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Communist Party (communist + party)
Kinds of Communist Party Selected AbstractsCooption and Repression in the Soviet UnionECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2001Dmitriy Gershenson The Soviet ruling elite, the nomenklatura, used both cooption and political repression to encourage loyalty to the communist regime. Loyalty was critical both in defusing internal opposition to the rule of the nomenklatura and in either deterring or defeating foreign enemies of the Soviet Union. The cost of coopting people into the Communist Party was a decrease in the standard of living of members of the nomenklatura, whereas the cost of political repression was the danger that members of the nomenklatura would themselves be victimized. We assume that the nomenklatura determined the extent of cooption and the intensity of political repression by equating perceived marginal benefits and marginal costs. We use this assumption to construct an account of the historical evolution of policies of cooption and political repression in the Soviet Union. [source] Correcting misconceptions about the development of social work in China: a response to Hutchings and TaylorINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE, Issue 1 2008Cunfu Jia Hutchings and Taylor, in their article entitled ,Defining the profession? Exploring an international definition of social work in the China context'[International Journal of Social Welfare 16: 381,389], no doubt had good intentions in offering their account of the development of social work in China, as the opening and concluding sections of the article show. Within the text, however, their critique of contemporary social work in China is, in my opinion, unfair in relation to, among other things, (i) the undemocratic nature of the Chinese political system, which they say hinders the development of social work in China; (ii) the ideology of the Communist Party, the government, and traditional Chinese culture, which they say are at odds with Western social work's value system and methodology; thus concluding that (iii) it is doubtful whether social work development in China could integrate with that of the international community. In this response, I comment on (i) the information base of the authors; (ii) the disconnection between their conceptualisation and historical facts; and (iii) their use of the international definition of social work. [source] "Peace Is the Concern of Every Mother": Communist and Social Democratic Women's Antiwar Activism in British Columbia, 1948,1960PEACE & CHANGE, Issue 4 2010Brian T. Thorn This article discusses the antiwar activism of Canadian women within two left-wing political movements: the revolutionary Communist Party of Canada and the social democratic Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation. The piece focuses on the period from 1948 to 1960, which is often seen as a time of retreat for the feminist movement in North America. This article engages in a critical dialogue with the concept of "maternalism," the notion that women had a special responsibility to speak out against wars and international conflicts that threatened the lives of the world's children and the husbands, brothers, and sons who would be killed in future wars. Maternalist ideology represented a double-edged sword for these left-wing women and for feminism. On one hand, it offered them a route into radical protest against war and capitalism. On the other hand, in its portrayal of women as "natural" wives and mothers, maternalism, at least in the short term, failed to advance women's equality. Nonetheless, this article concludes that, given the conservative context of the time, maternalism was a useful strategy for the left as well as for feminism. [source] Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled MediaPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2009John James Kennedy Literature on public opinion in China suggests that public support for the Chinese Communist party (CCP) is quite high. No matter how survey questions regarding regime support are phrased, the results are the same. The obvious question arises: how does an authoritarian regime, such as the PRC, garner the support of the vast majority of its citizens? I argue that the exposure-acceptance model best explains the high level of public support in China. This model suggests that educated citizens, who are politically aware, display high levels of political support within an authoritarian regime, but citizens at the highest levels of education are more resistant to political messages and tend to have lower levels of support. However, in a developing country such as China there are unequal educational opportunities for rural and urban citizens. This has a significant influence on how education affects regime support. Despite lower levels of support among the most educated citizens, the CCP still manages to maintain a high level of popular support through strict control over the media and education system. [source] Reclaiming Legitimacy in ChinaPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 3 2010HEIKE HOLBIG The contemporary politics of China reflect an ongoing effort by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to reclaim the right to rule in light of the consequences of economic development, international pressures, and historical change. China's regime stands out within the Asian region for its success in the effort of adapting to change and ensuring its continuity. Focusing on changes in China's elite discourse during the reform period and particularly during the last decade, the aim of this article is to elaborate the relative importance of various sources of legitimacy as they are shifting over time, as well as inherent dilemmas and limitations. There is evidence of an agile, responsive, and creative party effort to relegitimate the postrevolutionary regime through economic performance, nationalism, ideology, culture, governance, and democracy. At the same time, the study finds a clear shift in emphasis from an earlier economic-nationalistic approach to a more ideological-institutional approach. La política contemporánea China refleja un esfuerzo sostenido del Partido Comunista Chino por continuar ejerciendo el derecho de gobernar a la luz de las consecuencias del desarrollo económico, las presiones internacionales, y el cambio histórico. El régimen Chino se destaca dentro de la región de Asia por su éxito