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Cold War (cold + war)
Kinds of Cold War Terms modified by Cold War Selected AbstractsEducation in peace agreements, 1989,2005CONFLICT RESOLUTION QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2008Kendra E. Dupuy Education has been on the minds of peacemakers since the end of the Cold War, contrary to expectations. An examination of how education is addressed in full and partial post-Cold War peace agreements shows that education is mentioned in a large number of the agreements. However, the way in which education is addressed and incorporated into peace agreements varies significantly in terms of what is mandated to occur in the education sector after the signing of the peace agreement, including what kind of education will be provided and to whom and how education is viewed in these agreements. [source] Her kind: Anne Sexton, the Cold War and the idea of the housewifeCRITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2006CLARE POLLARD As a key figure of the 'Confessional' movement, Anne Sexton's work has often been critically assessed only in relation to her life - her history of mental illness and eventual suicide. This article attempts to place Sexton's poetry back into its historical context, arguing that with American suburbia being viewed as a new 'home front' during the Cold War, the persona of 'Housewife-poet' that Sexton adopted was highly politically charged. Seizing the language of pop-culture - from advertising to sci-fi - Sexton used it to expose the nightmare behind the white picket fence, and deconstruct the carefully constructed propaganda of the American housewife. [source] The Challenge to the State in a Globalized WorldDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 5 2002Christopher Clapham Individual instances of state failure and collapse must be placed within a broader appreciation of the evolution of statehood within the international system. The idea that the inhabited area of the globe must be divided between sovereign states is a recent development, and likely to prove a transient one. Largely the product of European colonialism, and turned into a global norm by decolonization, it is threatened both by the inherent difficulties of state maintenance, and by processes inherent in globalization. States are expensive organizations to maintain, not only in economic terms but also in the demands that they make on their citizens and their own employees. Poor and dispersed peoples, and those whose values derive from societies without states, have found these demands especially burdensome. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union revealed the hollowness of existing models of sovereign states, and challenged the triple narratives on which the project of global statehood has depended: the narratives of security, representation, and wealth and welfare. While individual cases of state failure and collapse may owe much to specific circumstances and the behaviour of particular individuals, they must also be understood within the context of a world in which maintaining states has become increasingly difficult. [source] The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia 1989,1999: War, Peace and Forest ExploitationDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 4 2000Philippe Le Billon Over the last decade, forests have played an important role in the transition from war to peace in Cambodia. Forest exploitation financed the continuation of war beyond the Cold War and regional dynamics, yet it also stimulated co-operation between conflicting parties. Timber represented a key stake in the rapacious transition from the (benign) socialism of the post-Khmer Rouge period to (exclusionary) capitalism, thereby becoming the most politicized resource of a reconstruction process that has failed to be either as green or as democratic as the international community had hoped. This article explores the social networks and power politics shaping forest exploitation, with the aim of casting light on the politics of transition. It also scrutinizes the unintended consequences of the international community's discourse of democracy, good governance, and sustainable development on forest access rights. The commodification of Cambodian forests is interpreted as a process of transforming nature into money through a political ecology of transition that legitimates an exclusionary form of capitalism. [source] "Going to War in Buses": The Anglo-American Clash over Leyland Sales to Cuba, 1963,1964DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 5 2010Christopher Hull The sale of buses by the Leyland Motor Company to Cuba proved contentious, not only in the realm of Anglo-American relations, but also in the domestic sphere of a behind the scenes inter-departmental disagreement within the British government. This is because the bus exports pitted political against economic interests at the height of the Cold War and in the midst of a British export drive. As Her Majesty's Government readily recognized, Washington was particularly sensitive over any issue related to Cuba, which by 1963 was firmly in the communist orbit of the Soviet bloc and which the United States was determined to isolate economically through the application of a trade blockade. The decision to approve the sales came at