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Chemical Process Industries (chemical + process_industry)
Selected AbstractsCorrosion characteristics of the wrought Ni-Cr-Mo alloysMATERIALS AND CORROSION/WERKSTOFFE UND KORROSION, Issue 9 2005P. Crook Abstract This paper concerns the wrought, nickel-chromium-molybdenum (Ni-Cr-Mo) alloys, a family of materials with a long history of use in the chemical process industries. Their attributes include resistance to the halogen acids and resistance to pitting, crevice attack, and stress corrosion cracking in hot, halide salt solutions. The purpose of this paper is to characterize the performance of the Ni-Cr-Mo alloys in several key chemicals, using iso-corrosion diagrams. These indicate the expected corrosion rates over wide ranges of concentration and temperature. Furthermore, the differences between individual Ni-Cr-Mo alloys, and their behavior relative to the stainless steels are defined. The data indicate benefits of both a high chromium content and a copper addition, as used in Hastelloy® C-2000® alloy. [source] An overview of inherently safer design,PROCESS SAFETY PROGRESS, Issue 2 2006Dennis C. Hendershot Inherently safer product and process design represents a fundamentally different approach to safety in the manufacture and use of chemicals. The designer is challenged to identify ways to eliminate or significantly reduce hazards, rather than to develop add-on protective systems and procedures. In the chemical process industries, risk management layers of protection are classified as inherent, passive, active, and procedural. Inherently safer design focuses on eliminating hazards, or minimizing them significantly, to reduce the potential consequence to people, the environment, property, and business. Inherently safer design is considered to be the most robust way of dealing with process risk and can be considered to be a subset of green chemistry and green engineering. It focuses on safety hazards,the immediate impacts of single events such as fires, explosions, and short-term toxic impacts. Many of the strategies of inherently safer design are not specific to the chemical industry, but apply to a broad range of technologies. Strategies for identifying inherently safer options are discussed, with examples. However, for most facilities, a complete risk management program will include features from all categories of layers of protection. Also, the designer must be aware that all processes and materials have multiple hazards and that there can be conflicts among the risks associated with different alternatives. Design alternatives that reduce or eliminate one hazard may create or increase the magnitude of others. Recognition and understanding of these conflicts will enable the designer to make intelligent decisions to optimize the design. © 2006 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2006 [source] Fluid-Borne entities in the impeller stream of a rushton turbineTHE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Issue 2 2000Larry A. Glasgow Abstract The breakage or disintegration of suspended entities by energetic fluid motions in stirred tanks is an essential aspect of many operations in the chemical process industries. However, the hydrodynamic inhomogeneity of such tanks makes it extremely difficult to characterize the stresses experienced in any simple manner. This work provides a determination of both the location and the frequency of interaction of spherical fluid-borne entities with the discharge of a Rushton turbine. These data show how both particle size and impeller speed affect the severity of the exposure, setting the groundwork for improved descriptions of the dynamic behaviour of the particle size distribution in a wide variety of dispersed-phase processes. La rupture ou la désintégration de particules suspendues par des déplacements de fluides énergé-tiques dans des réservoirs agités est un aspect essentiel de nombreuses opérations des industries de procédés chimiques. Toutefois, la non-homogénéité hydrody-namique de ces réservoirs rend extrçmement difficile la caractérisation des forces en jeu par une méthode simple. On détermine dans ce travail la position et la fréquence d'interaction de particules sphériques transpottées par le fluide dans la zone de refoulement d'une turbine Rushton. Ces données montrent comment la taille des particules et la vitesse de la turbine influent toutes deux sur la sévérité de l'exposi-tion, jetant ainsi les bases pour améliorer la description du comportement dynamique de la distribution de taille des particules dans un large éventail de procédés en phase dispersée. [source] Process integration technology review: background and applications in the chemical process industryJOURNAL OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY & BIOTECHNOLOGY, Issue 9 2003Russell F Dunn Abstract Process integration is a holistic approach to process design and operation which emphasizes the unity of the process. Process integration design tools have been developed over the past two decades to achieve process improvement, productivity enhancement, conservation in mass and energy resources, and reductions in the operating and capital costs of chemical processes. The primary applications of these integrated tools have focused on resource conservation, pollution prevention and energy management. Specifically, the past two decades have seen the development and/or application of process integration design tools for heat exchange networks (HENs), wastewater reduction and water conservation networks, mass exchange networks (MENs), heat- and energy-induced separation networks (HISENs and EISENs), waste interception networks (WINs) and heat- and energy-induced waste minimization networks (HIWAMINs and EIWAMINs), to name a few. This paper provides an overview of some of these developments and outlines major driving forces and hurdles. The fundamental aspects of this approach along with their incorporation in an overall design methodology will be discussed. The paper also highlights several recent applications of process integration to industrial processes. Copyright © 2003 Society of Chemical Industry [source] What risk should public accept from chemical process facilities?PROCESS SAFETY PROGRESS, Issue 2 2007Ernst Meyer Abstract Major incidents in chemical process plants such as Bhopal have raised the questions of facility, safety, and security by stakeholders and interest groups. How will the facility be perceived as safe given the possible consequences? No one denies that there have been improvements in process safety since Bhopal and many safety regulations have come into effect. The public may still question whether it is safe to live or work near a chemical plant today. This paper discusses the risk that the public should accept under governmental leadership and guidance. Also discussed is how the chemical process industry should ensure risk acceptance criteria compliance and maintenance of compliance throughout the lifetime of a facility. Safety may be enforced by compliance with a pre-defined set of risk acceptance criteria. These criteria may be absolute and tangible, but in some cases are more abstract. Different practices are seen among different countries, states, and regions as well as between different industry segments. This paper discusses the meaning of risk acceptance criteria and how exposed people and regulatory bodies should relate to the criteria. © 2007 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2007 [source] | ||||||||||