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Contemporary Discussions (contemporary + discussion)
Selected AbstractsReligious Diversity, Christian Doctrine and Karl BarthINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Issue 1 2006GEOFF THOMPSON In this article J.A. DiNoia's proposals for the recognition of subordinate and non-oppositional truths in the other religions, and his more recent defence of Barth's account of the religions in Church Dogmatics§17, are brought into dialogue with Karl Barth's account of truth extra muros ecclesiae in CD§69. It is argued that the latter raises a number of crucial doctrinal questions for DiNoia's own proposal for the recognition of subordinate and non-oppositional truth, and that it is a more important resource for contemporary discussions than is the controversial CD§17. [source] Sovereignty, Exception, and NormJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 1 2007Andrew Norris Carl Schmitt's Political Theology is the locus classicus of contemporary discussions of sovereignty. I argue that Schmitt's conception of sovereignty is excessively metaphysical and that it posits an incoherent 'sovereign' ability to decide what shall count as normal. Schmitt follows and radicalizes the late Bodin's claims , themselves the product of a political theology, namely, Bodin 's conversion to Judaism , regarding the necessity of an indivisible and absolute sovereignty. In each, the relation between the executive and the other parts of government is reduced to what Schmitt describes as an ,either/or.' This move is a disastrous mistake. The question is not whether exceptions and emergencies such as terrorist attacks are real, but to what extent the executive branch can rightly claim a monopoly on the ability to determine whether an exception exists, and whether its resulting actions will be permanently unchecked and unregulated. Recent work by Bruce Ackerman is a better guide in these matters than the metaphysics of either Schmitt or Bodin. [source] Teaching and Learning Guide for: Locutionary, Illocutionary, PerlocutionaryLINGUISTICS & LANGUAGE COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 9 2010Mikhail Kissine This guide accompanies the following article: Mikhail Kissine, ,Locutionary, Illocutionary, Perlocutionary', Language and Linguistics Compass 2/6 (2008) pp. 1189,1202. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-818x.2008.00093.x. The terms locutionary act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act originate from Austin's classical How to do with words. The corresponding notions, however, prove difficult to define. Yet, lack of careful delineating of each level can lead to important theoretical confusions. This Teaching and Learning Guide explains why proper understanding of Austin's trichotomy is crucial for semantics and pragmatics. Author's Introduction Most contemporary discussions in semantics and pragmatics employ , implicitly or explicitly , some or all of the concepts of locutionary,illocutionary or perlocutionary acts. These notions originate from Austin's posthumous and notoriously intricate book, How to do things with words. The point of interest for the linguist, however, is not so much the exegesis of Austin's ideas, as the precise delimitation of these levels of meaning. First, it is important to characterise the locutionary level , which falls short of any illocutionary force , to avoid contaminating analyses of utterance meanings with matters relative to the illocutionary level, viz. to the speech act performed. Second, the precise definition of illocutionary acts is an extremely difficult matter. However, the first, imperative step must be a clear demarcation between perlocutionary acts , relative to causal effects of the utterances , and the utterance's illocutionary force. Third, to assess theories of illocutionary forces, one must take into account the requirements for psychological and empirical plausibility. For instance, classical Gricean theories of illocutionary force attribution link it with the cognitive capacity to perform complex multi-layered mental state attributions, which is incompatible with the data available on the pragmatic and cognitive functioning of young children. In sum, gaining better understanding of the tripartite distinction between the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary levels is not a taxonomical exercise, but a prerequisite for anyone willing to tackle semantic and/or pragmatic issues with the right tools. Suggested Reading Austin, J.L. (1975) How to do things with words, Second edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Lecture VIII. Difficult reading, but essential to understand Austin's intuitions and the origin of the debate. Strawson, P.F. (1964) "Intention and convention in speech acts", Philosophical Review, 73, 439,60. Classical criticism of Austin's claim abut the conventionality of illocutionary acts and first formulation of a Gricean theory of speech acts. Strawson, P.F. (1973) "Austin and ,Locutionary meaning'", in I. Berlin et al. (eds.) Essays on J.L. Austin, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 46,68. This equally classical paper sheds light onto the difficult notions of rhetic and locutionary acts; it paves the way for using these concepts interchangeably. Recanati, F. (1987) Meaning and Force. The pragmatics of performative utterances, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 9. This is