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Compensation Practices (compensation + practice)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

International compensation practices: a ten-country comparative analysis

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2002
Kevin B. Lowe
This article presents a comparative study of compensation, by exploring nine items which measure pay and benefits practices in ten locations (nine countries and one region). First, similarities and differences in employee compensation are examined. Second, emerging issues for international compensation are identified. Third, gaps are identified between current practice and employee preferences for future compensation. Overall, the results of this study provide some support for previous research, although a number of counterintuitive findings are identified with respect to the ways in which culture might be expected to impact employee preferences for cross-cultural compensation practices. The research suggests several challenges for compensation practice and directions for future research. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source]

Unionization, Compensation, and Voice Effects on Quits and Retention

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 4 2000
John E. Delery
This study explores the relationships among unionization, compensation practices, and employee attachment (quit rates and tenure) among trucking companies to assess the applicability of Freeman and Medoff's exit/voice argument. Unionization was associated with lower quit rates, higher tenure, a better compensation package, and stronger voice mechanisms. The relationship of unionization to quit rates and tenure becomes nonsignificant after accounting for compensation (pay and benefits), and voice mechanisms do not add explanatory variance. [source]

Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2005
Lucian A. Bebchuk
In their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, the authors of this article provided a comprehensive critique of U.S. executive pay practices and the corporate governance processes that produce them, and then offered a number of proposals for improving both pay and governance. This article presents an overview of their analysis and proposals. The authors' analysis suggests that the pay-setting process in U.S. public companies has strayed far from the economist's model of "arm's-length contracting" between executives and boards in a competitive labor market. In place of this conventional model, which is standard in corporate law as well as economics, the authors argue that managerial power and influence play a major role in shaping executive pay, and in ways that end up imposing significant costs on investors and the economy. The main concern is not the levels of executive pay, but rather the distortion of incentives caused by compensation practices that fail to tie pay to performance and to limit executives' ability to sell their shares. Also troubling are "the correlation between power and pay, the systematic use of compensation practices that obscure the amount and performance insensitivity of pay, and the showering of gratuitous benefits on departing executives." To address these problems, the authors propose three kinds of changes: 1)increases in transparency, accomplished in part by new SEC rules requiring annual corporate disclosure that provides "the dollar value of all forms of compensation" (including "stealth compensation" in the form of pensions and other post-retirement benefits) and an analysis of the relationship between the past year's pay and performance, as well as more timely and informative disclosure of insider stock purchases and sales; 2)improvements in pay practices, including greater use of "indexed" stock and options to limit "windfalls," tougher limits on executives' freedom to sell shares, and greater use of "clawback" provisions in bonus plans that would force executives to return pay for performance that proves to be temporary; and 3)improvements in board accountability to shareholders, including limits on the use of staggered boards and granting shareholders the right to nominate directors and propose changes to governance arrangements in the corporate charter. [source]