Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Collective Intentionality (collective + intentionality)
Selected AbstractsRules, Social Ontology and Collective IdentityJOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, Issue 3 2009NUNO MARTINS Mainstream game theory explains cooperation as the outcome of the interaction of agents who permanently pursue their individual goals. Amartya Sen argues instead that cooperation can only be understood by positing a type of rule-following behaviour that can be (and often is) out of phase with the pursuit of individual goals, due to the existence of a collective identity. However, Sen does not clarify the ontological preconditions for the type of social behaviour he describes. I will argue that Sen's account of collective identity can be best interpreted in the light of John Searle's notion of collective intentionality, while Sen's explanation of rule-following behavior and agency is best understood using the critical realist transformational model of social activity. [source] Play, games, and the development of collective intentionalityNEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT, Issue 115 2007Hannes Rakoczy Playing games, particularly pretense games, is one of the areas where young children first enter into collective, conventional practices. This chapter reviews recent empirical data in support of this claim and explores the idea that games present a cradle for children's growing into societal and institutional life more generally. [source] Searle, Rationality, and Social RealityAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2003Alex Viskovatoff ABSTRACT . This paper makes a critical assessment of some contributions of John Searle of direct relevance to social science,his theory of rationality and his theory of institutions. The former is criticized for being able to account for how people can act for "external reasons," as opposed to their desires, only in cases where an obligation derives from a promise; a rival account is much more general. The latter is criticized on three grounds: (1) his theory of institutions can only account for a narrow range of social reality, that deriving from some kind of "enactment"; (2) his notion of "collective intentionality" is unnecessary to explain institutions and is introduced only so that Searle can stay within an individualistic, Cartesian theory of the mind, something of no interest to social scientists; (3) his account implies that if an institution exists, "we collectively accept it," whereas it may in fact not be accepted, but merely tolerated or submitted to. [source] The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and EmpiricalPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 6 2007Francesco Guala Ontological debates have always been prominent in the philosophy of social science. Philosophers have typically conceived of such debates as pre-scientific attempts to reform social scientific practice, rather than as post-scientific reflections on a firm body of scientific knowledge. Two celebrated contemporary research programs in social ontology , collective intentionality and evolutionary game theory , also follow this approach. In this paper I illustrate their central elements and criticize their weak empirical foundations. I finish by reviewing some work that combines empirical evidence with theoretical reflection, and suggest that it constitutes the way forward in the philosophy of social science. [source] | ||||||||||