Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Consumer Information (consumer + information)
Selected AbstractsProduct Safety Provision and Consumers' InformationAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2000Stephan Marette Economic mechanisms related to the provision of product safety are explored, with particular attention paid to the structure of consumers' information. The case of perfect information, of experience goods (for which consumers detect product safety after consumption) and of credence goods (where consumers cannot link a disease to a particular product consumed in the past) are explored. Imperfect competition is assumed in the supply sector. In the case of both perfect information and experience goods, market equilibrium is characterised by a less-than-socially optimal provision of safety, when the safety effort is costly. With credence goods, imperfect information leads to the absence of safety effort and to a market closure. Different types of public regulation aiming at increasing consumer protection and circumventing market failures are explored. Particular attention is paid to minimum safety standards, labels and liability enforcement. The relative efficiency of these instruments depends on the information structure. In the cases of perfect information and experience goods, a minimum safety standard can be an efficient instrument. Regulation is necessary but not sufficient to avoid market failure in the case of credence goods. [source] REPRODUCTIVE TOURISM IN ARGENTINA: CLINIC ACCREDITATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS, HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND POLICY MAKERSDEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS, Issue 2 2010ELISE SMITH ABSTRACT A subcategory of medical tourism, reproductive tourism has been the subject of much public and policy debate in recent years. Specific concerns include: the exploitation of individuals and communities, access to needed health care services, fair allocation of limited resources, and the quality and safety of services provided by private clinics. To date, the focus of attention has been on the thriving medical and reproductive tourism sectors in Asia and Eastern Europe; there has been much less consideration given to more recent ,players' in Latin America, notably fertility clinics in Chile, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. In this paper, we examine the context-specific ethical and policy implications of private Argentinean fertility clinics that market reproductive services via the internet. Whether or not one agrees that reproductive services should be made available as consumer goods, the fact is that they are provided as such by private clinics around the world. We argue that basic national regulatory mechanisms are required in countries such as Argentina that are marketing fertility services to local and international publics. Specifically, regular oversight of all fertility clinics is essential to ensure that consumer information is accurate and that marketed services are safe and effective. It is in the best interests of consumers, health professionals and policy makers that the reproductive tourism industry adopts safe and responsible medical practices. [source] Recent international and regulatory decisions about geographical indicationsAGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 4 2008Stephan Marette As worldwide consumer demand for high-quality products and for information about these products increases, labels and geographical indications (GIs) can serve to signal quality traits to consumers; however, GI systems among countries are not homogeneous and can be used as trade barriers against competition. Philosophical differences between the European Union (EU) and the United States about how GIs should be registered and protected led to the formation of a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute-settlement panel. In this article, we discuss the issues behind the dispute, the WTO panel decision, and the EU response to the panel decision leading to the new Regulation 510/2006. Given the potential for GI labels to supply consumer information, context is provided for the discussion using recent literature on product labeling. Implications are drawn regarding the importance of the panel decision and the EU response relative to GI issues yet to be negotiated under the Doha Round. [JEL classifications: D8, F1, Q1]. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] CONSUMERS AND AGENCY PROBLEMSTHE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 478 2002Canice Prendergast Consumers solve many agency problems, by pointing out when they believe that agents have made mistakes. I consider the role that consumers play in inducing efficient behaviour by agents. I distinguish cases where consumers have similar preferences to the principal, from those where they diverge. In the former case, allowing consumer feedback improves allocations, and increasing consumer information is unambiguously beneficial. Where consumers disagree with principals over desired outcomes, which characterises many public sector benefits, consumers' feedback about the performance of agents can reduce welfare. This may result in efficiently restricting the ability of consumers to complain about agent performance. [source] ASERNIP-S: INTERNATIONAL TREND SETTINGANZ JOURNAL OF SURGERY, Issue 10 2008Guy Maddern The Australian Safety and Efficacy Register of New Interventional Procedures , Surgical (ASERNIP-S) came into being 10 years ago to provide health technology assessments specifically tailored towards new surgical techniques and technologies. It was and remains the only organisation in the world to focus on this area of research. Most funding has been provided by the Australian Government Department of Health, and assessments have helped inform the introduction of new surgical techniques into Australia. ASERNIP-S is a project of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons. The ASERNIP-S program employs a diverse range of methods including systematic reviews, technology overviews, assessments of new and emerging surgical technologies identified by horizon scanning, and audit. Support and guidance for the program is provided by Fellows of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons. ASERNIP-S works closely with consumers to produce health technology assessments and audits, as well as consumer information to keep patients fully informed of research. Since its inception, the ASERNIP-S program has developed a strong international profile through the production of over 60 reports on evidence-based surgery, surgical technologies and audit. The work undertaken by ASERNIP-S has evolved from assessments of the safety and efficacy of procedures to include guidance on policies and surgical training programs. ASERNIP-S needs to secure funding so that it can continue to play an integral role in the improvement of quality of care both in Australia and internationally. [source] Product Safety Provision and Consumers' InformationAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2000Stephan Marette Economic mechanisms related to the provision of product safety are explored, with particular attention paid to the structure of consumers' information. The case of perfect information, of experience goods (for which consumers detect product safety after consumption) and of credence goods (where consumers cannot link a disease to a particular product consumed in the past) are explored. Imperfect competition is assumed in the supply sector. In the case of both perfect information and experience goods, market equilibrium is characterised by a less-than-socially optimal provision of safety, when the safety effort is costly. With credence goods, imperfect information leads to the absence of safety effort and to a market closure. Different types of public regulation aiming at increasing consumer protection and circumventing market failures are explored. Particular attention is paid to minimum safety standards, labels and liability enforcement. The relative efficiency of these instruments depends on the information structure. In the cases of perfect information and experience goods, a minimum safety standard can be an efficient instrument. Regulation is necessary but not sufficient to avoid market failure in the case of credence goods. [source] | ||||||||||