Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Collective Action (collective + action)
Terms modified by Collective Action Selected AbstractsCommunity Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in IndonesiaDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 2 2007Aniruddha Dasgupta ABSTRACT In response to the well documented limitations of top-down, modernist and authoritarian approaches that have dominated development, practitioners and academics increasingly promote more community-based approaches. The World Bank uses the term ,community driven development' to describe projects that increase a community's control over the development process. In an analysis of a community driven poverty alleviation project in Indonesia, this article examines the vulnerability of such an approach to elite capture. The expected relationships among a community's capacity for collective action, elite control over project decisions and elite capture of project benefits were not found. In cases where the project was controlled by elites, benefits continued to be delivered to the poor, and where power was the most evenly distributed, resource allocation to the poor was restricted. Communities where both non-elites and elites participated in democratic self-governance, however, did demonstrate an ability to redress elite capture when it occurred. [source] Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest ManagementDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 3 2004Amy R. Poteete Collective action for sustainable management among resource-dependent populations has important policy implications. Despite considerable progress in identifying factors that affect the prospects for collective action, no consensus exists about the role played by heterogeneity and size of group. The debate continues in part because of a lack of uniform conceptualization of these factors, the existence of non-linear relationships, and the mediating role played by institutions. This article draws on research by scholars in the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research network which demonstrates that some forms of heterogeneity do not negatively affect some forms of collective action. More importantly, IFRI research draws out the interrelations among group size, heterogeneity, and institutions. Institutions can affect the level of heterogeneity or compensate for it. Group size appears to have a non-linear relationship to at least some forms of collective action. Moreover, group size may be as much an indicator of institutional success as a precondition for such success. [source] Collective Action and Property Rights for Poverty Reduction: A Review of Methods and ApproachesDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 3 2009Esther Mwangi This article provides a review of literature on the relationship between poverty and the institutions of collective action and property rights, as outlined in the conceptual framework of Di Gregorio et al. (2008). Using the elements of the framework as a guide, it offers an overview of how researchers and practitioners identify and evaluate these concepts. The article emphasises the multidimensionality of poverty and the necessity of applying various approaches and tools to conceptualising and measuring it. In addition to highlighting the crucial role that institutions play in poverty reduction, it shows power relations and the political context to be of fundamental importance in poverty-related studies. [source] Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate ChangeECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Issue 4 2003W. Neil Adger Abstract: Future changes in climate pose significant challenges for society, not the least of which is how best to adapt to observed and potential future impacts of these changes to which the world is already committed. Adaptation is a dynamic social process: the ability of societies to adapt is determined, in part, by the ability to act collectively. This article reviews emerging perspectives on collective action and social capital and argues that insights from these areas inform the nature of adaptive capacity and normative prescriptions of policies of adaptation. Specifically, social capital is increasingly understood within economics to have public and private elements, both of which are based on trust, reputation, and reciprocal action. The public-good aspects of particular forms of social capital are pertinent elements of adaptive capacity in interacting with natural capital and in relation to the performance of institutions that cope with the risks of changes in climate. Case studies are presented of present-day collective action for coping with extremes in weather in coastal areas in Southeast Asia and of community-based coastal management in the Caribbean. These cases demonstrate the importance of social capital framing both the public and private institutions of resource management that build resilience in the face of the risks of changes in climate. These cases illustrate, by analogy, the nature of adaptation processes and collective action in adapting to future changes in climate. [source] Was Mancur a Maoist?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2003An Essay on Kleptocracy, Political Stability Much of Mancur Olson's work explored the link between government structure and economic development. This paper provides a framework for thinking about this link that exposes both the powerful insights and the deep tensions in Olson's work. In The Rise and Decline of Nations Olson argued that instability was good for democratic accountability because it upset entrenched interests. In contrast, after the fall of the socialist regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union, Olson argued that the stability of a single autocrat or "stationary bandit" was superior to the competitive rent seeking of competing "roving bandits." I argue that there is a real inconsistency in Olson's thinking on the role of stability and change in political life; I do this by developing the connections between Olson's classic Logic of Collective Action and his subsequent writing. The paper concludes by building on Olson's insights to point the way to a more complete analysis of democracy and transition. [source] Helping the Less Fortunate: A Predictive Model of Collective ActionJOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 8 2005Ann M. Beaton A model of factors that lead members of an advantaged group to perform collective action intended to help a disadvantaged out-group is tested. A distinction is made between easy and demanding collective activities. Two