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Coalition Partners (coalition + partner)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

Should I stay or should I go?

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 5 2008
An experimental study on voter responses to pre-electoral coalitions
Party elites, however, do not know how voters will respond to the coalition formation at the polls. In this article, the authors report on an experimental study among 1,255 Belgian students. In order to study voter responses to the formation of PECs, respondents were presented with two ballots: one with individual parties (party vote condition) and one with coalitions (coalition vote condition). The aim of this experiment is to predict under what conditions party supporters will follow their initially preferred party into the coalition and vote for the PEC, and under what conditions they would desert the PEC at the polls. The decision whether to follow the coalition or not can be traced back to four considerations: dislike of the coalition partner; ideological congruence between coalition partners; size of the initially preferred party; and being attracted to a specific high-profile candidate. (Dis)liking the coalition partner is independent from the ideological congruence between the two coalition partners. The study's results also show support for an adjustment effect, as respondents became more loyal toward cartels over the course of the 2003,2005 observation period. [source]

Electoral behaviour in a two-vote system: Incentives for ticket splitting in German Bundestag elections

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2002
Franz Urban Pappi
The ballot structure of German Bundestag elections allows two votes: one for a constituency candidate and the second for a party list. About one-fifth of the voters usually split their ticket. Several hypotheses are derived about incentives for ticket splitting and tested with survey data from a 1998 pre-election poll. We argue that an explanation of split tickets in the German system has to take into account both party rankings and coalition preferences. One of the most important incentives is a preference or top ranking of a minor party like the FDP or Greens, if it is combined with a preference for a coalition with either the CDU/CSU or SPD. Contrary to this finding, the hypothesis of threshold insurance voting of CDU/CSU or SPD supporters choosing the party list of their prospective minor coalition partner is rejected for the 1998 election. [source]

Should I stay or should I go?

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 5 2008
An experimental study on voter responses to pre-electoral coalitions
Party elites, however, do not know how voters will respond to the coalition formation at the polls. In this article, the authors report on an experimental study among 1,255 Belgian students. In order to study voter responses to the formation of PECs, respondents were presented with two ballots: one with individual parties (party vote condition) and one with coalitions (coalition vote condition). The aim of this experiment is to predict under what conditions party supporters will follow their initially preferred party into the coalition and vote for the PEC, and under what conditions they would desert the PEC at the polls. The decision whether to follow the coalition or not can be traced back to four considerations: dislike of the coalition partner; ideological congruence between coalition partners; size of the initially preferred party; and being attracted to a specific high-profile candidate. (Dis)liking the coalition partner is independent from the ideological congruence between the two coalition partners. The study's results also show support for an adjustment effect, as respondents became more loyal toward cartels over the course of the 2003,2005 observation period. [source]

REVISITING BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS: OAKLAND (CA), 40 YEARS LATER

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2009
FRÉDÉRICK DOUZET
ABSTRACT:,The city of Oakland, California, was one of the case studies Browning, Marshall and Tabb picked in their book,Protest Is not Enough,(1984) as a significant example of successful liberal black-and-white coalitions, leading to strong black incorporation. Yet over the past 40 years, the balance of power has dramatically changed in the city of Oakland. After several decades of experience with African-American mayors and changing demographics, we need to reflect on the adequacy of this paradigm in light of the contemporary situation. The city once governed by a black mayor with a majority black city council in a traditional white progressive-black coalition has now become intrinsically multicultural, leading to the election of former Governor Jerry Brown as a Mayor in 1998. Despite Ron Dellums's election in 2006, the black hold and control over the city seems to be more tenuous and fragile than it was 15 years ago. This article raises the question of the future of black urban political power in cities undergoing demographic and political changes. Our main findings are that black urban power in Oakland is still predominantly coalition-based but involves new coalition partners with the demographic growth and the electoral mobilization of Hispanics and Asians. While the black-led coalition still relies on white progressive support, this support has weakened, mostly because of the broadening of the progressives' agenda. Finally, the black community seems less likely to vote on pure identity grounds and seems increasingly inclined to vote along issues and interests. [source]

Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2009
Matias A. Bargsted
Inspired by analyses of majoritarian systems, students of consensual polities have analyzed strategic voting due to barriers to party success, namely, district magnitude and threshold. Given the prevalence of coalition governments in proportional systems, we analyze a type of strategic voting seldom studied: how expected coalition composition affects voter choice. We identify Duvergerian behavior by voters targeted at the coalition formation stage. We contend that when voters perceive their preferred party as unlikely to participate in the coalition, they often desert it and instead support the lesser of evils among those they perceive as viable coalition partners. We demonstrate our argument using data on coalition expectations from the 2006 Israeli elections. We find an appreciable albeit differential effect of coalition expectations on voter choice. Importantly, results hold controlling for ideological and coalition preferences. Lastly, we explore a broad cross-national comparison, showing that there is less, not more, proximity voting where coalitions are prevalent. [source]

Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2004
Lanny W. Martin
Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal-agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the "coalition deal"? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of "hostile" ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts. [source]