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Co-decision Procedure (co-decision + procedure)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences50%

Selected Abstracts

More power to the European Parliament?

ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 35 2002
Abdul G. Noury
SUMMARY Many observers have expressed scepticism about granting more power to the European Parliament. The sceptics believe that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) do not vote in a disciplined way and that they vote more often with their country group than with their European Party. Using a unique database consisting of all roll call votes by each individual MEP between 1989 and 1999 (over 6000 votes by over 1000 different MEPs), we show that the sceptics are wrong. Our data shows clearly that MEPs vote more along party lines than along country lines. Party cohesion is comparable to that of the US Congress and is increasing over time whereas country cohesion is low and declining. In short, politics in the European Parliament generally follows the traditional left,right divide that one finds in all European nations. These findings are valid across issues, even on issues like the structural and cohesion funds where one would expect country rather than party cohesion. In votes where the EP has the most power , those held under the so-called co-decision procedure , MEPs participate more and are more party-cohesive. In our opinion, this unique empirical analysis provides grounds for justifying a generalization of the co-decision procedure. [source]

The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the European Union,A Continental Perspective

EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2001
Xenophon A. Yataganas
This paper presents an initial response to the conclusions of the Nice Summit and the new EU Treaty which emerged from it. It consists of two parts: in the first I discuss the climate in which the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) took place and the opening positions of the Institutions, the Member States, and the applicant countries. The results achieved at Nice are set out in the second part, with special emphasis on the themes that mark a shift of power within the Community's institutional architecture; i.e. the extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council and the co-decision procedure with the European Parliament, the reweighting of votes and the composition of the Institutions with a view to an enlargement which is both imminent and unprecedented in the history of the EU. I conclude that while the results of the IGC and the new Treaty of Nice fall short of what is needed in an EU with ambitions on a continental scale, they do mark another stage in the process of European integration and the permanent evolution of its constitution. In this sense, the balance of power is likely to be different from what it has been in the past. The Franco-German axis has been severely weakened, the UK and Spain seem to be determined to play a central role, and the smaller countries are seeking to retain some influence over how the process works. New alliances are likely to emerge, particularly after enlargement, with Germany in search of a dominant position, France desperately trying to preserve the status quo, and the UK wanting to influence the direction of moves towards integration from the inside. Nice seems to mark an interim stage in this process. A new IGC has already been scheduled for 2004. There is no doubt that the post-Nice period will be one of transition towards a new distribution of power within the EU, sanctioned by a new, highly constitutional treaty. [source]

Co-decision and Inter-Committee Conflict in the European Parliament Post-Amsterdam1

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 2 2006
Charlotte Burns
This article makes a two-fold contribution to the European Parliament (EP) literature. First, it challenges the dominant assumption that post-Amsterdam the EP has experienced an increase in its powers. Through analysis of the Socrates case the article shows that the EP is now potentially weaker under the post-Amsterdam co-decision procedure (co-decision II), than it was under the earlier variant, co-decision I. Second, the article uncovers a hitherto overlooked aspect of internal divisions within the parliament, by revealing that there is scope for inter-committee conflict in the EP over budgetary allocations for multi-annual programmes. It is argued that such conflict can weaken the parliament in co-decision negotiations with the council, and that the negotiation of the EU's new multi-annual budgetary framework provides the perfect conditions for such internecine conflict to occur once more. [source]

The Legislative Powers and Impact of the European Parliament

JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 2 2003
Andreas Maurer
This article investigates the impact of the legislative powers of the European Parliament (EP), particularly the co-decision procedure. After explaining the development of the legislative procedures, the article analyses the extent to which the different procedures have been used since their creation. It then considers how growing legislative power has affected the EP's internal development, how far the EP has been able to influence EU legislation, and whether EP involvement in legislation has enhanced or impeded the efficiency of the EU legislative process. The article concludes by considering possible areas for further reform of the EP's role in the EU's legislative system. [source]

The role of the European Parliament in forest environment issues

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2002
Nikolaos D. Hasanagas
This article deals with the potential influence of European parliamentarism on environmental policy in forested areas. It is addressed as much to policy analysts and parliamentary theorists as to those most directly involved therein, for example international lobbyists and policy-makers. The relative powers of the European Parliament, Council of Ministers and Commission and assorted interest groups (forestry and environmental activists) will be considered through the analysis of documents and expert interviews. The gradual extension of the European Parliament's power (co-operation and co-decision procedures) in combination with the parliamentary functions (control, legislation, election, articulation and communication) will be described where relevant to forest environment policy, in particular to competition, harmonization, internal markets, industry, research, land use, energy and development. The optimal lobbying terrains and prospects of environmental interest groups are also examined and the potential influence of the European Parliament on the implementation of such policy is explored. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source]