en el esfuerzo de adaptarse al cambio y asegurar su continuidad. Centrándonos en los cambios en el discurso de la elite China durante el periodo de reforma y particularmente durante la última década, el objetivo de este artículo es el de detallar la relativa importancia de las diferentes fuentes de legitimidad y sus variaciones en el tiempo, así como los dilemas y limitaciones inherentes. Existe evidencia de un esfuerzo ágil, sensible y creativo para relegitimar el régimen post-revolucionario a partir del desempeño económico, el nacionalismo, la ideología, la cultura, un buen gobierno, y la democracia. De la misma forma, este estudio encuentra un cambio claro en el énfasis del régimen de un enfoque económico-nacionalista a uno ideológico-institucional. [source] Europeanization and the Communist Successor Parties in Post-Communist PoliticsPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 1 2006John Ishiyama In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the domestic political consequences of "Europeanization." This article seeks to focus on developing a framework by which the effects of Europeanization on the communist successor parties might be investigated and to initially examine that framework in light of the evidence presented by four "critical cases",the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), the Party of Social Democrats of Romania (PDSR/PSD), and the Party of the Democratic Left in Slovakia (SDL). Using textual analysis of party programs to ascertain the identity of the parties, and examining their organizational structures, this article finds that Europeanization itself does not explain the evolution of political parties in post-communist politics. Rather, domestic political considerations play a more important role in shaping these parties. [source] Vladimir Putin on Raising Russia's Birth RatePOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 2 2006Article first published online: 26 JUN 200 The total fertility rate in what is now the Russian Federation has been below replacement level during much of the last 40 years. By the late 1990s it was barely above 1.2 children per woman. There may have been some recovery since: the United Nations estimate for 2000,05 is 1.33. Other reports set the 2004 rate at 1.17. Countries elsewhere in Europe have fertility levels that are equally low or even lower, but the Russian demographic predicament is aggravated by mortality that is exceptionally high by modern standards. Thus, despite large-scale net immigration (mostly due to return of ethnic Russians from other republics of the former Soviet Union), the population in the last decade-and-a-half has been shrinking: of late by some 700,000 persons per year. The United Nations medium estimate assumes a steady recovery of the total fertility rate to reach a level of 1.85 by 2050 and a considerable improvement in survival rates during that period,notably an increase in male life expectancy at birth of more than ten years. It also assumes further modest net immigration at a steady rate, amounting to a total of somewhat over 2 million by midcentury. Under these stipulations the projected population of Russia in 2050 would be 112 million,some 31 million below its present size. By that time, 23 percent of the population would be aged 65 and older. The government's concern with the demographic situation of the country and its intent to improve it have been manifest in various official statements, notably in the annual State of the Nation Address given by the president to the Federal Assembly (or State Duma). Formerly a subordinate theme (see the Documents item in the June 2005 issue of PDR), the issue constituted the centerpiece of the 2006 Address, delivered on 10 May in the Kremlin by President Vladimir Putin. Policies regarding health and mortality were given short shrift in the speech,road safety, bootleg alcohol, and cardiovascular diseases being singled out as areas of special concern. The president's remarks on immigration are of greater interest: immigration of skilled persons is to be encouraged. They must be educated and law-abiding and must treat the country's culture and national tradition with respect. The main focus of the address, however, was on the birth rate and policies to be introduced to raise it. (The need for an "effective demographic policy" as seen from the Kremlin was of course also voiced in the later stages of the Soviet era. See, for example, the excerpts from the addresses delivered by then Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and Premier Nikolai Tikhonov to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1981 that appear in the Documents item in the June 1981 issue of PDR.) In detail and specificity, and also in terms of the economic cost of the measures envisaged, Putin's speech is without parallel in addressing population policy matters by a head of state in Europe. The demo graphically relevant portion of the address is reproduced below in the English translation provided by the website of the president's office «http://www.kremlin.ru/eng». Calling Russia's demographic situation "the most acute problem facing our country today," Putin terms its causes as "well known," but lists only economic factors, presumably because these, at least in principle, lend themselves to remedial measures that the Russian government, its coffers now swollen with petrodollars, should be able to provide. His starkly economic interpretation of the problem of low fertility (in Russia apparently taking the form of convergence to a single-child pattern) may be overly optimistic. Causes of electing to have only one child may lie deeper than those Putin names: low incomes, inadequate housing, poor-quality health care and inadequate educational opportunities for children, and even lack of food. Putin's proposed policies to attack these problems in part consist of a major upgrading of existing child care benefits: to 1,500 roubles a month for the first child and 3,000 roubles for the second. The latter amount is roughly equivalent to US$113, a significant sum given Russian income levels. Maternity leave for 18 months at 40 percent of the mother's previous wage (subject to a ceiling) and compensation for the cost of preschool childcare round out the basic package proposed. Benefits are to be parity-dependent, highlighting the pronatalist intent of the measures. Thus the child benefit for the second child is to be twice as large as for the first, and payment for