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Contract Theory (contract + theory)
Selected AbstractsSources of well-being and commitment of staff in the Australian Disability Employment ServicesHEALTH & SOCIAL CARE IN THE COMMUNITY, Issue 2 2008Andrew Noblet PhD Abstract This study examined the role of working conditions in predicting the psychological health, job satisfaction and organisational commitment of personnel responsible for helping people with disabilities gain employment in the mainstream Australian labour market. The working conditions were assessed using two theories: the Job Strain Model (job demand, social support and job control) and Psychological Contract Theory (unwritten reciprocal obligations between employers and employees). In the case of the Job Strain Model, the generic dimensions had been augmented by industry-specific sources of stress. A cross-sectional survey was undertaken in June and July 2005 with 514 staff returning completed questionnaires (representing a response rate of 30%). Comparisons between respondents and non-respondents revealed that on the basis of age, gender and tenure, the sample was broadly representative of employees working in the Australian disability employment sector at that time. The results of regression analyses indicate that social support was predictive of all of the outcome measures. Job control and the honouring of psychological contracts were both predictive of job satisfaction and commitment, while the more situation-specific stressors , treatment and workload stressors , were inversely related to psychological health (i.e. as concern regarding the treatment and workload stressors increased, psychological health decreased). Collectively, these findings suggest that strategies aimed at combating the negative effects of large-scale organisational change could be enhanced by addressing several variables represented in the models , particularly social support, job control, psychological contracts and sector-specific stressors. [source] Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on Social Contract TheoryRATIO JURIS, Issue 3 2007JANICE RICHARDSON First, which points must feminists continue to argue in their critique of the social contract tradition today? The second question is: Can feminists actually draw anything from the social contract tradition today? It argues that Pateman's critique of contractarianism continues to be useful when read in the context of her analysis of "self-ownership" and subordination rather than as a rewriting of the social contract. Hampton's deployment of a Kantian test for the failure of respect for personhood within domestic (and other) relationships does not undermine Pateman's position. Consideration of how such an ideal can be understood as potentially compatible with Pateman's perspective raises issues about the radical potential within claims for equal respect for personhood. In Hampton's work, widespread "test failure" can be used to indicate that political action rather than moral analysis is required. Hampton assumes that those employing the test are able to abstract themselves sufficiently from their current position to imagine what it would be to be treated as a person. It is argued that this "moral test" should be envisaged as being asked in concert with others, at which point it has the potential to become political action. [source] Contract theory and agricultural policy analysis: a discussion and survey of recent developments,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2006Steven Y. Wu This paper surveys some recent developments in contract theory and illustrates how this theory might be useful for conceptualising policy issues related to vertical coordination and contracting in the agro-food industry. The article begins by surveying contract theory to identify key economic distortions that can potentially justify government involvement. Next, the general ingredients of agricultural contracts that are most likely to create inefficiencies are discussed. Finally, controversial aspects of real-world agricultural contracts are highlighted and lessons from the theory are used to determine whether government intervention is justified. Actual legislation that has been proposed in the USA is analysed where appropriate and topics that await further research are also discussed. [source] The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from U.S. FirmsJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 6 2010LUIGI GUISO credit relationships; multiple creditors; borrowing allocation When firms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they appear to differentiate their allocation of borrowing. In this paper, we put forward hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and test them using a sample of small U.S. firms. We find that firms with more valuable and more homogeneous assets differentiate borrowing more sharply across concentrated creditors. Moreover, borrowing differentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to firms' informational transparency. The results suggest that the structure of credit relationships is used to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs, especially during corporate reorganizations. [source] THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS , A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ANALYSISECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2008Eirik G. Furubotn The initial objective of the paper is to describe the way in which the term ,New Institutional Economics' (NIE) emerged in the literature and became the designation for a new field concerned with the study of various analytical techniques designed for the exploration of institutional phenomena. It is then shown how some of the more important of these techniques, transaction-cost economics, property-rights analysis and contract theory, have been applied in two central lines of neoinstitutional thought , the Williamsonian and the Northian. Criticisms of these two disparate theoretical positions on the NIE are considered and assessed. Next, a brief review of some of the empirical literature is undertaken so that the explanatory powers of NIE themes can be gauged. Finally, the paper offers a few general remarks on the present state of the NIE and its possible influence on the further development of economics. [source] ON THE PREFERENCES OF PRINCIPALS AND AGENTSECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 2 2010MARCO CASTILLO One of the reasons why market economies are able to thrive is that they exploit the willingness of entrepreneurs to take risks that laborers might prefer to avoid. Markets work because they remunerate good judgment and punish mistakes. Indeed, modern contract theory is based on the assumption that principals are less risk averse than agents. We investigate if the risk preferences of entrepreneurs are different from those of laborers by implementing experiments with a random sample of the population in a fast-growing, small-manufacturing, economic cluster. As assumed by theory, we find that entrepreneurs are more likely to take risks than hired managers. These results are robust to the inclusion of a series of controls. This lends support to the idea that risk preferences is an important determinant of selection into occupations. Finally, our lotteries are good predictors of financial decisions, thus giving support to the external validity of our risk measures and experimental methods (JEL C93, D81, D86). [source] Can a purchaser be a partner? nursing education in the English universitiesINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2001E. Meerabeau Abstract Since the early 1990s, public sector management in England has been exhorted to follow the example of the private sector, and ,quasi-markets' have been established, for example in the health service. A quasi-market also exists between the NHS and higher education for the purchasing (or procurement) of nursing education. This paper uses policy documents such as the National Health Service Executive Circular (March 1999) on ,Good Contracting Guidelines' for Non-Medical Education and Training, plus other relevant literature on the commodification of higher education, quasi-markets and contract theory to examine this market, and the confusion of two rhetorics, those of competition and partnership. Nursing occupies a marginal place in higher education in England, having only recently become part of it. The emphasis of the quasi-market on the output of a trained ,fit for purpose' labour force combines with professional attempts to create an academic discipline, in complex ways which are as yet underanalysed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implicationsTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2006Pierre-André Chiappori Several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk, as predicted by standard models of pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard. We show here that the positive correlationproperty can be extended to general setups: competitive insurance markets and cases where risk aversion is public. We test our results on a French dataset. Our tests confirm that the estimated correlation is positive; they also suggest the presence of market power. [source] II,Comment on Munoz -Dardé's,Liberty's Chains'ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME, Issue 1 2009Niko Kolodny Munoz-Dardé (2009) argues that a social contract theory must meet Rousseau's ,liberty condition': that, after the social contract, each ,nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before'. She claims that Rousseau's social contract does not meet this condition, for reasons that suggest that no other social contract theory could. She concludes that political philosophy should turn away from social contract theory's preoccupation with authority and obedience, and focus instead on what she calls the ,legitimacy' of social arrangements. I raise questions about each of these claims. [source] Contract theory and agricultural policy analysis: a discussion and survey of recent developments,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2006Steven Y. Wu This paper surveys some recent developments in contract theory and illustrates how this theory might be useful for conceptualising policy issues related to vertical coordination and contracting in the agro-food industry. The article begins by surveying contract theory to identify key economic distortions that can potentially justify government involvement. Next, the general ingredients of agricultural contracts that are most likely to create inefficiencies are discussed. Finally, controversial aspects of real-world agricultural contracts are highlighted and lessons from the theory are used to determine whether government intervention is justified. Actual legislation that has been proposed in the USA is analysed where appropriate and topics that await further research are also discussed. [source] |