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Collective Decisions (collective + decision)
Selected AbstractsCentralisation versus Decentralisation of Public Policies: Does the Heterogeneity of Individual Preferences Matter?,FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2008Carlo Mazzaferro This paper explores the role of the heterogeneity of fiscal preferences in the assignment of policy tasks to different levels of government (decentralisation versus centralisation). With reference to a sample of European countries, a median-voter mechanism of collective decision is assumed to work at both a national and a supranational level. Using data from a large international survey (the International Social Survey Programme, ISSP), a series of econometric models are estimated in order to make individual attitudes representative of different categories of public expenditure and of different countries. The dominance of decentralisation over centralisation or vice versa is determined on the basis of the utility loss that each individual suffers in connection with the distance between his or her own most preferred level of public expenditure and that chosen by the national/supranational median voter. The main finding is that, differently from the predictions of Oates's decentralisation theorem, the assignment of responsibilities at the supranational level (centralisation) for a number of public expenditure programmes (healthcare, education, unemployment benefits) dominates (or is close to dominating) decentralisation, even in the absence of economies of scale and interregional spillovers. However, when the possibility of interjurisdictional mobility is explicitly considered, in line with the predictions of Tiebout's model, decentralisation dominance becomes more and more substantial and also prevails in the sectors where, under the nonmobility assumption, the assignment of responsibilities at the supranational level is efficient. [source] The relationship between NGOS and businesses in the public arena: An empirical analysis for SpainJOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2009Carmen Valor At the beginning of this century, corporate social responsibility was included in the public agenda. In certain countries, policy-making takes place in semi-public forums, in which NGOs are asked to participate. However, a different situation may be found in other countries. This paper analyses the relationship between businesses and NGOs in the public arena in Spain. By applying grounded theory, the authors summarize this relationship in the dynamics of approach-withdrawal. Firms have pushed to withdraw Advocacy NGOs from public forums, whose main purpose was policy-making. The explicit argument to justify this collective decision is the lack of foundational legitimacy of NGOs. Firms understand that these NGOs are not legitimized to be a counterbalancing force of corporations. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The role of collegial interaction in continuing professional developmentTHE JOURNAL OF CONTINUING EDUCATION IN THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS, Issue 4 2007Anna R. Gagliardi MLS Abstract Introduction: Many physicians seek information from colleagues over other sources, highlighting the important role of interaction in continuing professional development (CPD). To guide the development of CPD opportunities, this study explored the nature of cancer-related questions faced by general surgeons, and how interaction with colleagues addressed those questions. Methods: This study involved thematic analysis of field notes collected through observation and transcripts of telephone interviews with 20 surgeons, two pathologists, one medical oncologist, and one radiation oncologist affiliated with six community hospitals participating in multidisciplinary cancer conferences by videoconference in one region of Ontario, Canada. Results: Six multidisciplinary cancer conferences (MCCs) were observed between April and September 2006, and 11 interviews were conducted between December 2006 and January 2007. Sharing of clinical experience made possible collective decision making for complex cancer cases. Physicians thought that collegial interaction improved awareness of current evidence, patient satisfaction with treatment plans, appropriate care delivery, and continuity. By comparing proposed treatment with that of the group and gaining exposure to decision making for more cases than they would see in their own practices, physicians developed clinical expertise that could be applied to future cases. Little collegial interaction occurred outside these organized sessions. Discussion: These findings highlight the role of formally coordinated collegial interaction as an important means of CPD for general surgeons. Investment may be required for infrastructure to support such efforts and for release of health professional time for participation. Further research is required to examine direct and indirect outcomes of collegial interaction. [source] PLANNING THROUGH INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE: NO ESCAPE FROM SOCIAL CHOICE DILEMMASECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2005Tore Sager The thrust of the theory of preference aggregation is that it is impossible to design institutions guaranteeing collective decisions that are both consistent and fair. Proponents of deliberative democracy have used this as an argument for decision-making based on dialogue rather than voting. Communicative public planning - producing plans through public participation exercises - is seen as an integral part of deliberative democracy. It is argued here, however, that the inclusive dialogue of this style of planning cannot promise escape from arbitrariness and does not necessarily deliver improved local decision-making. [source] Deliberation, Legitimacy, and Multilateral DemocracyGOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2003Loren A. King Is deliberation essential to legitimate democratic governance? Deliberation may have epistemic value, improving the quality of information and arguments. Deliberation may be transformative, shaping beliefs and opinions. Or deliberation may be part of a conception of justice that constrains authority, by requiring that procedures be justified in terms of reasons acceptable to those burdened by authoritative decisions. Although appealing, the epistemic and transformative arguments are limited by the scale and complexity of many problems for which democratic solutions are sought. But the reason,giving argument is persuasive whenever collective decisions allow burdens to be imposed on others. [source] MAKING UP THE TRUTHPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2009STEVEN L. REYNOLDS A recent account of the meaning of ,real' leads to a view of what anti-realism should be that resembles fictionalism, while not being committed to fictionalism as such or being subject to some of the more obvious objections to that view. This account of anti-realism explains how we might ,make up' what is true in areas such as mathematics or ethics, and yet these made-up truths are resistant to alterations, even by our collective decisions. Finally it is argued that the sort of anti-realism suggested explains the appearance that the ethical domain supervenes on the naturalistic. [source] When consensus choice dominates individualism: Jensen's inequality and collective decisions under uncertaintyQUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2010Charles F. Manski D7; D81; H42 Research on collective provision of private goods has focused on distributional considerations. This paper studies a class of problems of decision under uncertainty in which an efficiency argument for collective choice emerges from the mathematics of aggregating individual payoffs. Consider decision making when each member of a population has the same objective function, which depends on an unknown state of nature. If agents knew the state of nature, they would make the same decision. However, they may have different beliefs or may use different decision criteria to cope with their incomplete knowledge. Hence, they may choose different actions even though they share the same objective. Let the set of feasible actions be convex and the objective function be concave in actions, for all states of nature. Then Jensen's inequality implies that consensus choice of the mean privately chosen action yields a larger mean payoff than does individualistic decision making, in all states of nature. If payoffs are transferable, the mean payoff from consensus choice may be allocated to Pareto dominate individualistic decision making. I develop these ideas. I also use Jensen's inequality to show that a planner with the power to assign actions to the members of the population should not diversify. Finally, I give a version of the collective-choice result that holds with consensus choice of the median rather than mean action. [source] Governance in Government: A Modest ProposalTHE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2005NICK MONCK This article recalls evidence in the Hutton and Butler reports about changes in decision-making procedures in government, including the role of Cabinet and of the Cabinet Office in supporting collective decisions; and the failure to circulate papers on Iraq to Cabinet or to use a cabinet committee. The government`s response has been largely intelligence-specific and evades the wider criticisms. This article makes the modest proposal that Parliament should impose standards of governance on governments that broadly match those already imposed, with government support, on the boards of private sector companies (based on the Combined Code of Corporate Governance and the Companies Act 1985). It would make sense for the Select Committee on Public Administration to work out and publish a specific proposal. The government would be asked to report after a year on action taken to improve governance standards. This proposal should be pursued after the election. [source] | |||||||||||||