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Competitive Pricing (competitive + pricing)
Selected AbstractsCompetitive Pricing in Markets with Different Overhead Costs: Concealment or Leakage of Cost Information?JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2008EDDY CARDINAELS ABSTRACT This paper experimentally investigates how leaders and followers in a duopoly set prices for two product markets that have different overhead costs. In a fully crossed two-by-two design, we manipulate the participants' private cost report quality as either low or high, representing the extent to which these reports reveal that product markets have different overhead costs. We show that when only the leader is given a high-quality cost report, private cost information of higher quality is better incorporated into market prices (that are observable to participants). Both the leader and follower improve in profits and their prices better reflect the differences in overhead costs because the follower infers information from the leader's prices (information leakage). In contrast, when only the follower receives a high-quality cost report, the leader's profits and prices do not improve. This occurs because the follower conceals cost information when the leader has a low-quality cost report. [source] TRANSFERABLE STOCK OPTIONS (TSOS) AND THE COMING REVOLUTION IN EQUITY-BASED PAYJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2004Brian J. Hall The dominant form of equity pay in the U.S. will change dramatically when accounting rules are changed (most likely in 2005) to require companies to charge the cost of their stock option plans on their income statements. Many companies are already switching from stock options to other forms of equity pay, especially restricted stock. The most notable switcher was Microsoft, the world's largest user of stock option pay. In July 2003, partnering with J.P. Morgan, Microsoft created a onetime transferable stock option (TSO) program that allowed holders of underwater Microsoft options to sell their options to J.P. Morgan in return for restricted shares. But the most important consequence of this transaction may not be a widespread shift by corporate America to restricted shares, but rather the creation of a more costeffective kind of stock option. By clearing the potentially messy hurdles involving taxes, accounting, SEC rules, and "transaction mechanics," Microsoft has opened the door for TSOs to be considered as an ongoing equitypay instrument, perhaps replacing standard stock options (which are not transferable). TSOs share the key advantages of restricted stock in terms of providing robust retention and ownership incentives and higher valuecost efficiency, while maintaining the key "leverage" advantage of options. In so doing, they create significant upside (and downside) while largely avoiding the "pay for pulse" problem of restricted stock. They also introduce the discipline of competitive pricing by third-party bidders. The bid prices of investment banks create nearly all of the information required for accurate estimates of option cost, which should foster greater board accountability and improved corporate governance. [source] Market power in tobacco: Measuring multiple marketsAGRIBUSINESS : AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 1 2007Kellie Curry Raper Traditional market power analyses of the U.S. cigarette manufacturing industry consider monopoly power exertion by manufacturers in selling cigarettes to consumers. Market characteristics combined with government policy make it plausible that manufacturers exert monopsony market power in procuring tobacco. We investigate this possibility in the U.S. and international tobacco markets by extending nonparametric tests to include simultaneously potential monopoly market power with potential monopsony market power in multiple input markets, allowing both Hicks-neutral and biased technical change. We use annual data from the cigarette manufacturing industry from 1977 to 1993. Results indicate substantial departures from competitive pricing in the procurement of domestic tobacco, supporting the postulate that cigarette manufacturers appropriate monopsony rents despite, and perhaps at times through, U.S. tobacco farm policy. Results are less clear with respect to monopsony market power exertion in imported leaf tobacco procurement by cigarette manufacturers. Finally, results indicate that monopoly market power exertion is relatively small and that, when the possibility of monopsony market power exertion is admitted, monopoly market power exertion is no longer problematic.[EconLit citations: L100, L660]. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 23: 35,55, 2007. [source] Lindahl Pricing, Nonrival Infrastructure, and Endogenous GrowthJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2001Dipankar Dasgupta The paper constructs a model of endogenous growth where infrastructure is an accumulable stock generating a nonrival input service. A typical market economy cannot attain the socially optimum steady state path, since nonrivalry precludes competitive pricing of infrastructure. However, there exist agent specific prices for the infrastructural service, a price for the infrastructural stock, a rate of interest, and a subsidy for the representative household that can sustain the optimal path as a dynamic Lindahl equilibrium. The rates of return from physical and infrastructural capital equal the rate of interest. Investment programs are socially optimum. The government's budget is balanced. [source] Craft Retailers' Criteria for Success and Associated Business StrategiesJOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2002Rosalind C. Paige This research was designed to fill the void in understanding how art,related retailers define and achieve success. A two,phase data collection process was implemented. Preliminary personal interviews were conducted with 12 craft retailers followed by a mailed survey to 1000 craft retailers in nine southeastern U.S. states. Factor analysis was employed to reduce the number of items for defining success. Cluster analysis followed to develop empirical groupings of craft retail businesses based on the success factor scores, of which four different groups were identified. Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used to compare retail clusters related to business strategy variables of competitive strategies, product assortment, pricing, and distribution strategies, and networking activities. Significant differences were found in the craft retailers' business strategies used to achieve success. Craft retail entrepreneurs were found to define success with both traditional criteria such as profit and growth and also with intrinsic factors such as personal satisfaction and the opportunity to elevate the craft tradition. Successful small craft retail firms offered more focused product assortments of specialized craft products, implemented more differentiated strategies of stocking unique crafts in their assortments, as well as offering unique services to educate consumers about crafts, craft artisans, and a region's culture. Craft retailers who reported greater success did not engage in competitive pricing. Collaborative strategies included networking among family, friends, and business peers. [source] | ||||||||||