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Conceptual Analysis (conceptual + analysis)
Selected AbstractsHAS PSYCHOLOGY DEBUNKED CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS?METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2006PER SANDIN Abstract: The philosophical method of conceptual analysis has been criticised on the grounds that empirical psychological research has cast severe doubt on whether concepts exist in the form traditionally assumed, and that conceptual analysis therefore is doomed. This objection may be termed the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I discuss the Charge from Psychology and argue that it is misdirected. [source] Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the MindNOUS, Issue 1 2002Brie Gertler First page of article [source] Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002JANET LEVIN In this paper I discuss the claim (advanced in various ways by Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers) that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts. [source] A Conceptual Analysis of Price Setting in Australian Local GovernmentAUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 2 2010Garry D. Carnegie A complex set of issues underlies the pricing of the diverse range of goods and services from which Australian local governments derive a significant portion of their revenues. Although local governments have a not-for-profit orientation, they are expected to be financially viable and embrace a broad notion of accountability. They are also expected to influence the behaviour of constituents in accordance with policy decisions, but be equitable in doing so. These and related parameters are discussed and illustrated in order to reveal and elucidate the nature of pricing decisions in local government, and to differentiate the local government context from other price-setting environments. [source] Social control and coercion in addiction treatment: towards evidence-based policy and practiceADDICTION, Issue 1 2006T. Cameron Wild ABSTRACT Background Social pressures are often an integral part of the process of seeking addiction treatment. However, scientists have not developed conclusive evidence on the processes, benefits and limitations of using legal, formal and informal social control tactics to inform policy makers, service providers and the public. This paper characterizes barriers to a robust interdisciplinary analysis of social control and coercion in addiction treatment and provides directions for future research. Approach Conceptual analysis and review of key studies and trends in the area are used to describe eight implicit assumptions underlying policy, practice and scholarship on this topic. Findings Many policies, programmes and researchers are guided by a simplistic behaviourist and health-service perspective on social controls that (a) overemphasizes the use of criminal justice systems to compel individuals into treatment and (b) fails to take into account provider, patient and public views. Conclusions Policies and programmes that expand addiction treatment options deserve support. However, drawing a firm distinction between social controls (objective use of social pressure) and coercion (client perceptions and decision-making processes) supports a parallel position that rejects treatment policies, programmes, and associated practices that create client perceptions of coercion. [source] Conceptual analysis of complianceJOURNAL OF CLINICAL NURSING, Issue 1 2000Helvi Kyngäs PhD ,,Compliance has been studied from a wide range of scientific perspectives including medicine, nursing, psychology and health economics. ,,There is no agreement regarding a commonly accepted definition. Lack of consistency in the definition and measurement of compliance is a major problem in research which becomes more complicated in an international study. ,,The response to the confusion over the term compliance has been to suggest and use alternative terms such as adherence, co-operation, mutuality and therapeutic alliance. These terms are ill-defined and often are used as synonyms. ,,The purpose of this paper is to analyse definitions of the concept of compliance. Abstracts from MEDLINE have been analysed in order to identify the types of compliance research that have been carried out. [source] Conceptual analysis of critical moments in Victoria Climbié's lifeCHILD & FAMILY SOCIAL WORK, Issue 1 2005Margaret Rustin ABSTRACT Victoria Climbié was a West African child sent to Europe in the care of her aunt, Kouao. She died as a consequence of cruelty and neglect at the hands of her aunt and her aunt's boyfriend, Manning, in particularly extreme circumstances. A major inquiry by Lord Laming into the failings of the statutory services revealed widespread problems and made many recommendations to government. Drawing on the Victoria Climbié Inquiry Report, the paper aims to describe and understand Victoria's states of mind during her time in England. The report contains many clues to the meaning of what happened, but their significance for learning from the entire tragedy is missed. The paper explores why professionals found it impossible to see what was happening, despite the evidence being available. Both Victoria's states of mind and those of the professionals who came into contact with her are analysed in terms of defences against extreme mental pain. The