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Consequence Relation (consequence + relation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

Think about the Consequences!

DIALECTICA, Issue 2 2006
Nominalism, the Argument from the Philosophy of Logic
Nominalism (the thesis that there are no abstract objects) faces the task of explaining away the ontological commitments of applied mathematical statements. This paper reviews an argument from the philosophy of logic that focuses on this task and which has been used as an objection to certain specific formulations of nominalism. The argument as it is developed in this paper aims to show that nominalism in general does not have the epistemological advantages its defendants claim it has. I distinguish between two strategies that are available to the nominalist: The Evaluation Programme, which tries to preserve the common truth-values of mathematical statements even if there are no mathematical objects, and Fictionalism, which denies that mathematical sentences have significant truth-values. It is argued that the tenability of both strategies depends on the nominalist's ability to account for the notion of consequence. This is a problem because the usual meta-logical explications of consequence do themselves quantify over mathematical entities. While nominalists of both varieties may try to appeal to a primitive notion of consequence, or, alternatively, to primitive notions of logical or structural possibilities, such measures are objectionable. Even if we are equipped with a notion of either consequence or possibility that is primitive in the relevant sense, it will not be strong enough to account for the consequence relation required in classical mathematics. These examinations are also useful in assessing the possible counter-intuitive appeal of the argument from the philosophy of logic. [source]

MEMORY, MEMORIALS, AND COMMEMORATION,

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 3 2008
ANITA KASABOVA
ABSTRACT According to a popular view, the past is present here and now. This is presentism combined with endurantism: the past continuously persists through time to the present. By contrast, I argue that memories, memorials, and histories are of entities discontinuous with present experiences, and that the continuity between past and present in them is a construct. Memories, memorials, and histories are semantic means for dealing with the past. My presupposition that past and present are different is supported by grammar: as verbal tenses show, the past is not present here and now, for otherwise it would not be past. A failure to note this difference is a lack of chronesthesia, a sense of time specific to human beings. I argue that presentism fails to account for the temporal structures of memory and the changes in perspective as we switch from the present to a past situation. My account is perdurantist in the sense that it allows for temporal parts of things such as memorials or tombstones, as well as events such as wars or commemorations. But my main goal is to outline a semantic approach to the past: the tie between past and present actions and events is the semantic ground,consequence relation: a past event is the antecedent grounding a present situation, explaining why it is the case. In addition, I show how we refer to the past by means of two rhetorical figures of speech: synecdoche, using the (emblematic-) part-whole relation for relating the past to the present by transposing its sense; and anaphor, which has a deictic function,it points back toward the past. In references to the past, the deictic field is a scene visualized by the speaker and addressees: the deictic field is transposed from a perceptual to an imaginary space. [source]

Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference not Consequence

PHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 4 2009
Nicholas J. J. Smith
One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted, that is, which are being used to express judgements. There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include such a symbol. This paper explains the intended role of the judgement stroke in a way that renders it readily comprehensible why Frege insisted that this symbol was an essential part of his logical system. The key point here is that Frege viewed logic as the study of inference relations amongst acts of judgement, rather than , as in the typical contemporary view , of consequence relations amongst certain objects (propositions or well-formed formulae). The paper also explains why Frege's use of the judgement stroke is not in conflict with his avowed anti-psychologism, and why Wittgenstein's criticism of the judgement stroke as ,logically quite meaningless' is unfounded. The key point here is that while the judgement stroke has no content, its use in logic and mathematics is subject to a very stringent norm of assertion. [source]

IV,Romeo, René, and the Reasons Why: What Explanation Is

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1part1 2008
C. S. JenkinsArticle first published online: 26 MAR 200
This paper suggests that our everyday explanation talk exhibits a number of important dimensions of variation, then proposes a functionalist account of explanation to help accommodate them. The functional role of explanations is given in terms of answering why-questions, which in turn is spelled out in terms of the provision of information about non-inferential consequence. Realizers of the explanation role can be found by considering various consequence relations, including (for example) relations of causal and nomic consequence. [source]