|
| ||
|
|
||
Choice Variable (choice + variable)
Selected AbstractsComparative Statics for a Decision Model with Two Choice Variables and Two Random Variables: A Mean,Standard Deviation ApproachTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2001Gyemyung Choi The decision model with two choice variables and two random variables, an extension of Feder, or Just and Pope, is examined here. Under the mean,standard deviation framework we derive the comparative statics results concerning the effects of a change in the mean, variance and covariance of the random parameters. Some restrictions on the random variables and on the decision model are considered for unambiguous comparative statics predictions. [source] Competition and the Incentive to Produce High QualityECONOMICA, Issue 279 2003Rachel E. Kranton Previous literature indicates that, when quality is a choice variable, firms have an incentive to produce high quality to maintain their reputations with consumers. The strategic interaction among firms and competition for market share is not considered. This paper finds that, when firms compete for market share, perfect equilibria in which firms produce high-quality goods need not exist. Competition for customers can eliminate the price premium needed to induce firms to maintain a reputation for high-quality production. In this case, economists and policy analysts should pay greater attention to the interaction among firms and the institutions, such as professional associations, that structure interfirm relations when considering whether firms have an incentive to produce high-quality goods. [source] ADAPTIVE CHANGE IN THE RESOURCE-EXPLOITATION TRAITS OF A GENERALIST CONSUMER: THE CEOLUTION AND COEXISTENCE OF GENERALISTS AND SPECIALISTSEVOLUTION, Issue 3 2006Peter A. Abrams Abstract Mathematical models of consumer-resource systems are used to explore the evolution of traits related to resource acquisition in a generalist consumer species that is capable of exploiting two resources. The analysis focuses on whether evolution of traits determining the capture rates of two resources by a consumer species produce one generalist, two specialists, or all three types, when all types are characterized by a common fitness function. In systems with a stable equilibrium, evolution produces one generalist or two specialists, depending on the second derivative of the trade-off relationship. When there are sustained population fluctuations, the nature of the trade-off between the consumer's capture rates of the two resources still plays a key role in determining the evolutionary outcome. If the trade-off is described by a choice variable between zero and one that is raised to a power n, polymorphic states are possible when n > 1, which implies a positive second derivative of the curve. These states are either dimorphism, with two relatively specialized consumer types, or trimorphism, with a single generalist type and two specialists. Both endogenously driven consumer-resource cycles, and fluctuations driven by an environmental variable affecting resource growth are considered. Trimorphic evolutionary outcomes are relatively common in the case of endogenous cycles. In contrast to a previous study, these trimorphisms can often evolve even when new lineages are constrained to have phenotypes very similar to existing lineages. Exogenous cycles driven by environmental variation in resource growth rates appear to be much less likely to produce a mixture of generalists and specialists than are endogenous consumer-resource cycles. [source] The Allocational Effects of the Precision of Accounting EstimatesJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2007RONALD A. DYE ABSTRACT This paper studies the allocational effects associated with the precision of accounting estimates when the precision of estimates is a choice variable for firms. One part of the paper considers the effects of the observability of precision choices. We show that, generally, making precision choices private increases firms' equilibrium precision choices and also, as a by-product, their equilibrium investment choices. We further show that, when firms' precision choices are private, there may be a "disclosure trap," in which, unless investors conjecture the owner has chosen an estimate with the highest possible precision, the owner will respond to investors' conjecture by choosing an estimate whose precision is higher than investors' conjecture. In a multifirm version of the model with endogenous investment, we show that the equilibrium investment by the firm increases in the precision of the firm's own estimate and decreases in the precisions of other firms' estimates. Finally, we show that, in a setting where the firm's initial owner sells his stake in the firm over the course of two periods, with disclosures of estimates of the firm's value occurring prior to each sale of shares, if the precisions of the estimates are public, the equilibrium precisions of the estimates increase over time when the owner sells a sufficiently large fraction of the firm in the first period, and otherwise the equilibrium precisions of estimates remain constant over time. [source] Party loyalty as habit formationJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, Issue 3 2003Ron Shachar In most democracies, at least two out of any three individuals vote for the same party in sequential elections. This paper presents a model in which vote-persistence