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Company Directors (company + director)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	50%

Selected Abstracts

Short-run Returns around the Trades of Corporate Insiders on the London Stock Exchange

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2002
Sylvain Friederich
Previous work examined the long-run profitability of strategies mimicking the trades company directors in the shares of their own company, as a way of testing for market efficiency. The current paper examines patterns in abnormal returns in the days around these trades on the London Stock Exchange. We find movements in returns that are consistent with directors engaging in short-term market timing. We also report that some types of trades have superior predictive content over future returns. In particular, medium-sized trades are more informative for short-term returns than large ones, consistent with Barclay and Warner's (1993) ,stealth trading' hypothesis whereby informed traders avoid trading in blocks. Another contribution of this study is to properly adjust the abnormal return estimates for microstructure (spread) transactions costs using daily bid-ask spread data. On a net basis, we find that abnormal returns all but disappear. [source]

Wrongful trading and the liability of company directors: a theoretical perspective,

LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2005
Andrew Keay
When a company enters insolvent liquidation, the liquidator might take proceedings, under s 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, against one or more of the company's directors on the basis that the director(s) engaged in wrongful trading. If found liable, a director might be ordered by a court to contribute to the assets of the company. This article examines whether subjecting directors to liability f or wrongful trading is theoretically justifiable. After briefly explaining the origin, aims, rationale and operation of s 214, the article then rehearses and evaluates the arguments propounded by several scholars against any justijkation for a provision in the mould of s 214. Next the article investigates some of the reasons given for supporting the provision. Following this some consideration is given to whether it is possible to opt out of s 214, and, if not, whether this should be permitted. It is concluded, inter alia, that while s 214 is not representative of good regulation, some form of prohibition against wrongful trading can be justified on theoretical grounds. [source]

Beyond Agency Conceptions of the Work of the Non-Executive Director: Creating Accountability in the Boardroom

BRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 2005
John Roberts
This paper examines board effectiveness through an examination of the work and relationships of non-executive directors. It is based on 40 in-depth interviews with company directors, commissioned for the Higgs Review. The paper observes that research on corporate governance lacks understanding of the behavioural processes and effects of boards of directors. Whilst board structure, composition and independence condition board effectiveness it is the actual conduct of the non-executive vis-à-vis the executive that determines board effectiveness. Data about behaviour and relationships on boards suggest that traditional theoretical divisions between agency and stewardship theory, and control versus collaboration models of the board do not adequately reflect the lived experience of non-executive directors and other directors on the board. Developing accountability as a central concept in the explanation of how boards operate effectively enables the paper to both challenge the dominant grip of agency theory on governance research and support the search for theoretical pluralism and greater understanding of board processes and dynamics. Practically, the work suggests that corporate governance reform will be undermined by prescription that supports distant perceptions of board effectiveness but not the actual effectiveness of boards. [source]