentiels des P3 sont souvent surpassés par les frais élevés de passation de contrats dûs à l'opportunisme généré par les conflits en matière d'objectifs. Ces coûts sont particulièrement élevés lorsque la complexité de la construction ou de l'exploitation est élevée et que l'incertitude des revenus (le risque d'utilisation) est forte, que ces deux risques ont été transférés au partenaire du secteur privé, et que l'efficacité de la gestion du contrat est médiocre. Dans les projets d'infrastructure, il est souvent absurde d'essayer de transférer de grands montants de risque d'utilisation au secteur privé. [source]