importance of the right kind of training and organizational support being available for child protection staff is discussed. [source] Love as a Contested ConceptJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 3 2006RICHARD PAUL HAMILTON Theorists about love typically downplay the scale of persistent and possibly intractable disagreement about love. Where they have considered such disagreements at all, they have tended to treat them as an example of the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of love, a problem which can be resolved by philosophical analysis. In doing so, they invariably slip into prescriptive mode and offer moral injunctions in the guise of conceptual analyses. This article argues for philosophical modesty. I propose that the starting point of any coherent philosophical investigation of love must be a willingness to take our disagreements seriously. These disagreements stem from profound moral differences: we disagree about love inasmuch as we disagree about how we should properly treat one another. With a series of examples drawn from philosophy, literature and real life I attempt to illustrate some of the disagreements that arise in relation to erotic love. Drawing upon the work of Wittgenstein, Friedrich Waissman and W.B. Gallie, I suggest that any robust theory of love needs to take account of its contestable nature and the integral role it plays in our moral life. [source] Clinical versus statistical prediction: The contribution of Paul E. MeehlJOURNAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 10 2005William M. GroveArticle first published online: 22 JUL 200 The background of Paul E. Meehl's work on clinical versus statistical prediction is reviewed, with detailed analyses of his arguments. Meehl's four main contributions were the following: (a) he put the question, of whether clinical or statistical combinations of psychological data yielded better predictions, at center stage in applied psychology; (b) he convincingly argued, against an array of objections, that clinical versus statistical prediction was a real (not concocted) problem needing thorough study; (c) he meticulously and even-handedly dissected the logic of clinical inference from theoretical and probabilistic standpoints; and (c) he reviewed the studies available in 1954 and thereafter, which tested the validity of clinical versus statistical predictions. His early conclusion that the literature strongly favors statistical prediction has stood up extremely well, and his conceptual analyses of the prediction problem (especially his defense of applying aggregate-based probability statements to individual cases) have not been significantly improved since 1954. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Clin Psychol 61: 1233,1243, 2005. [source] Defining characteristics of educational competenciesMEDICAL EDUCATION, Issue 3 2008Mark A Albanese Context, Doctor competencies have become an increasing focus of medical education at all levels. However, confusion exists regarding what constitutes a competency versus a goal, objective or outcome. Objectives, This article attempts to identify the characteristics that define a competency and proposes criteria that can be applied to distinguish between competencies, goals, objectives and outcomes. Methods, We provide a brief overview of the history of competencies and compare competencies identified by international medical education organisations (CanMEDS 2005, Institute for International Medical Education, Dundee Outcome Model, Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education/American Board of Medical Specialties). Based upon this review and comparisons, as well as on definitions of competencies from the literature and theoretical and conceptual analyses of the underpinnings of competencies, the authors develop criteria that can serve to distinguish competencies from goals, objectives and outcomes. Results, We propose 5 criteria which can be used to define a competency: it focuses on the performance of the end-product or goal-state of instruction; it reflects expectations that are external to the immediate instructional programme; it is expressible in terms of measurable behaviour; it uses a standard for judging competence that is not dependent upon the performance of other learners, and it informs learners, as well as other stakeholders, about what is expected of them. Conclusions, Competency-based medical education is likely to be here for the foreseeable future. Whether or not these 5 criteria, or some variation of them, become the ultimate defining criteria for what constitutes a competency, they represent an essential step towards clearing the confusion that reigns. [source] Problems for Linguistic Solutions to the Paradox of AnalysisMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2001Jeffrey Cobb G. E. Moore opined that the paradox of analysis might be avoided if it could be shown that sentences expressing conceptual analyses convey information not only about concepts, but also about the expressions they use. If so, "to be a brother is to be a male sibling" and "to be a brother is to be a brother" might express the same proposition, and yet not be identical in information value as the paradox suggests. How sentences might do this, Moore could not see. Many philosophers have pointed out an obvious way in which sentences might be said to convey