the end of the Macmillan and Kennedy administrations, and clouded the short-lived partnership of Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home and President Lyndon B. Johnson. The bus exports became an election issue in the campaigns of both leaders in 1964, assuming a political significance that belied the buses' seemingly innocuous function and outward appearance. [source] A Test of Wills: Jimmy Carter, South Africa, and the Independence of NamibiaDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 5 2010Piero Gleijeses Until 1975, Washington paid little attention to southern Africa, a backwater in the Cold War where weak insurgencies posed little threat to white rule in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia. The collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship in April 1974 meant the end of white rule in Angola and Mozambique. The Cuban victory in Angola the following year propelled southern Africa into the vortex of the Cold War. Between 1977 and 1981, the Carter administration engaged in a complicated minuet with South Africa and the Namibian rebels to craft a negotiated settlement that would grant Namibia its independence. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski clashed over the course the United States should follow, while Cuba and the Soviet Union strongly supported the Namibian insurgents and 20,000 Cuban soldiers were poised in neighboring Angola. I analyze the failure of Carter's Namibia policy based on US, Cuban and South African documents, as well as interviews with Namibian, US, Cuban and South African protagonists. [source] A Darker View of U.S. Policy in the Cold WarDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 1 2010David N. Gibbs First page of article [source] "Help Them Move the ILO Way": The International Labor Organization and the Modernization Discourse in the Era of Decolonization and the Cold WarDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 3 2009Daniel Maul First page of article [source] Illusions of Coherence: George F. Kennan, U.S. Strategy and Political Warfare in the Early Cold War, 1946,1950*DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 1 2009Scott Lucas First page of article [source] "God Has Chosen Us": Re-Membering Christian Realism, Rescuing Christendom, and the Contest of Responsibilities during the Cold War*DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 1 2009Mark Edwards First page of article [source] Trying to Make the MAGIC Last: American Diplomatic Codebreaking in the Early Cold WarDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 5 2007David Alvarez First page of article [source] "For The Cause of Christ Here in Italy": America's Protestant Challenge in Italy and the Cultural Ambiguity of the Cold WarDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 4 2005Roy Palmer Domenico First page of article [source] The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the Cold War*DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 3 2005Alan P. Dobson First page of article [source] The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold WarDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 1 2004David C. Engerman First page of article [source] Where the Buck Stopped: Harry S Truman and the Cold WarDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 5 2003James G. Hershberg Book reviewed: Arnold A. Offner. Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945,1953. [source] The Gold Battles within the Cold War: American Monetary Policy and the Defense of Europe, 1960,1963DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 1 2002Francis J. Gavin First page of article [source] The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) ParadigmsDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 4 2000Odd Arne Westad First page of article [source] New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold WarDIPLOMATIC HISTORY, Issue 4 2000Tony Smith First page of article [source] The structural context of recent transitions to democracyEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2004RENSKE DOORENSPLEET An analysis of the influence of these structural factors is however important, and it has not yet been done in a systematic way in order to explain recent transitions to democracy since 1989. It will be shown that some structural factors indeed play a role in generating transitions to democracy. These results contradict the idea that structural factors can be ignored when explaining recent transitions to democracy. An additional finding in this article is that some structural factors, such as economic development, growth and a country's role in the world-system had an unexpected impact on democratic transitions since the end of the Cold War. These findings set bounds to the strength of the modernization and world-system theories to explain transitions to democracy, but on the other hand, democratic diffusion played a significant role after 1989. In the (structural) context in which a state had a peripheral role, a low level of economic growth and a high proportion of democratic neighbors, the probability of a state's transition to democracy was high. This structural context seemed to be fertile soil for recent transitions to democracy. [source] The Origins of the ,Nonmarket Economy': Ideas, Pluralism & Power in EC