different routes are expected to lead to collective action. First, an indirect link is proposed between a common in-group identity and collective action. This link is believed to be mediated by perceived mobilization resources. Second, the link between relative deprivation on behalf of others (RDBO) and collective action will vary according to the type of behavior considered. While, RDBO is expected to be directly associated with easy collective behavior, the link between RDBO and demanding collective activities is mediated through perceived mobilization resources. In turn, perceived resources are linked to both forms of collective behaviors. The predicted model is tested among 273 undergraduate respondents. Findings point to the relevance of all factors considered and the pivotal role of perceived mobilization resources on collective action. [source] Leading by Example and International Collective ActionJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2005ANDRÉ ROSSI DE OLIVEIRA This paper investigates leading by example as a policy prescription for international collective action to provide summation public goods. A country leads by example by committing to a minimal level of provision, and by matching higher contributions there beyond. In an evolutionary game-theoretic setting, we establish conditions for leading by example to be a neutrally stable strategy; i.e., to noncooperatively implement the cooperative outcome. These conditions are related to the degree of concavity of the contributors' utility functions and the incentives for free riding. They can be tested against empirical estimates of the public benefits of an international regime. [source] Metaphors of Protest: A Classification of Motivations for Collective ActionJOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, Issue 4 2009Martijn Van Zomeren This article proposes a classification of motivations for collective action based in three of Tetlock's (2002) metaphors of social functionalism (i.e., people as intuitive economists, politicians, and theologians). We use these metaphors to map individual- and group-based motivations for collective action from the literature onto the distinction between individuals who are strongly or weakly identified with their social group. We conclude that low identifiers can be best understood as intuitive economists (supported by both early and recent work on collective action), whereas high identifiers can be best thought of as intuitive politicians or theologians (as recent work on social identity has started to explore). Interestingly, our classification reveals a remarkable lack of attention for the intuitive theologian's motivation for collective action. We therefore develop new hypotheses for future research, and derive recommendations for policy and practice from our analysis. [source] Patronage Politics and Contentious Collective Action: A Recursive RelationshipLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 3 2009Javier Auyero ABSTRACT Based on ethnographic reanalysis and on current qualitative research on poor people's politics, this article argues that routine patronage politics and nonroutine collective action should be examined not as opposite and conflicting political phenomena but as dynamic processes that often establish recursive relationships. Through a series of case studies conducted in contemporary Argentina, this article examines four instances in which patronage and collective action intersect and interact: network breakdown, patron's certification, clandestine support, and reaction to threat. These four scenarios demonstrate that more than two opposing spheres of action or two different forms of sociability, patronage, and contentious politics can be mutually imbricated. Either when it malfunctions or when it thrives, clientelism may lie at the root of collective action. [source] The Repoliticization of Collective Action After Neoliberalism in PeruLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 3 2008Moisés Arce ABSTRACT Examining the popular uprising against the privatization of electric service in Arequipa and other revolts against foreign direct investment in Peru, this article explores the changing basis of antigovernment mobilizations against economic liberalization. It suggests that the transition from Fujimori to Toledo led to a major shift in the political opportunity structure, creating a more conducive environment for greater levels of mobilization while increasing the leverage of challengers, along with their chances to achieve positive goals. These new forms of collective resistance are geographically segmented or territorialized; they present concrete demands; and they often involve unexpected actors, yet they resonate at the national level. These results confirm the expectations from recent repoliticization literature insofar as collective actors remain acutely responsive to market reforms in more democratic settings. [source] Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action: The Impact of Selective IncentivesAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 2 2010Andreas P. Kyriacou I integrate the notion of intrinsic motivation, applied to economics most notably by Frey (1997), into the logic of individual contributions toward collective goods as analyzed since Olson ([1965] 1971). This illuminates the many and various ways through which the intrinsic motivation to contribute toward such goods can be crowded out by the application of selective incentives. I suggest that the crowding-out effect increases the cost to society of organizing the provision of collective goods and argue in favor of designing selective incentives that mitigate this effect. [source] Collective Action through Voluntary Environmental Programs: A Club Theory PerspectivePOLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 4 2007Aseem Prakash Voluntary environmental programs are institutions that seek to induce firms to produce positive environmental externalities beyond what government regulations require. Drawing on club theory, this paper outlines a theoretical perspective to study the relationship between program design and program effectiveness. Effective programs have rule structures that mitigate two central collective action problems inherent in producing positive environmental externalities: attracting firms to participate in the program and ensuring that participating firms adhere to program obligations. Because program efficacy can be undermined by collective action problems associated with free riding and shirking, effective voluntary clubs should be designed to mitigate these challenges. [source] The