information about the expressions they use. Some have suggested this information might be used to develop Moore's intuition and resolve the paradox of analysis. I argue that this approach fails. I present a version of the paradox of analysis that resists this sort of solution. [source] Stochastic,conceptual analysis of near-surface hydrological responseHYDROLOGICAL PROCESSES, Issue 14 2001Keith Loague Abstract The stochastic,conceptual rainfall,runoff simulator (SCRRS) developed by R. A. Freeze in 1980 was used in this study to demonstrate quantitatively the interplay of the factors that control the occurrence of overland flow by the Horton and Dunne mechanisms. The simulation domain and input data for the SCRRS simulations reported here were abstracted from the R-5 catchment (Chickasha, OK) data sets. The results illustrate that the identification of a dominant hydrological response process may not be as simple as a singular Horton or Dunne characterization. The SCRRS simulations show that the Horton and Dunne processes can (i) occur simultaneously at different locations during a given rainfall event, (ii) change from one process to the other with time depending on the characteristics of the rainfall event, and (iii) be strongly dependent on the initial conditions. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Beliefs about organising learning: a conceptual and empirical analysis of managers' and workers' learning action theoriesINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT, Issue 2 2000Ferd J. Van der Krogt This article describes research on the action theories that managers and workers hold toward organising learning. It begins with a conceptual analysis of learning action theories, then the empirical research is reported. The aim was to deter-mine the dimensions in people's perceptions of the learning system and whether these form more or less stable profiles. These perception profiles are interpreted as representing the respondents' learning action theories. [source] Safety is more than the antonym of riskJOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2006NIKLAS MÖLLER abstract Even though much research has been devoted to studies of safety, the concept of safety is in itself under-theorised, especially concerning its relation to epistemic uncertainty. In this paper we propose a conceptual analysis of safety. The paper explores the distinc-tion between absolute and relative safety, as well as that between objective and subjective safety. Four potential dimensions of safety are discussed, viz. harm, probability, epistemic uncertainty, and control. The first three of these are used in the proposed definition of safety, whereas it is argued that control should not be included in a reasonable definition of safety. It is shown that strictly speaking, an objective safety concept is not attainable. Instead, an intersubjective concept is proposed that brings us as close as possible to an objective concept. [source] Four Motives for Community InvolvementJOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, Issue 3 2002C. Daniel Batson A conceptual analysis is offered that differentiates four types of motivation for community involvement: egoism, altruism, collectivism, and principlism. Differentiation is based on identification of a unique ultimate goal for each motive. For egoism, the ultimate goal is to increase one's own welfare; for altruism, it is to increase the welfare of another individual or individuals; for collectivism, to increase the welfare of a group; and for principlism, to uphold one or more moral principles. As sources of community involvement, each of these four forms of motivation has its strengths; each also has its weaknesses. More effective efforts to stimulate community involvement may come from strategies that orchestrate motives so that the strengths of one motive can overcome weaknesses of another. Among the various possibilities, strategies that combine appeals to either altruism or collectivism with appeals to principle may be especially promising. [source] "I'm feeling lucky": The role of emotions in seeking information on the WebJOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Issue 6 2006James Kalbach Recent research highlights the potential relevance of emotions in interface design. People can no longer be modeled as purely goal-driven, task-solving agents: They also have affective motivations for their choices and behavior implying an extended mandate for search design. Absent from current Web design practice, however, is a pattern for emotive criticism and design reflecting these new directions. Further, discussion of emotions and Web design is not limited to visual design or aesthetic appeal: Emotions users have as they interact with information also have design implications. The author outlines a framework for understanding users' emotional states as they seek information on the Web. It is inspired largely by Carol Kuhlthau's (1991, 1993, 1999) work in library services, particularly her information searching process (ISP), which is adapted to Web design practice. A staged approach resembling traditional models of information seeking behavior is presented here as the basis for creating appropriate search and navigation systems. This user-centered framework is flexible and solution-oriented, enjoys longevity, and considers affective factors. Its aim is a more