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Conceptual Truth (conceptual + truth)

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Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

III,Are There Any Conceptual Truths About Knowledge?

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1part1 2008
Finn SpicerArticle first published online: 26 MAR 200
In this paper I investigate the nature of the concept knowledge. I ask how this concept must be if it is to generate conceptual truths about knowledge, arguing that it must have a set of principles attached to it (a folk theory) that plays a reference-determining role. I then produce evidence that suggests that the folk theory attached to our concept KNOWLEDGE,our folk epistemology,is inconsistent. If folk epistemology is inconsistent, I conclude, then either there are no conceptual truths about knowledge or any conceptual truths there are will not be a priori knowable. [source]

A New Argument for Evidentialism

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 225 2006
Nishi Shah
When we deliberate whether to believe some proposition, we feel immediately compelled to look for evidence of its truth. Philosophers have labelled this feature of doxastic deliberation ,transparency'. I argue that resolving the disagreement in the ethics of belief between evidentialists and pragmatists turns on the correct explanation of transparency. My hypothesis is that it reflects a conceptual truth about belief: a belief that p is correct if and only if p. This normative truth entails that only evidence can be a reason for belief. Although evidentialism does not follow directly from the mere psychological truth that we cannot believe for non-evidential reasons, it does follow directly from the normative conceptual truth about belief which explains why we cannot do so. [source]

III,Are There Any Conceptual Truths About Knowledge?

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1part1 2008
Finn SpicerArticle first published online: 26 MAR 200
In this paper I investigate the nature of the concept knowledge. I ask how this concept must be if it is to generate conceptual truths about knowledge, arguing that it must have a set of principles attached to it (a folk theory) that plays a reference-determining role. I then produce evidence that suggests that the folk theory attached to our concept KNOWLEDGE,our folk epistemology,is inconsistent. If folk epistemology is inconsistent, I conclude, then either there are no conceptual truths about knowledge or any conceptual truths there are will not be a priori knowable. [source]