Anti-dumping Law about ChinaEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2001Francis Snyder ,Market' and ,market economy' exercise a powerful, even magnetic grip on our collective imagination. But what do we mean by ,market economy'? Does it make sense to speak of a ,nonmarket economy', and if so, what does it mean? How are the ideas of ,market economy' and ,nonmarket economy' related? Focusing on EC anti-dumping law, this article seeks to answer these questions. It argues that the legal concept of ,nonmarket economy' in EC anti-dumping law has been socially constructed, by means of relations among a plurality of institutional and normative sites, as part of a changing configuration of legal ideas in specific historical circumstances, and in contexts of political, economic, social, and symbolic power. This argument is articulated in three parts. First, the concept of ,nonmarket economy' in EC anti-dumping law, though drawing on earlier elements, had its main roots in the early Cold War. Second, starting in the 1960s, the GATT multilateral negotiating rounds began to define more specific international rules of the game, but a variety of more localised processes played essential roles as forces of change. Of special importance were, first, the tension between legislative rules and administrative discretion in the United States, and, second, the Europeanisation of foreign trade law in the course of European integration. Third, the EC law concept of ,nonmarket economy' was born in the late 1970s. The main reasons were changes in the international anti-dumping law repertoire, specific ideas in Europe about comparative economic systems, and the perceived emergence of new economic threats, including exports from China. [source] A Political Theory of Economic StatecraftFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2008Jean-Marc F. Blanchard When can economic sanctions and incentives achieve important political objectives? Why do they often fail? We propose a political theory of economic statecraft, arguing that the success of economic statecraft does not depend on the magnitude of its economic effect. Instead, it succeeds when the economic pain or gain it engenders translates into political costs or opportunities. We argue that the political effects of economic signals will depend on a variety of international and domestic political factors, the most important of which is the target state's level of stateness, comprised of three components: autonomy, capacity, and legitimacy. When economic statecraft motivates key domestic coalitions to push for policy change, high stateness enables target state leaders to resist their calls and defy the sender. Conversely, when economic statecraft convinces target leaders that they ought to comply with the sender's demands, high stateness enable them to overcome domestic opposition to compromise. To evaluate the usefulness of our theory, we employ a plausibility probe, testing our approach against three leading alternatives (the realist, economic liberal, and domestic conditionalist approaches) with case studies of Western economic incentives to Hungary and Romania after the Cold War and Indian sanctions against Nepal in the late 1980s. [source] Following START: Risk Acceptance and the 1991,1992 Presidential Nuclear InitiativesFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 1 2008Matthew Fuhrmann In September 1991, U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), which were unilateral measures that led to the largest reductions in the American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals to date. Despite their eventual success, the United States took on significant risks in launching the PNIs. To uncover the best theoretical explanation for their onset, this article uses realism, neorealism, the bureaucratic politics model, expected utility theory, and prospect theory to generate ex ante predictions regarding nuclear arms control at the end of the Cold War. It then tests the theories' predictions against the empirical record. The results suggest that a focus on an individual decision maker,President Bush,is necessary to fully understand the PNIs and that an explanation rooted in prospect theory offers the most explanatory power. This study speaks to an important debate in discipline regarding the significance of individuals, while underscoring the value of exploring foreign policy decision making from multiple levels of analysis. It also advances the literatures on risk acceptance and prospect theory by shifting their applications away from militarized conflict and crises to diplomatic negotiations and cooperation. [source] Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the "Rogue State" Concept by U.S. Foreign Policy ElitesFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2007K. P. O'Reilly In the aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy dialogue has shifted from its half century focus dominated by the superpower struggle with the Soviet Union to the challenges presented by so-called "rogue states." For many observers, however, the term "rogue state" is viewed as problematic failing to providing either a clear picture of who and what constitutes a rogues state, or, perhaps more importantly, the ramification of this term on U.S. policy action. In examining the public statements of key U.S. foreign