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Constitutional Structure (constitutional + structure)
Selected AbstractsInherent Presidential Power and Constitutional StructurePRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2007NEIL KINKOPF Much current debate about presidential power revolves around the phrase "inherent power." This phrase has a loose signification, but disputes often involve the question of whether presidential power is subject to limitation by Congress. This essay identifies four different constitutional constructions that might lead to such unchecked presidential power. The essay also assesses each of these four constructions from the standpoint of the Constitution's structure, concluding in each case that the assertion of unchecked power is inconsistent with constitutional structure. [source] Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation and Autocratic Militarism in TurkeyDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 4 2005Tim Jacoby This article argues that, since the early 1980s, there have been two regimes in Turkey. The first, which is broadly akin to Michael Mann's characterization of Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation, has predominated in areas of the country not administered through emergency legislation. In keeping with his model, it has been most fully asserted in areas of key economic value , particularly the Marmara region and the environs of the capital, Ankara. In the thirteen predominantly Kurdish provinces of the south-east of the country, on the other hand, a second of Mann's regime types, Autocratic Militarism, is discernible. This was institutionalized under a new constitutional structure introduced following the 1980 coup as a means of dealing with a rise in pro-Kurdish insurgency. [source] Englishness and the Union in Contemporary Conservative ThoughtGOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 4 2009Richard English This article analyses the importance of arguments developed since 1997 by influential right-wing commentators concerning Englishness and the United Kingdom. Drawing on historical, cultural and political themes, public intellectuals and commentators of the right have variously addressed the constitutional structure of the UK, the politics of devolved government in Wales and Scotland, and the emergence of a more salient contemporary English sensibility. This article offers case studies of the arguments of Simon Heffer, Peter Hitchens and Roger Scruton, all of whom have made controversial high-profile interventions on questions of national identity, culture and history. Drawing on original interviews with these as well as other key figures, the article addresses three central questions. First, what are the detailed arguments offered by Heffer, Hitchens and Scruton in relation to Englishness and the UK? Second, what does detailed consideration of these arguments reveal about the evolution of the politics of contemporary conservatism in relation to the Union? And, third, what kinds of opportunity currently exist for intellectuals and commentators on the fringes of mainstream politics to influence the terms of debate on these issues? [source] The Completely Decentralized City: The Case for Benefits Based Public FinanceAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2001Fed E. Foldvary An alternative to centralized top-down city governance is a multi-level bottom-up structure based on small neighborhood contractual communities. This paper analyzes the voting rules and public finances of decentralized, contractual urban governance and the likely outcome of such a constitutional structure, substantially reduced transfer seeking or rent seeking. Tax and service substitution, with lower-level funding and services substituting for higher-level public finance, is the general process by which the governance would devolve. Land rent is the most feasible source of such decentralized public finance, and local communities could also engage in local currency and credit services. Some empirical examples demonstrate the implementation of some of these governance structures. [source] Inherent Presidential Power and Constitutional StructurePRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2007NEIL KINKOPF Much current debate about presidential power revolves around the phrase "inherent power." This phrase has a loose signification, but disputes often involve the question of whether presidential power is subject to limitation by Congress. This essay identifies four different constitutional constructions that might lead to such unchecked presidential power. The essay also assesses each of these four constructions from the standpoint of the Constitution's structure, concluding in each case that the assertion of unchecked power is inconsistent with constitutional structure. [source] National Security, Terrorism and Constitutional BalanceTHE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2004Laurence Lustgarten ABSTRACT The 'war on terrorism' engages all the institutions of the state. A constitutional structure devoted to protection of liberty must place a paramount value on separation of powers, and a parliamentary democratic constitution should ensure that the ultimate locus of responsibility rests in the legislature, the only branch which has a direct connection to the citizens. However, in an ironic reversal of practice that prevailed before the coming of mass democracy, Parliament in the UK since the early twentieth century has largely accepted a supine role compared to the executive in matters of 'national security'. The judiciary, despite the enactment of legally enforceable human rights, has also manifestly failed to exercise its proper function of curbing abuses of state power. The result is an over-mighty executive, able to draw upon the deference of other branches of government in prosecuting the 'war on terrorism' on the battlefield and in the statute book, which has trampled on individual rights with virtually no check or counte-balance. Some principles by which the balance might be restored are suggested. [source] |