comprehensive, conceptual analysis of the user's entire information search experience. [source] Strategic help in user interfaces for information retrievalJOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Issue 5 2002Giorgio Brajnik Although no unified definition of the concept of search strategy in Information Retrieval (IR) exists so far, its importance is manifest: nonexpert users, directly interacting with an IR system, apply a limited portfolio of simple actions; they do not know how to react in critical situations; and they often do not even realize that their difficulties are due to strategic problems. A user interface to an IR system should therefore provide some strategic help, focusing user's attention on strategic issues and providing tools to generate better strategies. Because neither the user nor the system can autonomously solve the information problem, but they complement each other, we propose a collaborative coaching approach, in which the two partners cooperate: the user retains the control of the session and the system provides suggestions. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by a conceptual analysis, a prototype knowledge-based system named FIRE, and its evaluation through informal laboratory experiments. [source] HAS PSYCHOLOGY DEBUNKED CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS?METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2006PER SANDIN Abstract: The philosophical method of conceptual analysis has been criticised on the grounds that empirical psychological research has cast severe doubt on whether concepts exist in the form traditionally assumed, and that conceptual analysis therefore is doomed. This objection may be termed the Charge from Psychology. After a brief characterisation of conceptual analysis, I discuss the Charge from Psychology and argue that it is misdirected. [source] What do we Want from a Theory of Happiness?METAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2003Daniel M. Haybron Abstract: I defend a methodology for theorizing about happiness. I reject three methods: conceptual analysis; scientific naturalism; and the "pure normative adequacy" approach, where the best conception of happiness is the one that best fills a role in moral theory. The concept of happiness is a folk notion employed by laypersons who have various practical interests in the matter, and theories of happiness should respect this fact. I identify four such interests in broad terms and then argue for a set of desiderata that theories of happiness ought to satisfy. The theory of happiness falls within the province of ethics. It should, however, be viewed as autonomous and not merely secondary to moral theory. [source] On conflict, containment and the relationship between themNURSING INQUIRY, Issue 3 2006Len Bowers A programme of research into conflict (e.g. violence, absconding, medication refusal) and containment (e.g. seclusion, special observation, physical restraint) in inpatient psychiatry has been under way at City University, London, UK, for the past 10 years. Recent research findings, plus the challenges posed by ongoing projects, have made apparent the need for greater clarity about the overarching concepts of ,conflict' and ,containment'. This paper pulls together research findings pertaining to this issue, and conducts a reasoned analysis of what common characteristics might underlie ,conflict' and ,containment'. It is concluded that these are patient threats to safety, and the staff maintenance of safety. Details are presented on the inclusions and exclusions that follow from taking such a position, and potential definitions offered. On the grounds of this conceptual analysis, plus evidence for moderate degrees of statistical association between behaviours and events in each domain, it is concluded that it is legitimate to conduct analyses at the level of total conflict and containment rates, as well as at the level of individual types of behaviours and events (e.g. verbal abuse, sedation). Some of the mathematical difficulties in the analysis of total conflict and containment are addressed, and results of a weighting exercise presented. This exercise challenges our perception of the severity of some containment measures that are becoming more commonly used in acute psychiatry. [source] The kiss of the porcupines: From attributing responsibility to forgivingPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, Issue 1 2000FRANK D. FINCHAM How to maintain relatedness in the context of being harmed by others, especially an intimate partner, is a fundamental human challenge. Forgiveness provides a way of meeting this challenge as it removes the barrier to relatedness caused by a transgression. But scientists know very little about forgiveness and its role in close relationships. This article therefore offers a conceptual analysis of forgiveness. The analysis then serves as the foundation for an organizational framework that can be used to study forgiveness in close relationships. Finally, preliminary data are presented that speak to some of the issues introduced in the article. [source] Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002JANET LEVIN In this paper I discuss the claim (advanced in various ways by Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers) that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal-functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts. [source] Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Realism