policy decision makers over the course of 1993 to 2004, this paper offers insights as to the perceptions which manifest the "rogue" stereotype as exhibited by statements on the policies and behaviors associated with rogue states. What is revealed is a relatively fixed and stable image over time as held by key decisions-makers with similar unity expressed as to policy prescriptions. Combining perceptions of power capabilities and cultural judgments unique to this rogue stereotype, the rogue image presents a challenge to U.S. strategy demanding attention to the future threat posed by these states while also constraining policy options. [source] Germans as Venutians: The Culture of German Foreign Policy BehaviorFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 1 2006AKAN MALICI The end of the Cold War eliminated many of the external constraints that had straitjacketed German policy during the Cold War era. At the same time, unification augmented Germany's already substantial power base. In light of these changed geopolitical circumstances, it was only logical for the dominant theory of security studies, namely realism, to expect a reorientation in German foreign policy behavior toward unilateralism and increased levels of power politics. Yet these expectations proved wrong. This article argues that German foreign policy behavior in the post-Cold War era can be ascribed to a foreign policy culture of reticence,a culture of restraint and accommodation that can be traced to well-defined sets of fundamental beliefs of the German decision-making elite. This article systematically examines these beliefs in the post-Cold War era, relates them to foreign policy choices, and concludes with a plea for increased attention to ideational variables. [source] Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign PolicyFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 2 2005David Skidmore How should we explain the recent unilateralist turn in U.S. foreign policy? Some accounts treat growing American unilateralism as a passing aberration attributable to the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration. This paper, by contrast, traces U.S. unilateralism to the structural effects, at home and abroad, of the end of the Cold War. Internationally, the removal of the Soviet threat has undermined the "institutional bargain" that once guided relations between the U.S. and its major allies. Absent Cold War imperatives, the U.S. is less willing to provide collective goods through strong international institutions and other states are less likely to defer to U.S. demands for special privileges that exempt the U.S. from normal multilateral constraints. Domestically, the end of the Cold War has weakened the ability of presidents to resist the appeals of powerful veto players whose interests are threatened by multilateral commitments. These factors suggest that American unilateralism may have deeper roots and more staying power than many expect. [source] Bridging the Realist/Constructivist Divide: The Case of the Counterrevolution in Soviet Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold WarFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 1 2005Robert S. Snyder The surprising end of the Cold War has led to a debate within international relations (IR) theory. Constructivists have argued that the end of the Cold War is best explained in terms of ideas and agency,specifically Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking. A few realists have countered that Soviet material decline was "endogenous" to the new ideas. Can these two theoretical perspectives be reconciled with respect to this case? They can be partially integrated with a path-dependent strategy that places an emphasis on "institutions." Nevertheless, explaining the end of the Cold War largely requires a theory of Soviet foreign policy and its relation to the state. As a former or ossified revolutionary state, Soviet foreign policy for at least several years was largely based on the principle of externalization: outside threats were used to rationalize radical centralization, repression, and the dominance of the Party. In using the USSR's institutionalized legacy as a revolutionary state, Gorbachev acted as a counterrevolutionary and reversed this process with his revolution in foreign policy. In creating a new peaceful international order, he sought,through the "second image reversed",to promote radical decentralization, liberalization, and the emergence of a new coalition. The case examines how Gorbachev's domestic goals drove his foreign policy from 1985 to 1991. [source] The Elephant in the Corner?GEOGRAPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 2 2010Reviewing India-Africa Relations in the New Millennium As countries of the ,global South' seek to challenge existing uneven architectures of economic, political and institutional power, now under different circumstances to those prevailing during the Cold War, relations between African countries and various ,Rising Powers' have drawn a great deal of academic and public attention. This scrutiny has been heavily tilted towards analysis of China's African activities. This paper aims to partially redress this balance with an introductory review of India's contemporary relations with sub-Saharan Africa. A number of analysts suggest that in the longer term, India may well achieve a more prosperous and stable economy than China, while in the shorter term, its economic and political profile may result in a more productive relationship for many different African countries, sectors and constituencies. But India will also bring its own challenges in its African commercial interactions, bilateral relations and through its part in shaping the multilateral polity and global economy. This paper therefore aims to critically review contemporary India-Africa relations on four broad thematic points. 