is partly due to the dependence of the utility on the previous voting decision. This dependence is termed ,habit formation'. The model and its implications are supported by individual-level panel data on the presidential elections in the USA in 1972 and 1976. For example, it is found that the voting probability is a function of the lagged choice variable, even when the endogeneity of the lagged variable is accounted for, and that the tendency to vote for different parties in sequential elections decreased with the age of the voter. Furthermore, using structural estimation the effect of habit is estimated, while allowing unobserved differences among respondents. The structural habit parameter implies that the effect of previous votes on the current decision is quite strong. The habit model fits the data better than the traditional ,party identification' model. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy in a Model of Imperfect Competition With Transactions MoneyAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2000Hassan Molana This paper examines the effectiveness of fiscal policy in a general equilibrium macromodel with transactions money and an oligopolistic product market. The results suggest that although money may be neutral and play no direct role as a policy instrument, its indirect impact on the effectiveness of fiscal policy can be quite substantial. In particular, when money balances feature as a choice variable in the households' objective function, (i) fiscal policy becomes ineffective as the weight attached to money is reduced; (ii) the fiscal multiplier becomes negative when the elasticity of substitution between money and leisure exceeds unity; and (iii) it is possible that policy effects are in fact enhanced as the product market becomes more competitive. [source] Client choice of treatment and client outcomesJOURNAL OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2003Robert J. Calsyn Participants in this study suffered from severe mental illness and were homeless at baseline. They were given their choice of five different treatment programs. The current study investigated two major questions: (1) what is the impact of positive expectancies about the efficacy of the chosen program on number of contacts with the chosen program and client outcomes; and (2) what is the impact of positive views about nonchosen programs (alternative choice variables) on contact with the chosen program and client outcomes. Client outcomes assessed were psychotic symptoms, days homeless, and client satisfaction. Positive expectancy variables were the number of reasons for choosing a program and confidence that the program would help. Alternative choice variables were the number of nonchosen programs visited and the attractiveness of a nonchosen program. Only the number of reasons for choosing the program was significantly related to program contact with the chosen program. Both of the positive expectancy variables and program contact were significantly correlated with consumer satisfaction. In general, neither the positive expectancy variables nor the alternative choice variables predicted changes in psychotic symptoms nor days homeless. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Comm Psychol 31: 339,348, 2003. [source] Comparative Statics for a Decision Model with Two Choice Variables and Two Random Variables: A Mean,Standard Deviation ApproachTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2001Gyemyung Choi The decision model with two choice variables and two random variables, an extension of Feder, or Just and Pope, is examined here. Under the mean,standard deviation framework we derive the comparative statics results concerning the effects of a change in the mean, variance and covariance of the random parameters. Some restrictions on the random variables and on the decision model are considered for unambiguous comparative statics predictions. [source] Normalization in cointegrated time series systemsCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2009Robert J. Rossana Abstract A method for normalizing cointegrating vectors is proposed for cointegrated time series systems containing multiple cointegrating vectors, a method requiring that an identity matrix appear in the normalized cointegrating matrix with unit coefficients attached to the endogenous or choice variables. The preferred method causes the normalized cointegrating matrix and the adjustment matrix to be consistent with the implications of static and dynamic economic theory. Alternative normalizations generate cointegrating and adjustment matrices that do not match up well with economic theory and do not reveal the testable restrictions implied by static economic theory. On propose une méthode pour normaliser les vecteurs co-intégrants pour des systèmes de séries chronologiques co-intégrées contenant de multiples vecteurs co-intégrants. Cette méthode requiert qu'une matrice identitaire apparaisse dans la matrice co-intégrante normalisée avec des coefficients unitaires attachés aux variables endogènes et de choix. La méthode préférée assure que la matrice co-intégrante normalisée et la matrice d'ajustement soient consistantes avec les implications de la théorie économique statique et dynamique. Des normalisations de rechange engendrent des matrices qui s'arriment mal à la théorie économique et ne révèlent pas les restrictions vérifiables impliquées par la théorie statique. [source] | ||||||||||