Phenomenon of Collective Action: Modeling Institutions as Structures of CarePUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 3 2008Raul Lejano This essay develops a theory of how institutions can work through the web of social relationships that exist in a place rather than through formal, bureaucratic lines of authority. In contrast to models that characterize institutions as organizational structures, roles, and patterns of exchange, this model depicts institutions as constituted primarily through the active working and reworking of relationships. Rather than adopt the network literature's focus on the overall pattern of relationships and exchanges carried out between policy actors, the author focuses directly on the nature of the relationships themselves and portrays the institution as the playing out of these relationships, employing Carol Gilligan's notion of care. The model of care is used to analyze the evolution, unraveling, and restoration of resource management systems on the Turtle Islands in Southeast Asia. The model provides lessons for institution building, especially for community-centered governance. [source] Social Networks and Collective ActionAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2009David A. Siegel Despite growing attention to the role of social context in determining political participation, the effect of the structure of social networks remains little examined. This article introduces a model of interdependent decision making within social networks, in which individuals have heterogeneous motivations to participate, and networks are defined via a qualitative typology mirroring common empirical contexts. The analysis finds that some metrics for networks' influence,size, the prevalence of weak ties, the presence of elites,have a more complex interaction with network structure and individual motivations than has been previously acknowledged. For example, in some contexts additional network ties decrease participation. This presents the potential for selection bias in empirical studies. The model offers a fuller characterization of the role of network structure and predicts expected levels of participation across network types and distributions of motivations as a function of network size, weak and strong ties, and elite influence. [source] The Logic of Expressive Collective Action: When will Individuals ,Nail their Colours to the Mast'?BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 4 2007Philip Jones Individuals do not act collectively simply because they recognise common interests; collective interests can be defined as collective goods and collective goods are non-excludable. In ,large' groups instrumental individuals have no incentive to act because individual action is imperceptible. But are individuals always this instrumental? If it is a mistake to assume that collective action occurs ,naturally' when common interests are recognised, it is a mistake to ignore awareness of common interests. Individuals derive satisfaction from expressing identity with common interests but when will individuals choose to ,nail their colours to the mast'? [source] Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the Contemporary Media EnvironmentCOMMUNICATION THEORY, Issue 4 2005Bruce Bimber Collective action theory, which is widely applied to explain human phenomena in which public goods are at stake, traditionally rests on at least two main tenets: that individuals confront discrete decisions about free riding and that formal organization is central to locating and contacting potential participants in collective action, motivating them, and coordinating their actions. Recent uses of technologies of information and communication for collective action appear in some instances to violate these two tenets. In order to explain these, we reconceptualize collective action as a phenomenon of boundary crossing between private and public domains. We show how a reconceptualized theory of collective action can better account for certain contemporary phenomena, and we situate traditional collective action theory as a special case of our expanded theory. [source] Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest ManagementDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 3 2004Amy R. Poteete Collective action for sustainable management among resource-dependent populations has important policy implications. Despite considerable progress in identifying factors that affect the prospects for collective action, no consensus exists about the role played by heterogeneity and size of group. The debate continues in part because of a lack of uniform conceptualization of these factors, the existence of non-linear relationships, and the mediating role played by institutions. This article draws on research by scholars in the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research network which demonstrates that some forms of heterogeneity do not negatively affect some forms of collective action. More importantly, IFRI research draws out the interrelations among group size, heterogeneity, and institutions. Institutions can affect the level of heterogeneity or compensate for it. Group size appears to have a non-linear relationship to at least some forms of collective action. Moreover, group size may be as much an indicator of institutional success as a precondition for such success. [source] Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in IndonesiaDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 2 2007Aniruddha Dasgupta ABSTRACT In response to the well documented limitations of top-down, modernist and authoritarian approaches that have dominated development, practitioners and academics increasingly promote more community-based approaches. The World Bank uses the term ,community driven development' to describe projects that increase a community's control over the development process. In an analysis of a community driven poverty alleviation project in Indonesia, this article examines the vulnerability of such an approach to elite capture. The expected relationships among a community's capacity for collective action, elite control over project decisions and elite capture of project benefits were not found. In cases where the project was controlled by elites, benefits continued to be delivered to the poor, and where power was the most evenly distributed, resource allocation to the poor was restricted. Communities where both non-elites and elites participated in democratic self-governance, however, did demonstrate an ability to redress elite capture when it occurred. [source] Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest ManagementDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 3 2004Amy R. Poteete Collective action for sustainable management among resource-dependent populations has important policy implications. Despite considerable progress in identifying factors that affect the prospects for collective action, no consensus exists about the role played by heterogeneity and size of group. The debate continues in part because of a lack of uniform conceptualization of these factors, the existence of non-linear relationships, and the mediating role played by institutions. This article draws on research by scholars in the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research network which demonstrates that some forms of heterogeneity do not negatively affect some forms of collective action. More importantly, IFRI research draws out the interrelations among group size, heterogeneity, and institutions. Institutions can affect the level of heterogeneity or compensate for it. Group size appears to have a non-linear relationship to at least some forms of collective action. Moreover, group size may be as much an indicator of institutional success as a precondition for such success. [source] The Distribution of Subsidized Agricultural Credit in Brazil: Do Interest Groups Matter?DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 3 2001Steven M. Helfand This article examines the unequal distribution of credit and credit subsidies in the Brazilian agricultural sector from 1969 to 1990. Total credit subsidies exceeded US$ 40 billion in this period. The distribution across crops is studied econometrically. After controlling for area, the crops that benefited most had superior access to credit institutions, were tradeable, had high prices, and were not perennials. Proxies for collective action by crop were an unimportant determinant of credit policy, while a bias in favour of large producers was evident. Alternative explanations for this bias are discussed, including collective action by farm size and transaction costs in lending. [source] A Strategic Approach to Multistakeholder NegotiationsDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 2 2001David Edmunds Environment and development practitioners increasingly are interested in identifying methods, institutional arrangements and policy environments that promote negotiations among natural resource stakeholders leading to collective action and, it is hoped, sustainable resource management. Yet the implications of negotiations for disadvantaged groups of people are seldom critically examined. We draw attention to such implications by examining different theoretical foundations for multistakeholder negotiations and linking these to practical problems for disadvantaged groups. We argue that negotiations based on an unhealthy combination of communicative rationality and liberal pluralism, which underplays or seeks to neutralize differences among stakeholders, poses considerable risks for disadvantaged groups. We suggest that negotiations influenced by radical pluralist and feminist post-structuralist thought, which emphasize strategic behaviour and selective alliance-building, promise better outcomes for disadvantaged groups in most cases, particularly on the scale and in the historical contexts in which negotiations over forest management usually take place. [source] Collective Action and Property Rights for Poverty Reduction: A Review of Methods and ApproachesDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 3 2009Esther Mwangi This article provides a review of literature on the relationship between poverty and the institutions of collective action and property rights, as outlined in the conceptual framework of Di Gregorio et al. (2008). Using the elements of the framework as a guide, it offers an overview of how researchers and practitioners identify and evaluate these concepts. The article emphasises the multidimensionality of poverty and the necessity of applying various approaches and tools to conceptualising and measuring it. In addition to highlighting the crucial role that institutions play in poverty reduction, it shows power relations and the political context to be of fundamental importance in poverty-related studies. [source] Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate ChangeECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Issue 4 2003W. Neil Adger Abstract: Future changes in climate pose significant challenges for society, not the least of which is how best to adapt to observed and potential future impacts of these changes to which the world is already committed. Adaptation is a dynamic social process: the ability of societies to adapt is determined, in part, by the ability to act collectively. This article reviews emerging perspectives on collective action and social capital and argues that insights from these areas inform the nature of adaptive capacity and normative prescriptions of policies of adaptation. Specifically, social capital is increasingly understood within economics to have public and private elements, both of which are based on trust, reputation, and reciprocal action. The public-good aspects of particular forms of social capital are pertinent elements of adaptive capacity in interacting with natural capital and in relation to the performance of institutions that cope with the risks of changes in climate. Case studies are presented of present-day collective action for coping with extremes in weather in coastal areas in Southeast Asia and of community-based coastal management in the Caribbean. These cases demonstrate the importance of social capital framing both the public and private institutions of resource management that build resilience in the face of the risks of changes in climate. These cases illustrate, by analogy, the nature of adaptation processes and collective action in adapting to future changes in climate. [source] Guilds, efficiency, and social capital: evidence from German proto-industryECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 2 2004SHEILAGH OGILVIE This article considers recent economic theories about guilds in the light of evidence from a German proto-industrial region. The empirical findings cast doubt on views that guilds existed because they were efficient institutional solutions to market failures relating to product quality, training, and innovation. However, guilds did generate a ,social capital' of shared norms, common information, mutual sanctions, and collective political action. This social capital benefitted guild members, but harmed outsiders and the wider economy. The article concludes that economic theories of collective