preschool childcare is to cover 20 percent of parental costs for the first, 50 percent for the second, and 70 percent for the third child. Putin mentions "young families" as recipients, but the payments are clearly directed to mothers. (Even the usually obligatory reference to western European,style paternity leave is missing.) The most innovative element of the proposed measures, however, is support for women who have a second birth. The state should provide such women (not the child, as called for in some European precedents) "with an initial maternity capital that will raise their social status and help resolve future problems." Citing expert opinion, Putin says that such support "should total at least 250,000 roubles [about $9,300] indexed to annual inflation." Evidently assuming, optimistically, that there will be many takers, Putin says that carrying out all these plans will require not only a lot of work but also "an immense amount of money." The measures are to be launched starting January 2007. [source] Civil Service Law in the People's Republic of China: A Return to Cadre Personnel ManagementPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Hon S. Chan Despite the outward appearance of depoliticization, the civil service in China today is actually being repoliticized. This paper compares the 1993 Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants with the Civil Service Law approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in April 2005. The 2005 reform formalized what had been a historical pattern,the Communist Party holds tight control over leadership change and management at various levels. The Civil Service Law has turned the Communist Party of China into a political institution that has become the source of both civil service empowerment and control. Although civil service reform in China differs markedly from approaches adopted elsewhere, China is clearly expanding its political control to ensure greater leverage over the bureaucracy. In this regard, China is in line with the global trend. That said, civil service reform in China has focused on structural elements and formal reorganizations, whereas most industrialized democracies have engaged in a dialectic between individualist and corporate responses to managerial questions. An understanding of the Chinese ability to adopt reforms,while strengthening its traditional hold,provides key perspectives not only on the world's largest nation and a rapidly emerging force in global political and economic relationships but also on the Chinese experience with important public sector reforms that have occurred in many other countries over recent decades. [source] Economic Returns to Communist Party Membership: Evidence From Urban Chinese Twins,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 523 2007Hongbin Li This article estimates the returns to membership of the Chinese Communist Party using unique twins data we collected from China. Our OLS estimate shows a Party premium of 10%, but the within-twin-pair estimate becomes zero. One interpretation is that the OLS premium is due to omitted ability and family background. This interpretation suggests that Party members fare well not because of their political status but because of the superior ability that made them Party members. The estimates are also consistent with another interpretation that Party membership not only has its own effect but also has an external effect on siblings. [source] Violence in Paradise: André Masson's MassacresART HISTORY, Issue 5 2001Laurie J. Monahan Focusing on André Masson's Massacres, a series of images depicting men killing women and occasionally boys, produced over a period of four years (1930,34) this article explores the ways in which violence and tragedy were imagined as a potentially revolutionary force. Disenchanted with the strategies of the organized left and the alliance the Surrealists had attempted to forge with the Communist Party, Masson reconfigured his political and pictorial strategies in the Massacres, using highly repetitive, figurative imagery of murder and catastrophe. Stripped of any traces of ,civilized' behaviour, Masson's Massacres produce tragedy without resolution, a collective, unstructured violence that nevertheless turns on gendered power relations. [source] State,society relations in contemporary Vietnam: An examination of the arena of youthASIA PACIFIC VIEWPOINT, Issue 3 2006Phuong An Nguyen Abstract: This paper offers an analysis of the relations between youth and the socialist state in contemporary Vietnam, which sheds light on the wider state,society relations. Amid rapid social changes brought about by economic liberalisation, the Vietnamese Communist Party and socialist state may no longer be the sole driving force that motivates young people. As they seek to be both in control of and in touch with youth, the leaders of the Party and state find themselves negotiating between maintaining their ideological integrity and accommodating the changing needs and desires of youth. An analysis of recent events demonstrates that youth are no longer merely a subject of political propaganda and mass mobilisation, but instead they have evolved to become an important social actor urging the leadership to further reform itself. As young people express a desire to embrace socioeconomic and cultural changes wrought by processes of marketisation and globalisation, the Party and state are actively reforming themselves not only to respond to young people's desires and aspirations, but also to strengthen their political authority and leadership, and to consolidate their control and management of youth amid the new conditions of a market-oriented society. Overall, this paper sheds light on the changes in what is considered to be the ,strategic' relationship between the state and youth, and the wider process of sociopolitical transformation in present-day Vietnam. [source] The Politics of Social Harmony: Ruling Strategy and Health Care Policy in Hu's ChinaASIAN POLITICS AND POLICY, Issue 2 2009Bin Yu This study seeks to explain the causes of social welfare policy change in a single-party authoritarian system. Using the evolution of Chinese health care policy as an example, it discerns why the Hu Jintao administration opted for a compensation-oriented welfare policy paradigm in the absence of adequate interest articulation and apparent electoral accountability, despite the virtual collapse of the Chinese social welfare system during