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Concentrated Ownership (concentrated + ownership)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Effects of Concentrated Ownership and Owner Management on Small Business Debt Financing,

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2007
Zhenyu Wu
Using unique data and a new powerful Monte Carlo-based statistical tool, we examine the effects of concentrated ownership and owner,management (CO-OM) on the creditor,shareholder agency conflicts in small firms. A significant CO-OM effect from the small business owner's view, but insignificant from the commercial lenders' perspective, is found. Special features of informational asymmetry problems in small firms with CO-OM are also highlighted. Theoretical and empirical contributions are made to the small business management and corporate governance literature. Findings obtained from this research have important implications for small business practitioners as well as researchers, and this study can serve as a reference for policymakers and institutional lenders to assist small firms in successfully raising money through debt financing. In addition, a new powerful methodology is introduced to deal with various potential statistical biases and can be further applied to this line of research. [source]

Why Do Some Family Businesses Out-Compete?

ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 6 2006
Governance, Long-Term Orientations, Sustainable Capability
This article seeks to link the domains of corporate governance, investment policies, competitive asymmetries, and sustainable capabilities. Conditions such as concentrated ownership, lengthy tenures, and profound business expertise give some family-controlled business (FCB) owners the discretion, incentive, knowledge, and ultimately, the resources to invest deeply in the future of the firm. These long-term investments accrue from particular governance conditions and engender competitive asymmetries,organizational qualities that are hard for other firms to copy, and thus, if tied to the value chain, create capabilities that are sustainable. Investments in staff and training, e.g., create tacit knowledge and preserve it within the firm. Investments in enduring relationships with partners enhance access to resources and free firms to focus on core competencies. And devotion to a compelling mission dedicates most of these investments to a core competency. When such investments are farsighted, orchestrated, and ongoing, capabilities will tend to evolve in a cumulative trajectory, making them doubly hard to imitate and thereby extending competitive advantage. Arguments are supported by making reference to the literature on corporate governance and agency theory and to emerging research on FCBs. [source]

Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from Spain

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2009
Julio Pindado
G31; G32 Abstract This paper investigates how ownership affects the investment-cash flow sensitivity by taking into account the non-linearities of ownership with respect to firm value, and using a free cash flow index and a criterion for financial constraints to disentangle underinvestment and overinvestment. Interesting results are provided by estimating using the Generalized Method of Moments to eliminate the endogeneity problem. The alignment of interests between owners and managers and the monitoring by concentrated ownership both alleviate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow both in underinvestor and overinvestor firms. However, in the presence of controlling owners, underinvestment and overinvestment are exacerbated. [source]

Effects of Concentrated Ownership and Owner Management on Small Business Debt Financing,

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2007
Zhenyu Wu
Using unique data and a new powerful Monte Carlo-based statistical tool, we examine the effects of concentrated ownership and owner,management (CO-OM) on the creditor,shareholder agency conflicts in small firms. A significant CO-OM effect from the small business owner's view, but insignificant from the commercial lenders' perspective, is found. Special features of informational asymmetry problems in small firms with CO-OM are also highlighted. Theoretical and empirical contributions are made to the small business management and corporate governance literature. Findings obtained from this research have important implications for small business practitioners as well as researchers, and this study can serve as a reference for policymakers and institutional lenders to assist small firms in successfully raising money through debt financing. In addition, a new powerful methodology is introduced to deal with various potential statistical biases and can be further applied to this line of research. [source]

Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2004
Alexander Dyck
ABSTRACT We estimate private benefits of control in 39 countries using 393 controlling blocks sales. On average the value of control is 14 percent, but in some countries can be as low as ,4 percent, in others as high a +65 percent. As predicted by theory, higher private benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership, and more privately negotiated privatizations. We also analyze what institutions are most important in curbing private benefits. We find evidence for both legal and extra-legal mechanisms. In a multivariate analysis, however, media pressure and tax enforcement seem to be the dominating factors. [source]