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Coalition Formation (coalition + formation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	35%
Information Science and Computing	21%

Selected Abstracts

COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING

NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 3 2006
JOHAN EYCKMANS
ABSTRACT. We combine new concepts of noncooperative coalition theory with an integrated assessment model on climate change to analyze the impact of different protocol designs on the success of coalition formation. We analyze the role of "single versus multiple coalitions,""open versus exclusive membership,""no, weak and strong consensus about membership" and "no transfers versus transfers." First, we want to find out whether and how modifications of the standard assumptions affect results that are associated with the widely applied cartel formation game in the noncooperative game theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements. Second, we discuss normative policy conclusions that emerge from the various modifications. Third, we confront our results with evidence on past international environmental treaties and derive an agenda for future research. [source]

Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2009
Thomas T. Holyoke
This article investigates how interest group competition, a state of conflicting policy preferences stemming from how organizational memberships are defined, can resolve into conflict or cooperation. The strategic choices of competing lobbyists are modeled as the results of a trade-off between the need to represent members and please legislators, and the additional advocacy resources they hope to gain by agreeing to form coalitions with their competitors rather than fight them in resource-draining conflicts. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested with data from interviews with lobbyists on six issues taken up by the U.S. Congress from 1999 to 2002. The results suggest that while group members do have some limited power to constrain the policy positions taken on issues by their lobbyists, it is primarily the pressures from legislators and competitor groups that push lobbyists into collectively supporting coalition positions different from those desired by their members. [source]

COALITIONS AMONG INTELLIGENT AGENTS: A TRACTABLE CASE

COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, Issue 1 2006
M. V. Belmonte
Coalition formation is an important mechanism for cooperation in multiagent systems. In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation among self-interested agents in superadditive task-oriented domains. We assume that each agent has some "structure," i.e., that it can be described by the values taken by a set of m nonnegative attributes that represent the resources w each agent is endowed with. By defining the coalitional value as a function V of w, we prove a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable payment configuration,in the sense of the core,in terms of certain properties of V. We apply these ideas to a simple case that can be described by a linear program and show that it is possible to compute for it,in polynomial time,an optimal task allocation and a stable payment configuration. [source]

Experiments on robustness and deception in a coalition formation model

CONCURRENCY AND COMPUTATION: PRACTICE & EXPERIENCE, Issue 4 2006
M. V. Belmonte
Abstract In the last few years coalition formation algorithms have been proposed as a possible way of modeling autonomous agent cooperation in multi-agent systems. This work is based on a previously proposed coalition formation model founded on game theory for a class of task-oriented problems that guarantees an optimum task allocation and a stable profit division. In this paper we study two properties of the model that are very important for application in real-life scenarios: robustness and tolerance to an agent's misbehavior. First, we study the robustness of this model as regards the effect the agent's failure has on the resultant profits of the coalition formation. Secondly, we also study the coalition formation model in the presence of misbehaving agents. Agents have some kind of execution autonomy, and they can deceive or mislead each other when they reveal their information, if they believe this will give them more profits. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Should I stay or should I go?

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 5 2008
An experimental study on voter responses to pre-electoral coalitions
Party elites, however, do not know how voters will respond to the coalition formation at the polls. In this article, the authors report on an experimental study among 1,255 Belgian students. In order to study voter responses to the formation of PECs, respondents were presented with two ballots: one with individual parties (party vote condition) and one with coalitions (coalition vote condition). The aim of this experiment is to predict under what conditions party supporters will follow their initially preferred party into the coalition and vote for the PEC, and under what conditions they would desert the PEC at the polls. The decision whether to follow the coalition or not can be traced back to four considerations: dislike of the coalition partner; ideological congruence between coalition partners; size of the initially preferred party; and being attracted to a specific high-profile candidate. (Dis)liking the coalition partner is independent from the ideological congruence between the two coalition partners. The study's results also show support for an adjustment effect, as respondents became more loyal toward cartels over the course of the 2003,2005 observation period. [source]

The interplay of self-interest and equity in coalition formation

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2004
Dr Ilja van Beest
In this paper we investigated the interplay of self-interest and equity concerns in coalition formation by manipulating the number of units in which the coalition payoff is made available, and by manipulating the way people are allowed to interact. Results of three experiments showed that when the coalition payoff was such that members of each possible coalition could obtain an equitable payoff share, the outcome tended to be coalitions that also maximized the payoff of its members. However, when the payoff was such that people had to make trade-offs between maximizing their payoff share and obtaining an equitable payoff share, it took longer to form a coalition and it was harder to maintain a coalition. Moreover, depending on the way people were allowed to interact, the final outcome was a coalition that maximized the payoff of its members or a coalition that provided them with an equitable payoff share. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional Impacts

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2001
Etel Solingen
This article introduces a conceptual design for mapping the domestic impact of internationalization. It proposes that internationalization leads to a trimodal domestic coalitional profile and advances a set of expectations about the regional effects of each profile. Aggregate data from ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states over five regions suggests that between 1948 and 1993 the three coalitional types differed in their international behavior. Internationalizing coalitions deepened trade openness, expanded exports, attracted foreign investments, restrained military-industrial complexes, initiated fewer international crises, eschewed weapons of mass destruction, deferred to international economic and security regimes, and strove for regional cooperative orders that reinforced those objectives. Backlash coalitions restricted or reduced trade openness and reliance on exports, curbed foreign investment, built expansive military complexes, developed weapons of mass destruction, challenged international regimes, exacerbated civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differentiation within their region, and were prone to initiate international crises. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently. These findings have significant implications for international relations theory and our incipient understanding of internationalization. Further extensions of the conceptual framework can help capture international effects that are yet to be fully integrated into the study of the domestic politics of coalition formation. [source]

The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2004
Pieter Bouwen
This article is an attempt to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the lobbying behaviour of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the supranational assembly in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of ,access goods'. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament. Surprisingly, European and national associations enjoy a similar degree of access to the Parliament. Individual companies and consultants have a much lower degree of access than the two collective forms of interest representation. In the conclusion, these results are analysed in the light of the existing literature on party cohesion and coalition formation in the European Parliament. [source]

COALITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 3 2008
MARKO LINDROOS
Abstract We show that with symmetric agents, noncooperation is the only stable coalition structure in a fishery with more than two countries. In the case of asymmetric fishing nations, partial or full cooperation may be stable even if the number of countries exceeds two. These are important results for recent fisheries economics papers that have not allowed for coalition formation. As an example how of one can use the model, we study the problem of new entrants into Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). We show that depending on the economic structure of the fishery, new entrants may make cooperation more difficult or easier. [source]

COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING

Explaining the 2005 Coalition Formation Process in Germany: A Comparison of Power Index and Median Legislator Approaches

POLITICS, Issue 3 2006
Charles Lees
The article uses data from the 2005 German Bundestag elections to test the power index (PI) and median legislator (ML) models of coalition formation. The article finds that, while the PI approach is successful in predicting the real-world formation of a Grand Coalition after the election, neither model is sufficient to explain the outcome of the coalition formation process. Nevertheless, the article argues that such formal models are useful in identifying ,crucial cases' and in eliminating irrelevant data from explanations. The article concludes by suggesting some methodological routes through which formal models can be harnessed to culturally sensitive, inductive research. [source]

Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 532 2008
Brian Knight
This article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds. In a legislative bargaining model, we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas, and two channels underlie this result. The proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments, and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation. In our empirical analysis, we find that small states, relative to large states, receive more funding in the US Senate, relative to the House. We also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship. [source]