the 1990s. I explore the hypothesis that a high level of political pressure, coupled with a high degree of economic openness, drove the Chinese Communist Party to alter its ruling strategy, a political paradigm that best ensures its monopoly on political power and consequently produces distinct implications for public policy outputs. This study suggests that authoritarian regimes can and do compensate the citizenry under certain circumstances. Further, it also reveals a self-adaptation process initiated by a single-party authoritarian system. [source] The "ANRC has Withdrawn its Offer": Paul Kirchhoff, Academic Freedom and the Australian Academic Establishment,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 3 2006Geoffrey Gray The main focus of examinations of intellectual suppression and censorship of scholars and academics in Australia has been on the post-1945 period, particularly the Cold War. The interwar years have, in comparison, received little attention, resulting in a lack of historical understanding of the development of censorious structures and traditions in Australia. In this paper I discuss the exclusion of Paul Kirchhoff, a German anthropologist, a member of the German Communist Party and a Jew, from undertaking anthropological research in Australia, including its external territories, between 1931 and 1932. Kirchhoff applied for a research grant from the Australian National Research Council (ANRC) which, although awarded, was withdrawn once the Executive Committee was informed by the Australian government that the British MI5 considered him a security risk. His membership of the Communist Party was the reason put forward. This case also underlines the transnational aspect of security services and the international reach of academic anthropology. Kirchhoff was a victim of the ANRC's sympathetic collaboration with the Commonwealth Attorney-General's office to stifle academic and civil freedom. [source] A Troika of Agitators: Three Comintern Liaison Agents in Australia, 1920,22AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 1 2006Kevin Windle Peter Simonoff, Consul-General in Australia for the Bolshevik regime from early 1918 to mid-1921, is known to have played an active role in the founding of the Communist Party of Australia in 1920, and in promoting the "Trades Hall" faction against the ASP faction when the new party divided. Paul Freeman and Alexander Zuzenko, both deported from Australia in 1919, made return visits to Australia from Moscow in 1921 and 1922 to carry the process further. Freeman, however, backed the ASP faction, while Zuzenko lent his support to "Trades Hall". This paper uses previously unknown reports to the Comintern's Executive Committee (ECCI) from Simonoff, Freeman and Zuzenko, as well as Australian sources, to study the relations between these men and their mutually contradictory actions. [source] The Melbourne Jewish Left, Communism and the Cold War.AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 4 2003Responses to Stalinist Anti-Semitism, the Rosenberg Spy Trial This article explores the political marginalisation of the Melbourne Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism during the Cold War. Attention is drawn to contending views about the nature of the Council's links with communism. By comparing the Council's response to two coinciding international events during 1952 and 1953 - the anti-Jewish show trials in Stalinist Eastern Europe, and the Rosenberg spy trial in the USA - evidence is derived confirming the dominance of communist influence within the Jewish Council at that time. In order, I examine the Australian Jewish political context in which the Council operated and its relations with the wider Jewish community prior to the Cold War; explore rival arguments concerning the Council's links with communism and the Australian Communist Party; examine the major features of Stalinist anti-Semitism and the Council's response to them; recount the Council's reaction to the Rosenberg Spy Trial and Doctors Plot; and conclude that the Council lost influence because it fell under the control of a pro-Soviet group unwilling to recognise and attack anti-Semitism on the political left. [source] The 1934 Southern Railway Strike in PeruBULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH, Issue 1 2004Paulo Drinot This article examines the 1934 Southern Railway Strike, a largely neglected yet important episode in Peruvian labour history. The strike, which pitted the British-owned Peruvian Corporation against its workforce, resulted in victory for the company. Drawing on a variety of original primary sources, I examine the factors that shaped the development and outcome of the strike. I pay particular attention to the strategies developed by the company managers to defeat the workers. The success of these strategies, I suggest, owed in no small measure to the volatile political situation created by the insurgency tactics of APRA and the Communist Party, which made victory for the workers politically impossible, and to the capacity of the Peruvian Corporation managers to draw on ,imperial connections' in their dealings with the Peruvian government. [source] Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled MediaPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2009John James Kennedy Literature on public opinion in China suggests that public support for the Chinese Communist party (CCP) is quite high. No matter how survey questions regarding regime support are phrased, the results are the same. The obvious question arises: how does an authoritarian regime, such as the PRC, garner the support of the vast majority of its citizens? I argue that the exposure-acceptance model best explains the high level of public support in China. This model suggests that educated citizens, who are politically aware, display high levels of political support within an authoritarian regime, but citizens at the highest levels of education are more resistant to political messages and tend to have lower levels of support. However, in a developing country such as China there are unequal educational opportunities for rural and urban citizens. This has a significant influence on how education affects regime support. Despite lower levels of support among the most educated citizens, the CCP still manages to maintain a high level of popular support through strict control over the media and education system. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||