and Moral NonnaturalismPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2008Stephen Finlay Authors' Introduction Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. As it consists in an array of questions about ethics, it is really a mix of (at least) applied metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and mind. The seminal texts therefore arise out of, and often assume competence with, a variety of different literatures. It can be taught thematically, but this sample syllabus offers a dialectical approach, focused on metaphysical debate over moral realism, which spans the century of debate launched and framed by G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. The territory and literature are, however, vast. So, this syllabus is highly selective. A thorough metaethics course might also include more topical examination of moral supervenience, moral motivation, moral epistemology, and the rational authority of morality. Authors Recommend: Alexander Miller, An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). This is one of the few clear, accessible, and comprehensive surveys of the subject, written by someone sympathetic with moral naturalism. David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Brink rehabilitates naturalism about moral facts by employing a causal semantics and natural kinds model of moral thought and discourse. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's book frames the debate as driven by a tension between the objectivity of morality and its practical role, offering a solution in terms of a response-dependent account of practical rationality. Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism & Moral Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996). Harman argues against the objectivity of moral value, while Thomson defends it. Each then responds to the other. Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Jackson argues that reductive conceptual analysis is possible in ethics, offering a unique naturalistic account of moral properties and facts. Mark Timmons, Morality without Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Timmons distinguishes moral cognitivism from moral realism, interpreting moral judgments as beliefs that have cognitive content but do not describe moral reality. He also provides a particularly illuminating discussion of nonanalytic naturalism. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001). A Neo-Aristotelian perspective: moral facts are natural facts about the proper functioning of human beings. Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). In this recent defense of a Moorean, nonnaturalist position, Shafer-Landau engages rival positions in a remarkably thorough manner. Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Cuneo argues for a robust version of moral realism, developing a parity argument based on the similarities between epistemic and moral facts. Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). Schroeder defends a reductive form of naturalism in the tradition of Hume, identifying moral and normative facts with natural facts about agents' desires. Online Materials: PEA Soup: http://peasoup.typepad.com A blog devoted to philosophy, ethics, and academia. Its contributors include many active and prominent metaethicists, who regularly post about the moral realism and naturalism debates. Metaethics Bibliography: http://www.lenmanethicsbibliography.group.shef.ac.uk/Bib.htm Maintained by James Lenman, professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield, this online resource provides a selective list of published research in metaethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu See especially the entries under ,metaethics'. Sample Syllabus: Topics for Lecture & Discussion Note: unless indicated otherwise, all the readings are found in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology (Malden: Blackwell, 2007). (FE) Week 1: Realism I (Classic Nonnaturalism) G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 2nd ed. (FE ch. 35). W. K. Frankena, ,The Naturalistic Fallacy,'Mind 48 (1939): 464,77. S. Finlay, ,Four Faces of Moral Realism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 820,49 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00100.x]. Week 2: Antirealism I (Classic Expressivism) A. J. Ayer, ,Critique of Ethics and Theology' (1952) (FE ch. 3). C. Stevenson, ,The Nature of Ethical Disagreement' (1963) (FE ch. 28). Week 3: Antirealism II (Error Theory) J. L. Mackie, ,The Subjectivity of Values' (1977) (FE ch. 1). R. Joyce, Excerpt from The Myth of Morality (2001) (FE ch. 2). Week 4: Realism II (Nonanalytic Naturalism) R. Boyd, ,How to be a Moral Realist' (1988) (FE ch. 13). P. Railton, ,Moral Realism' (1986) (FE ch. 14). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth' (1991) (FE ch. 38). Week 5: Antirealism III (Contemporary Expressivism) A. Gibbard, ,The Reasons of a Living Being' (2002) (FE ch. 6). S. Blackburn, ,How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist' (1993) (FE ch. 4). T. Horgan and M. Timmons, ,Nondescriptivist Cognitivism' (2000) (FE ch. 5). W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ,Expressivism and Embedding' (2000) (FE ch. 37). Week 6: Realism III (Sensibility Theory) J. McDowell, ,Values and Secondary Qualities' (1985) (FE ch. 11). D. Wiggins, ,A Sensible Subjectivism' (1991) (FE ch. 12). Week 7: Realism IV (Subjectivism) & Antirealism IV (Constructivism) R. Firth, ,Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer' (1952) (FE ch. 9). G. Harman, ,Moral Relativism Defended' (1975) (FE ch. 7). C. Korsgaard, ,The Authority of Reflection' (1996) (FE ch. 8). Week 8: Realism V (Contemporary Nonnaturalism) R. Shafer-Landau, ,Ethics as Philosophy' (2006) (FE ch. 16). T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 1. T, Cuneo, ,Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism', Philosophy Compass 2/6 (2007): 850,79 [DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00102.x]. [source] IV,Three Moments in the Theory of Definition or Analysis: Its Possibility, Its Aim or Aims, and Its Limit or TerminusPROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1pt1 2007David Wiggins The reflections recorded in this paper arise from three moments in the theory of definition and of conceptual analysis. The moments are: (I) Frege's (1894) review of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic (Vol. I), the discussion there of the paradox of analysis, and the division that Frege marks, ensuing upon his distinction of Sinn/sense from Bedeutung/reference, between two different conceptions of definition; (II) Leibniz's still serviceable account (1684, 1704) of a distinction between the clarity and the distinctness of ideas,a distinction that prompts the suggestion that the guiding purpose of lexical definition is Leibnizian clarity whereas that of real definition (as Aristotle has us conceive it) is inseparable from the pursuit of Leibnizian distinctness; (III) Leibniz's speculations (1679) concerning the limit or terminus of analysis. The apparent failure of these speculations, casting doubt as it does upon the aspirations that give rise to them (aspirations not necessarily or entirely alien to the Zeitgeist of our own epoch), points to the long-standing need to reconfigure the philosophical business of enquiry into concepts. [source] The ,self' in analytical psychology: the function of the ,central archetype' within Fordham's modelTHE JOURNAL OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2008Elizabeth Urban Abstract:, This paper concerns the self as Fordham came to conceive it after a conceptual analysis of Jung's use of the term. Fordham identified a contradiction in Jung's usage, and resolved it by reserving ,self' for a definition of the psychosomatic entirety of the individual, and using a separate term for referring to expressions of the self in human experience (e.g. symbols). Fordham tentatively suggested that the latter be termed the ,central archetype', although this was neither developed nor dropped. I explore the value of this term from a developmental perspective and, more specifically in terms of the deintegration of psyche out of an early psychosomatic unity. This draws upon infant research and an observation of a 14-month old boy. Finally, further developments are briefly described and illustrated, whereby pre-symbolic expressions of the central archetype become symbolic and come to reflect what was for Jung, the ,ultimate', ,Formation, Transformation, Eternal Mind's eternal recreation'. Translations of Abstract Cet article traite du soi tel que Fordham fut amenéà le concevoir, à partir d'une analyse conceptuelle de l'usage jungien de ce terme. Fordham identifia chez Jung une contradiction dans l'usage du terme, qu'il résolut en réservant « soi »à une définition de l'entièreté psychosomatique de l'individu et en utilisant un terme séparé pour se référer aux expressions du soi dans l'expérience humaine (les symboles). Fordham proposa de nommer « archétype central » ces occurrences du soi, mais cette proposition ne fut ni développée ni abandonnée. J'étudie dans cet article la valeur de ce terme dans une perspective développementale et, plus spécifiquement, en termes de dé-intégration de la psyché dans une unité psychosomatique précoce, ceci en référence à l' « infant research », ainsi qu'à l'observation d'un bébé de quatorze mois. Enfin, je décris et illustre brièvement des développements ultérieurs, dans lesquels des expressions pré-symboliques de l'archétype central deviennent symboliques et en viennent à refléter ce qui pour Jung était le but « ultime »; « Formation, Transformation, Eternelle recréation de l'Esprit Éternel ». Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Selbst, so wie Fordham es entwickelt und verstanden hat, einer begrifflichen Analyse von Jungs Gebrauch des Terminus Selbst folgend. Fordham erkannte einen Widerspruch in Jungs Gebrauch und er löste ihn auf, indem er das ,Selbst' für die Definition der psychosomatischen Gesamtheit des Individuums reservierte und einen gesonderten Begriff benutzte, um auf die Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten des Selbst in der menschlichen Erfahrung (z. B. Symbole) zu verweisen. Fordham schlug versuchsweise vor, dieses letztere als ,zentralen Archetypus' zu bezeichnen, wenngleich dieser Vorschlag weder weiter entwickelt, noch fallen gelassen wurde. Ich untersuche den Wert dieses Begriffes von einer entwicklungspsychologischen Perspektive aus und, noch spezifischer, in Begriffen der Deintegration der Psyche ausgehend von einer frühen psychosomatischen Einheit. Dieses verweist auf die Säuglingsforschung und die Beobachtung eines 