a lucid discussion and elaboration of Strawson's conception of the locuitonary act as a potential for the illocutionary level. Wilson, D. and Sperber, D. (1988) "Mood and the analysis of non-declarative sentences", in J. Dancy et al. (eds.) Human Agency, Language, Duty and Value. Philosophical essayes in honour of J.O. Urmson, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 77,101. This paper gives important reasons for not confusing the analysis of mood , of the locutionary level , with the analysis of speech acts. Kissine, M. (2009) "Illocutionary forces and what is said", Mind and Language, 24, 122,38. Provides a definition of locutionary acts as linguistic representations of mental states, and lays grounds for a theory of speech acts as reasons to believe or to act. Bach, K. (1994) "Conversational impliciture", Mind and Language, 9, 124,62. An important defence of the distinction between illocutionary and locutionary acts. However, the reader should be warned that Bach conceives of locutionary acts as context-independent propositional radicals, which is not a self-evident position. Alston (2000) Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, Chapter 2. Contains a clear and lucid criticism of theories that confuse illocutionary and perlocutionary levels. Dominicy, M. (2008) "Epideictic rhetoric and the representation of human decision and choice", in K. Korta and J. Garmendia (eds.) Meaning, Intentions, and Argumentation, Stanford, CSLI, 179,207. This paper contains a useful test for distinguishing verbs that describe illocutionary acts form those that describe perlocutionary acts. It is also the first proposal to formulate the illocutionary/perlocutionary divide in Davidsonian terms. Focus Questions 1,What kind of philosophy of action is called for by the distinction between locutions, perlocutions and illocutions? 2,Should the locutionary level be always fully propositional? 3,Can illocutionary acts be characterised in terms of prototypical perlocutional effects? 4,Should illocutionary acts be divided in conventional (institutional) and non-conventional (non-insitutional) ones? 5,Are there good reasons for singling out a locutionary level? 6,,Does the attribution of illocutionary forces presuppose a complex mindreading process? Connexion with to Related Material in Lectures or Discussions 1,The distinction between the locutionary and illocutionary levels is crucial for any discussion about the semantics/pragmatics interface. Many scholars hastily characterise semantics as related to sentence-meaning and pragmatics as concerning the speech act performed. However, one should not take for granted that any level where the meaning is context-dependant is necessarily that of the illocutionary act performed. 2,This distinction can also be relevant for the discussions about the meaning of moods. For instance, the imperative mood is often analysed in terms of the directive illocutionary force. However, there are cases where utterances of imperative sentences do not correspond to a directive speech act. 3,The distinction between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts remains central for any attempt to classify or to define illocutionary forces. 4,Different conceptions of illocutionary acts are important for discussions about the ontogeny and phylogeny of the pragmatic dimension(s) of linguistic competence. [source] A Delicate Knowledge: Epistemology, Homosexuality, and St. John of the CrossMODERN THEOLOGY, Issue 4 2001Christopher Hinkle In light of the intractable disagreements, both theological and theoretical, which emerge at every turn in contemporary discussions of homosexuality and religion, this essay advances an epistemological approach to the discussion. The advantage of an epistemological approach is that it sidesteps many of the narrow denominational discussions, making almost no reference to Romans, to natural law, or to a sexual ethic based on love and mutuality. By drawing upon analytic philosophy of religion (Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne specifically), I hope to show how a failure explicitly to face epistemological challenges has undermined pro-gay claims and arguments and contributed to religious confusion. Constructively, the work of St. John the Cross helpfully offers a powerful epistemological vision that importantly supplements the analytic projects of Plantinga and Swinburne, thereby helping us comprehend more fully what is implied and required in justified pro-gay religious conviction. [source] Discerning Fidelity: Badiou between Faith and ReasonNEW BLACKFRIARS, Issue 1033 2010Geoffrey Holsclaw Abstract At this juncture in history, viewed as either the dusk of modernity or the dawn of its overcoming, questions of faith and reason are continually cast up anew. The questioning of faith and reason raise familiar binaries and oppositions: Is faith for or against, internal or external, before or after, above or below reason? Does faith perfect or overcome, complete or destroy, add or subtract from reason? This essay will pass through two figures representative of the contested field of Thomistic scholarship en route to a discussion of how the French philosopher Alain Badiou might intervene within the contemporary discussions of faith and reason. It will first engage Denys Turner's recent work which could be characterized as a dogmatic faith in reason attempting to repel the dispositional faith which he attributes to Fergus