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Collective Action Problems (collective + action_problem)
Selected AbstractsPharmaceutical Innovation as a Collective Action ProblemTHE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 2 2005An Application of the Economic Theory of Alliances First page of article [source] The Microfoundations of Corporatist Intervention: Dairying's Collective Action Problems in Canada and England during the 1930s Depression,CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY/REVUE CANADIENNE DE SOCIOLOGIE, Issue 4 2000Roy C. Barnes Dans cet article, nous démontrons l'utilité d'une approche microfondamentale dans la compréhension de phénomènes sociaux de plus grande ampleur. Grâce à l'analyse des questions de recours collectifs, qui se sont posées aux différents acteurs, au Canada et en Angleterre, nous établissons un lien informel entre la macrovariable de « structure de l'industrie » et les formes divergentes de réglementation corporatiste instaurées dans les années 1930. Après avoir expliqué les caracteéristiques centrales de l'approche microfondamentale et souligné les aspects importants de la théorie des jeux et du concept de choix rationnel, nous examinons les témoignages élaborés, présentés dans le cadre de commissions et de comités du gouvernement. Ces données comparatives et historiques fournissent les bases qui permettent de comprendre la manière dont les différentes structures de l'industrie ont causé des problèmes de réglementation uniques pour les gouvernements canadien et britannique. This paper argues for the utility of a microfoundational approach to understanding larger social phenomena. Through an analysis of the collective action problems experienced by the various actors in both Canada and England, I wish to establish a causal link between the macro-level variable "industry structure" and the divergent forms of corporatist regulation instituted in the 1930s. After clarifying the central features of my microfoundational approach and highlighting important aspects of game theory and rational choice explanations, I review the extensive sets of testimonies given before governmental commissions and committees. These comparative and historical data provide the foundations for understanding how distinct industry structures produced unique sets of regulatory problems for the Canadian and British governments. [source] THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODSECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 4 2007MARTIN SEFTON A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero-sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment. (JEL C92) [source] Policy Failure and Petroleum Predation: The Economics of Civil War Debate Viewed ,From the War-Zone'GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 2 2005Jenny Pearce The analysis of armed conflict in the post Cold War era has been profoundly influenced by neoclassical economists. Statistical approaches have generated important propositions, but there is a danger when these feed into policy prescriptions. This paper first compares the economics of civil war literature with the social movement literature which has also tried to explain collective action problems. It argues that the latter has a much more sophisticated set of conceptual tools, enriched by empirical study. The paper then uses the case of multipolar militarization in oil-rich Casanare, Colombia, to demonstrate complexity and contingency in civil war trajectories. State policy failure and civil actors can be an important source of explanation alongside the economic agendas of armed actors. [source] The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations,INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2010Alexandru Grigorescu The study asks why so many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established recently offices and policies intended to facilitate the oversight of their bureaucracies. It begins from a set of hypotheses derived from the principal-agent (PA) literature, a natural starting point for answering this question. It then considers explanations based on norms and institutional diffusion to offer a more complete explanation of developments. The study argues that the empowerment of democratic norms and institutional diffusion processes across IGOs have altered member-states' preferences and allowed them to overcome collective action problems involved in the adoption of oversight mechanisms. The hypotheses are tested across more than 70 organizations. The results suggest that arguments extracted from the PA literature and the one on norms allow us to understand which IGOs are more likely to have bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. On the other hand, models that also take into account diffusion processes allow us to understand better when such mechanisms are adopted. [source] From Militancy to Clientelism: Labor Union Strategies and Membership Trajectories in Contemporary ChileLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2010Indira Palacios-Valladares ABSTRACT For the past 30 years, Chilean unionism has been shrinking. Through a comparison of the membership trajectories of 26 unions in two firms between 1990 and 2004, this article explains why some unions defied this trend and how their success affected overall union density in their firms. It argues that the unions that experienced the most favorable membership outcomes were those that, at key junctures of firm restructuring, earliest or most aggressively established a partnership relationship with management. However, in a context of great labor weakness, these cases of union accommodation took the form of exclusive patron-client exchanges, which exacerbated collective action problems and further eroded union density. [source] Collective Action through Voluntary Environmental Programs: A Club Theory PerspectivePOLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 4 2007Aseem Prakash Voluntary environmental programs are institutions that seek to induce firms to produce positive environmental externalities beyond what government regulations require. Drawing on club theory, this paper outlines a theoretical perspective to study the relationship between program design and program effectiveness. Effective programs have rule structures that mitigate two central collective action problems inherent in producing positive environmental externalities: attracting firms to participate in the program and ensuring that participating firms adhere to program obligations. Because program efficacy can be undermined by collective action problems associated with free riding and shirking, effective voluntary clubs should be designed to mitigate these challenges. [source] Performance Decline and Turnaround in Public Organizations: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,BRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2005Pauline Jas Public sector performance is currently a significant issue for management practice and policy, and especially the turnaround of those organizations delivering less than acceptable results. Theories of organizational failure and turnaround derive largely from the business sector and require adaptation to the public service. The performance of public organizations is more complex to measure, is related to institutional norms, and the idea of ,failure' is problematic. Empirical findings from a real-time, longitudinal study of poorly performing English local authorities are used to develop an initial theory of performance failure and turnaround suited to public organizations. The paper argues that the typical performance of public organizations over time is cyclical. Where cognition and leadership capability are absent, organizations fail to self-initiate turnaround. In this situation authoritative external intervention is necessary. The strategies applied are principally concerned with building a leadership capability that engages senior politicians and managers in order to overcome inertia and collective action problems. The theory is presented in the form of seven propositions that provide a basis for further research across the public sector. [source] The Microfoundations of Corporatist Intervention: Dairying's Collective Action Problems in Canada and England during the 1930s Depression,CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY/REVUE CANADIENNE DE SOCIOLOGIE, Issue 4 2000Roy C. Barnes Dans cet article, nous démontrons l'utilité d'une approche microfondamentale dans la compréhension de phénomènes sociaux de plus grande ampleur. Grâce à l'analyse des questions de recours collectifs, qui se sont posées aux différents acteurs, au Canada et en Angleterre, nous établissons un lien informel entre la macrovariable de « structure de l'industrie » et les formes divergentes de réglementation corporatiste instaurées dans les années 1930. Après avoir expliqué les caracteéristiques centrales de l'approche microfondamentale et souligné les aspects importants de la théorie des jeux et du concept de choix rationnel, nous examinons les témoignages élaborés, présentés dans le cadre de commissions et de comités du gouvernement. Ces données comparatives et historiques fournissent les bases qui permettent de comprendre la manière dont les différentes structures de l'industrie ont causé des problèmes de réglementation uniques pour les gouvernements canadien et britannique. This paper argues for the utility of a microfoundational approach to understanding larger social phenomena. Through an analysis of the collective action problems experienced by the various actors in both Canada and England, I wish to establish a causal link between the macro-level variable "industry structure" and the divergent forms of corporatist regulation instituted in the 1930s. After clarifying the central features of my microfoundational approach and highlighting important aspects of game theory and rational choice explanations, I review the extensive sets of testimonies given before governmental commissions and committees. These comparative and historical data provide the foundations for understanding how distinct industry structures produced unique sets of regulatory problems for the Canadian and British governments. [source] | |||||||||||||