14 Monate alten Jungen. Schließlich werden weitere Entwicklungen kurz beschrieben und illustriert, wobei die präsymbolischen Äußerungen des zentralen Archetypus zu symbolischen werden und beginnen, das zu reflektieren, was für Jung das ,Endgültige war, Formation, Transformation, des ewigen Geistes ewige Neugestaltung'. Questo lavoro tratta del sé come Fordham giunse a considerarlo, seguendo un'analisi concettuale dell'uso che Jung ne fece. Fordham scoprì una contraddizione nel modo di usarlo di Jung, e la risolse riservando il termine sé per una definizione della totalità psicosomatica dell'individuo e utilizzando un termine diverso per riferirsi all'espressione del sé nell'esperienza umana (ad es. i simboli). Fordham propose come tentativo di chiamare quest'ultimo ,archetipo centrale' sebbene questo non fosse né sviluppato né lasciato cadere. Esamino il valore di questo termine da un punto di vista evolutivo e, più specificamente in termini di deintegrazione della psiche a partire da una totalità psicosomatica. Ciò si basa sull'infant research e sull'osservazione di un bambino di 14 mesi. Infine verranno descritti e illustrati ulteriori sviluppi per mezzo dei quali le espressioni dell'archetipo centrale divengono simboliche e arrivano a riflettere ciò che per Jung era ,il definitivo'; ,Formazione, Trasformazione, creazione eterna della Mente Eterna'. Este trabajo se refiere al self tal como Fordham lo concibe, seguido de un análisis conceptual del uso que Jung le da al término. Fordham encuentra una contradicción en la utilización de Jung, y la resuelve reservando el término ,self' para definir la entidad psicosomática del individuo, y utilizando un término aparte para referirse a las expresiones del self en la experiencia humana (p.ej. los símbolos). Tentativamente Fordham sugiere que este último sea denominado como ,arquetipo central', a pesar de que este no se haya desarrollado ni caído. Exploro el valor de este término desde la perspectiva desarrollista y, mas específicamente en términos de desintegración de la psique de la unidad psicosomática temprana. Ello mediante la investigación y la observación de un niño de 14 meses de edad. Finalmente, otros desarrollos son descritos e ilustrados, donde las expresiones pre-simbólicas del arquetipo central se hacen simbólicas y reflejan lo que para Jung era, ,la finalidad', ,Formación, Transformación, la recreación de la Mente eterna'. [source] Dupré's Anti,Essentialist Objection to ReductionismTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 211 2003D. Gene Witmer In his ,The Disorder of Things' John Dupré presents an objection to reductionism which I call the ,anti,essentialist objection': it is that reductionism requires essentialism, and essentialism is false. I unpack the objection and assess its cogency. Once the objection is clearly in view, it is likely to appeal to those who think conceptual analysis a bankrupt project. I offer on behalf of the reductionist two strategies for responding, one which seeks to rehabilitate conceptual analysis and one (more concessive) which avoids commitment to any such analysis. [source] Emergence and composition of the traditional-modern bicultural self of people in contemporary Taiwanese societiesASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2006Luo Lu In the present paper, a preliminary statement on the traditional-modern bicultural self in contemporary Taiwan was proposed and our presentation was organized in four parts. First, a theoretical and conceptual analysis was attempted to describe the emergence and composition of the traditional-modern bicultural self of the contemporary Taiwanese people. The cultural and social roots of such a bicultural self were explored, and its constituting elements delineated and their interrelations analyzed. Second, relevant empirical evidence pertaining to this particular model of the Chinese bicultural self was reviewed. Third, our present model was related and compared against various existing bicultural self models. Finally, directions and issues for future research on the Chinese bicultural self were discussed. [source] Ethical investment: whose ethics, which investment?BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 3 2001Russell Sparkes Ethical or socially responsible investment (SRI) is one of the most rapidly growing areas of finance. New government regulations mean that all pension funds are obliged to take such considerations into account. However, this phenomenon has received little critical attention from business ethicists, and a clear conceptual framework is lacking. This paper, by a practitioner in the field, attempts to fill this analytical gap. It considers what difference, if any, lies between the terms ,ethical', ,green', or ,socially responsible'. It also tackles the difficult question of how any public form of investment can be called ,ethical' in an overtly pluralistic society. The paper provides an account of the historical development of ethical investment, and traces the evolution of the varying terms used to describe it. This is followed by a conceptual analysis of these terms, and a description of ethical decision-making in this context. The paper ends by considering the role of shareholder action within ethical investment, and assesses the utility of the stakeholder model as a theoretical justification. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||