Kerr. These competing conceptions of faith will set the backdrop for a presentation and application of Badiou's understanding of faith as discerning fidelity. [source] The Origin of IntentionsPHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 4 2006Richard Scheer Professor Emeritus In contemporary discussions of the concept of intention, the assumption is made that an intention results from a person's decision, or resolution, or plan, or the like. And the intention persists, generally, until the appropriate action is carried out. However, intentions cannot be said to have temporal duration, or beginnings, or endings. And it is not necessary for a person who is intending to do something to have made a decision to do it, or a resolution, or anything else. It may be that a person acquires an intention because of the circumstances that he finds himself in. If one sees that a tricycle is in front of his car, he will move it. No decision is necessary, obviously, because running over it would be contrary to common sense. Or one may gradually come to realise that he is obliged to do something and thereupon acquires the intention to do it. By focusing on one kind of intention, the "desire-belief" theories have failed to realise that intentions originate in various ways, and for various reasons. [source] Between Predication And Silence: Augustine On How (Not) To Speak Of GodTHE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 1 2000James K. A. Smith Throughout his corpus (both theological and pastoral), Augustine grapples with the challenge of how (not) to speak of that which exceeds and resists conceptualization. The one who would speak of God is confronted, it seems, by a double-bind: either one reduces God's transcendence to the immanence of language and concepts, or one remains silent. Even to call God ,inexpressible', he remarks in De doctrina christiana, is to predicate something of God and thus make some claim to comprehension. ,This battle of words', he continues, ,should be avoided by keeping silent' (DC 1.6.6). Augustine thus seems to privilege and apophatic strategy. But this is not his last word on the matter. Indeed upon the heels of this passage he carefully notes: ,And yet, while nothing really worthy of God can be said about him, he has accepted the homage of human voices, and has wished us to rejoice in praising [laude] him with our words.' My goal in this essay is to consider Augustine's laudatory strategy of ,praise' as a non-objectifying discourse concerning transcendence which navigates the straits between kataphatic theological positivism and apophatic silence. This will be taken up against the horizon of contemporary discussions of transcendence and phenomenology, particularly in the work of Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion. [source] The Sources and Fortunes of Piranesi's Archaeological IllustrationsART HISTORY, Issue 4 2002Susan M. Dixon Susan M. Dixon earned her doctorate from Cornell University in 1991 with a dissertation on the archaeological publications of Giovanni Battista Piranesi. She studies the history of pre,scientific archaeology, from Pirro Ligorio to Piranesi, with a particular focus on illustration as a means to convey historical knowledge. She has published on this subject in a variety of venues, and is beginning a book,length manuscript on the subject. In 1995,96, she was awarded a J. Paul Getty post,doctoral fellowship to study the Accademia degli Arcadi, a society founded in 1690 primarily to restore good taste in literature, and its successes and failures in bringing about the reform of Italian society and architecture. She has written a book entitled The Bosco Parrasio: Performance and Perfectibility in the Garden of the Arcadians, which focuses on their garden meeting place as a breeding ground for a utopian society. Dr Dixon teaches art history at the University of Tulsa in Oklahoma. Giovanni Battista Piranesi (1720,1778) developed a way of representing the archaeological past by using the multi,informational image, an engraved illustration which appears to be a composite of various drawings, on various surfaces, and employing various modes of representation, scale and detail. The cartographic tradition, particularly maps from sixteenth,century Europe, offer a precedent for this type of illustration. Piranesi found theoretical underpinnings for it in contemporary discussions about the workings of the human memory, which was identified as a viable tool for those pursuing historical knowledge. His illustrations make visible the processes of memory on an assemblage of archaeological information, and they were a means to historical reconstruction. Archaeologists of the generation after Piranesi did not use the multi,informational image as the science of archaeology underwent a sea change at the end of the century. However, some compilers of travel literature, in particular Jean,Laurent,Pierre HoĆ,el, author and illustrator of Voyage pittoresque des isles de Sicile, de Malte, et de Lipari, found the format suitable to their purposes. Like Piranesi's, Hoüel's multi,informational images reveal the hand of the artist on the information he had diligently collected and ordered; Hoüel's picturesque illustrations of the southern Italian islands' people and places are self,consciously subjective. The format also makes apparent what was so appealing to many a voyager ,the apparent survival of the past in the culture of the present. [source] |