action and interlinked markets can explain why guilds were widespread while not necessarily being efficient. [source] THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR PLAYERSECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 4 2004Braham Dabscheck Professional team sports have developed a series of monopsonistic labour market rules that have severely limited the economic rights and income earning potential of players. These rules have been linked to the peculiar economics of professional team sports-the need of competitors to combine to produce a product (games). The paper identifies such rules. It also provides information on individual challenges by players to these rules before common law courts and collective action by players who formed player associations. The paper also outlines the trajectory of collective-bargaining negotiations in Australian rules football, soccer, rugby union, and cricket. [source] Trust, public participation and environmental governance in Hong KongENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2009Stephen Tsang Abstract This paper explores the role of trust in environmental governance and its role in facilitating collective action through public participation in making decisions on environmental policies in Hong Kong. Opinions from key stakeholders with regard to the environmental performance of the Hong Kong government and public participation in Hong Kong were collected. Their opinions help to explain the hypothesized ,trust deficit' in Hong Kong. A trust-based framework was used to identify the appropriate stakeholder participation strategy for environmental governance in Hong Kong. Given that the level of trust in experts, trust between stakeholders and trust in government decision-makers are all low, a deliberation strategy using professional facilitation is recommended in implementing public participation in Hong Kong to rebuild trust. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Who is that (wo)man in the street?EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2001From the normalisation of protest to the normalisation of the protester The time has long since passed that protests and demonstrations were regarded as the possible beginning of violent revolutionary ferment. Venting dissatisfaction or making demands in the streets has become commonplace in our ,demonstration,democracy'. In this article we examine whether this normalisation of street protest also means that more heterogeneous groups of people take to the streets. Have citizens become potentially peaceful protesters or is protest politics still the domain of union militants, progressive intellectuals, and committed students? In answering these questions we will use the three research methods most commonly used for studying collective action: population surveys, protest event,analysis and interviews with protesters at demonstrations. [source] Identity affirmation and social movement supportEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 6 2008Bernd Simon It is argued that the power of collective identification to mobilize people for collective action such as social movement support derives at least partly from processes of identity affirmation. The hypothesized identity-affirming function of social movement support is tested in two laboratory experiments which revolve around collective identity as a supporter of the peace movement. In Experiment 1, we predicted and found that people who strongly identified with the peace movement showed more movement support (i.e. made more monetary donations to the peace movement) under conditions of uncertain as opposed to certain possession of identity as a movement supporter. In Experiment 2, we replicated this finding, but also found, in accordance with the notion of substitution, that the mobilizing effect of uncertain collective-identity possession was undermined when an identity symbol was available that could function as a surrogate for more costly identity-affirming behaviour. Further conceptual and social implications of the identity-affirming function of social movement support are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Explaining enduring empowerment: a comparative study of collective action and psychological outcomesEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2005John Drury An ethnographic study of two crowd events was carried out in order to develop a hypothesis about the experience of empowerment in collective action. Qualitative comparison of an anti-roads occupation and a mass eviction suggests that empowerment as an outcome of collective action is a function of the extent to which one's own action is understood as expressing social identity, a process we term collective self-objectification. The comparison indicates that empowerment is not reducible to the experience of success. While both events came to be construed by participants as ,victories', their associated emotions (joy versus despair and anger) and rationales for future participation (confidence versus enhanced self-legitimacy) were different. The relation between collective self-objectification and self-efficacy is discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The Free Movement of Goods as a Possible ,Community' Limitation on Industrial ConflictEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2000Giovanni Orlandini The aim of this essay is to underline the fact that the process of achieving single market integration is very likely to influence the regulation of industrial conflict. In this perspective, the Commission v France judgment is analysed, in which the ECJ,through a combined interpretation of Article 30 (now 28) and Article 5 (now 10) of the Treaty,states that a Member State is obliged to adopt all ,appropriate measures' to remove any ,obstacles' impeding the free circulation of goods caused by private persons. A new Regulation (n. 2679/98) has followed the ECJ decision, instituting a system of notification of such obstacles arising, or the threat of them, and the right of the Commission to demand a formal reply from a State on whether it has taken, or will be taking the necessary and proportionate measures. The analysis of the principles adopted by the ECJ and of the Regulation shows that, at Community level, pressure is exerted on States to prevent the exercise of collective action as effectively as possible, if this damages inter-State trade. A transnational limit on industrial conflict thus emerges in the Community order, which may well affect the equilibria of national industrial relations in various ways. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||