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Constitutional Democracy (constitutional + democracy)
Selected AbstractsJudicial Hegemony: Dworkin's Freedom's Law and the Spectrum of Constitutional DemocraciesRATIO JURIS, Issue 3 2002Brian Donohue Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law offers a solution to a thorny problem in American constitutional law. He argues that the authority of the American Supreme Court to make the final determination on constitutional questions is consistent with democratic principles. In this paper, I try to show that his solution is unsatisfactory because it permits the possibility of a judicial usurpation of authority that is inconsistent with his characterization of democratic principles. Freedom's Law is also a bold attempt to offer prescriptions for constitutional democracies generally. By drawing a distinction between two concepts of authority, I object to this effort. I argue that Dworkin's analysis assumes the operation of a conception of authority that I label the pyramid model. I also introduce a bipolar model of authority and try to show its application to the Canadian constitutional scheme. On this basis, I conclude that his prescriptions are relevant only for a portion of the spectrum of constitutional democracies. [source] Rawls and Derrida on the Historicity of Constitutional Democracy and International JusticeCONSTELLATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRITICAL AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY, Issue 1 2009Johan van der Walt First page of article [source] The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional DemocracyTHE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 2 2002James Tully The paper is a critical survey of the last ten years of research on the principles of legitimacy of constitutional democracy and their application in practice in Europe and North America. A constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets the test of two principles: the principles of democracy or popular sovereignty and of constitutionalism or the rule of law. There are three contemporary trends which tend to conflict with the principle of democracy and thus diminish democratic freedom. There are three responses to the lack of legitimacy of these three trends. The first is to downplay the principle of democracy in order to endorse the three trends. The second is to uphold the principle of democracy, in the form of deliberative constitutional democracy, in order to criticise aspects of the three trends and to call for further democratisation. The third trend deepens this critical response by tying the test of democratic legitimacy more closely to case studies of attempts by citizens to exercise their democratic freedom. [source] Constitutional democracy and civic nationalismNATIONS AND NATIONALISM, Issue 3 2007DONALD IPPERCIEL ABSTRACT. This article seeks to bring to the fore the intrinsic link between constitutional democracy and the civic nation, relying on Jürgen Habermas's theory of democracy. This theoretical framework will serve as the basis for a communicative understanding of civic nationalism, underscoring the notable role played by language. Attention will be given to the normative dimension that allows for the legitimisation of national divisions of a civic space bound by universal rights. The prime motivation behind this article is thus political-philosophical, although empirical examples, drawn particularly from the French revolutionary discourse, will be brought to bear. And since a civic nation construed in communicative terms has necessary linguistic implications, cases of multilingual and multinational states will be examined. [source] Judicial Hegemony: Dworkin's Freedom's Law and the Spectrum of Constitutional DemocraciesRATIO JURIS, Issue 3 2002Brian Donohue Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law offers a solution to a thorny problem in American constitutional law. He argues that the authority of the American Supreme Court to make the final determination on constitutional questions is consistent with democratic principles. In this paper, I try to show that his solution is unsatisfactory because it permits the possibility of a judicial usurpation of authority that is inconsistent with his characterization of democratic principles. Freedom's Law is also a bold attempt to offer prescriptions for constitutional democracies generally. By drawing a distinction between two concepts of authority, I object to this effort. I argue that Dworkin's analysis assumes the operation of a conception of authority that I label the pyramid model. I also introduce a bipolar model of authority and try to show its application to the Canadian constitutional scheme. On this basis, I conclude that his prescriptions are relevant only for a portion of the spectrum of constitutional democracies. [source] Constitutional democracy and civic nationalismNATIONS AND NATIONALISM, Issue 3 2007DONALD IPPERCIEL ABSTRACT. This article seeks to bring to the fore the intrinsic link between constitutional democracy and the civic nation, relying on Jürgen Habermas's theory of democracy. This theoretical framework will serve as the basis for a communicative understanding of civic nationalism, underscoring the notable role played by language. Attention will be given to the normative dimension that allows for the legitimisation of national divisions of a civic space bound by universal rights. The prime motivation behind this article is thus political-philosophical, although empirical examples, drawn particularly from the French revolutionary discourse, will be brought to bear. And since a civic nation construed in communicative terms has necessary linguistic implications, cases of multilingual and multinational states will be examined. [source] The Public Administration Review and Ongoing Struggles for ConnectednessPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 1 2000Chester A. Newland Facilitation of connectedness has been a fundamental role of the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) and the Public Administration Review (PAR) throughout their six decades of professional service. Together, they have sought to link practitioners and academicians across subfields and varied levels of activities. As a foremost refereed journal, PAR has sought to encourage the linking of practice and theory through timely publication of methodologically disciplined research, informed analyses and commentaries, and constructive literature reviews and correspondence. These responsibilities have been persistently challenging. ASPA and PAR have served a dynamic field that has made some wrong turns and had others forced on it, resulting in failed autonomy, followed by increasing partisan politicization of governments and reduced reliance on professionally expert administration. For ASPA, it has created leadership and membership problems. For PAR, it has sometimes exacerbated difficulties in connecting practitioners and academicians, but it has also created more shared concerns as important subjects of inquiry. Challenges now are to serve both enduring and new spheres of the field that are afforded by international and domestic developments. Both ASPA and PAR are striving to do that. Globalization of public administration opens a world of opportunities today. Localization, as a fundamental of constitutional democracy, is a priority internationally, presenting an engaging paradox of global attention to both place and planet. That is linked in this commentary to the classic democracy-bureaucracy quandary that has constructively challenged public administration. While arrays of other important subjects, old and new, need to command attention in PAR, these are linked in this analysis to today's theory and practice of interdependent facilitative states to assess how the journal serves its responsibilities. [source] The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional DemocracyTHE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 2 2002James Tully The paper is a critical survey of the last ten years of research on the principles of legitimacy of constitutional democracy and their application in practice in Europe and North America. A constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets the test of two principles: the principles of democracy or popular sovereignty and of constitutionalism or the rule of law. There are three contemporary trends which tend to conflict with the principle of democracy and thus diminish democratic freedom. There are three responses to the lack of legitimacy of these three trends. The first is to downplay the principle of democracy in order to endorse the three trends. The second is to uphold the principle of democracy, in the form of deliberative constitutional democracy, in order to criticise aspects of the three trends and to call for further democratisation. The third trend deepens this critical response by tying the test of democratic legitimacy more closely to case studies of attempts by citizens to exercise their democratic freedom. [source] | |||||||||||||