1Changing geographies of Indo-African relations; 2Trade and foreign direct investment; 3Development cooperation; and 4Geopolitics and diplomacy. India's confidence as a global political and economic actor is apparent in its African diplomacy and economic engagements, but claims to exceptionalism (relative both to Chinese and Western actors) in such relations are not as self-evident as some have asserted. Whether recent shifts in relations between African nations and India will work in the interests of less privileged citizens, workers and consumers in Africa and in India also remain unclear. [source] Brecht and Sinn und Form: The Creation of Cold War LegendsGERMAN LIFE AND LETTERS, Issue 4 2007Stephen Parker ABSTRACT Brecht and Peter Huchel's Sinn und Form are among the few examples of early GDR cultural life with a genuine capacity to accumulate cultural capital on the international stage. The analysis of Brecht's collaboration with Sinn und Form in the Deutsche Akademie der Künste offers a fresh perspective upon their attainment of a legendary pre-eminence in German cultural life during the Cold War. Brecht's espousal of Marxism-Leninism and of a relative artistic autonomy, informed by political constraints, ensured some common ground with the SED leadership. However, the Party's enforcement of a binary opposition between Socialist Realism and Formalism became a crucial field of conflict, spawning major illusions and antagonisms between the artistic and political elites. In key contributions to Sinn und Form, Brecht foregrounded aesthetic considerations and historical responsibility, yet the SED's nationalistic discourse colouring Socialist Realism was motivated by the geopolitical imperative of justifying the GDR's status among the people's democracies of the Eastern Bloc. This, in turn, justified the SED's subordination of cultural to political capital, dismissing the claims of elite culture in a series of staged events. The position of Brecht and his supporters was relentlessly eroded until, quite improbably, the crisis of 17 June 1953 allowed them to turn the tables. While popular opposition was suppressed, Brecht simultaneously re-affirmed his loyalty to the weakened SED leadership, whose revolutionary achievements he continued to praise, and re-asserted the relative autonomy of the elite Akademie and its journal. Brecht and Sinn und Form capitalised upon their enhanced reputations, securing the legendary status that later repression did nothing to diminish. [source] American foundations and the development of international knowledge networksGLOBAL NETWORKS, Issue 1 2002Inderjeet Parmar This article examines the role and influence of three American foundations , Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford , in developing international knowledge networks that significantly impacted upon the Third World, helping to consolidate US hegemony after 1945, fostering pro-US values, methods and research institutions. The international networks were modelled on prior domestic initiatives resulting in the effective intellectual hegemony of ,liberal internationalism', of empirical scientific research methods, and of policy-oriented studies. Such domestic hegemony constructed a key basis of America's rise to globalism, which after 1945 required a continuing and enhanced foundation role, especially with the onset of the Cold War. The article, which examines the role of the US foundations in relation to intellectual hegemony construction in Latin America, Indonesia, and Africa, concludes that the evidence is best explained by Gramscian theory, and calls for further empirical research in this vital area. [source] ILLUSIONS OF POWER AND EMPIRE,HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2005JAMES N. ROSENAU ABSTRACT Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, analysts groped for an understanding of the overall structures of world politics that marked the emergence of a new epoch. As a result, the concept of empire became a major preoccupation, with the economic and military power of the United States considered sufficient for regarding it as an empire. Due to the proliferation of new microelectronic technologies and for a variety of other specified reasons, however, the constraints inherent in the new epoch make it seem highly unlikely that the U.S. or any other country can ever achieve the status of an empire. In effect, the substantial shrinkage of time and distance in the current period has led to the replacement of the age of the nation-state that originated with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 with the age of the networked individual. It is an age that has developed on a global scale and that has brought an end to the history of empires. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||