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Committee Independence (committee + independence)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Kinds of Committee Independence

  • audit committee independence
    		•

    Selected Abstracts

    Audit Committee Independence and Disclosure: choice for financially distressed firms

    CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2003
    Joseph V. Carcello
    This study examines the relation between audit committee independence and disclosure choice for financially distressed US firms. The tenor of both the financial statement notes and Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) is considered. For firms experiencing financial distress, there is a significant positive relation between the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee and the optimism of the going-concern discussion in both the notes and the MD&A. These results add to the growing body of literature documenting a relation between audit committee independence and financial reporting quality. [source]

    Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information

    ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2010
    Jodie Nelson
    M40; M41 Abstract We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001,2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements' continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive executive stock option information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders' Association) and regulatory intervention. [source]

    Effect of regulatory oversight on the association between internal governance characteristics and audit fees

    ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2008
    El'fred Boo
    G34; M42; N40 Abstract We examine the relationship between internal governance, external audit monitoring and regulatory oversight for a sample comprising industrial companies and financial/utility companies subject to additional industry-specific regulation. Our results indicate that the association between audit fees and board/audit committee independence and size are weaker for regulated companies. These observations are consistent with the notion that regulatory oversight partially substitutes the external audit as a monitoring mechanism. However, boards/audit committees with more multiple directorships demand a more extensive audit in the presence of regulatory oversight to protect their reputation capital. Our study enhances our understanding of the complex relationships among the major corporate governance elements. [source]

    Audit Quality, Corporate Governance, and Earnings Management: A Meta-Analysis

    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AUDITING, Issue 1 2010
    Jerry W. Lin
    Earnings management is of great concern to corporate stakeholders. While numerous studies have investigated the effects of various corporate governance and audit quality variables on earnings management, empirical evidence is rather inconsistent. This meta-analysis identifies 12 significant relationships by integrating results from 48 prior studies. For corporate governance, the independence of the board of directors and its expertise have a negative relationship with earnings management. Similar negative relationships exist between earnings management and the audit committee's independence, its size, expertise, and the number of meetings. The audit committee's share ownership has a positive effect on earnings management. For audit quality, auditor tenure, auditor size, and specialization have a negative relationship with earnings management. Auditor independence, as measured by fee ratio and total fee, is also a deterrent to earnings management. [source]