Causal Forces (causal + force)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences50%

Selected Abstracts

Agency, Postmodernism, and the Causes of Change

HISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 4 2001
Michael L. Fitzhugh
This theme issue's call for papers notes that "several prevalent and influential historical practices of the last thirty years have limited agency's significance, . . . seeing the human as the patient of History rather than its agent." The questions implicit in this statement are nowhere more urgent than in those practices collectively known as the "linguistic turn." Yet such questions have been explored sparsely enough in relation to this movement that some adherents can still insist that the ideas they favor do not devalue agency, while many simply ignore the issue and incorporate agency as an integral part of their work. By examining a largely unremarked episode in Michel Foucault's highly influential thought and considering its connections to foundational assumptions of the linguistic turn, we seek to demonstrate in detail why the premises that underlie both structuralism and poststructuralism (the theoretical movements most deeply implicated in the direction the linguistic turn has taken in history) logically require the denial of agency as a causal force and ultimately compel the conclusion that no change can occur in realities as interpreted by humans. We illustrate the intractability of these logical problems by analyzing unsatisfactory defenses from some of the few linguistic-turn historians who have discussed relevant issues, after which we conclude by suggesting that attention to current work in linguistics and cognitive science may help resolve such difficulties. [source]

Leading Sectors and Leading Regions: Economic Restructuring and Regional Inequality in Hungary since 1990

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2007
DAVID L. BROWN
Abstract This article examines factors accounting for persisting regional inequality in Hungary during the regime change from socialism to a market economy in 1990. We examine the determinants of regional inequality through the lens of leading sector theory which has been used to explain why some ex-socialist countries have done better than others during the transformation. In other words, we ask whether some regions of Hungary are doing better than others for the same reasons that some ex-socialist countries have outperformed their counterparts. We use county level data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office to examine whether the quantity and types of foreign direct investment counties have received since 1990 are associated with regional inequality in per capita GDP. We find that foreign capitalists concentrate human-capital-intensive investment in already well performing locations because they have similar supply structures to their home economies. We also contend that no measure of institutional modernization is likely to make lagging regions attractive candidates for human-capital-intensive investments in the near future. Hence, regardless of the national state's efforts to target development to lagging areas, or the effectiveness of local institutions, lagging regions are likely to remain underdeveloped. We recommend that future field-based research be conducted to examine the nexus between FDI, the nation state and localities. Unraveling interrelationships between these three political economy sites will expose the causal forces sustaining regional inequalities during post-socialism. Résumé Cet article analyse les facteurs qui expliquent l'inégalité persistante entre régions hongroises lors du passage du socialisme à une économie de marché en 1990. Nous examinons les déterminants de l'inégalité régionale à travers la théorie du secteur moteur qui a servi à expliquer pourquoi certains ex-pays socialistes ont mieux réussi que d'autres pendant la transition. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à savoir si des régions de Hongrie font mieux que d'autres pour les mêmes raisons que certains ex-pays socialistes ont eu de meilleurs résultats que leurs homologues. Nous utilisons des données départementales provenant du Bureau central hongrois de la statistique afin d'examiner si la quantité et les types d'investissement direct à l'étranger que les départements ont reçu depuis 1990 sont associés à une inégalité régionale en termes de PIB par habitant. Nous établissons ainsi que les capitalistes étrangers concentrent leur investissement à fort capital humain dans des sites qui présentent déjà de bons résultats, les structures d'approvisionnement étant similaires à celles de leur économie nationale. Nous soutenons également que, dans le court terme, aucune mesure de modernisation institutionnelle ne va sans doute transformer les régions en retard en candidates intéressantes pour des investissements à fort capital humain. En conséquence, quels que soient les efforts de l'État national en vue de développer spécifiquement les zones en décalage, ou l'efficacité des institutions locales, les régions en retard resteront sans doute moins développées. Nous conseillons d'entreprendre à l'avenir des études de terrain afin d'analyser le lien entre IDE, État national et régions. Démêler les relations entre ces trois centres de l'économie politique révélera les forces en cause dans la durabilité des inégalités régionales pendant l'après-socialisme. [source]

Identification of asymmetric prediction intervals through causal forces

JOURNAL OF FORECASTING, Issue 4 2001
J. Scott Armstrong
Abstract When causal forces are specified, the expected direction of the trend can be compared with the trend based on extrapolation. Series in which the expected trend conflicts with the extrapolated trend are called contrary series. We hypothesized that contrary series would have asymmetric forecast errors, with larger errors in the direction of the expected trend. Using annual series that contained minimal information about causality, we examined 671 contrary forecasts. As expected, most (81%) of the errors were in the direction of the causal forces. Also as expected, the asymmetries were more likely for longer forecast horizons; for six-year-ahead forecasts, 89% of the forecasts were in the expected direction. The asymmetries were often substantial. Contrary series should be flagged and treated separately when prediction intervals are estimated, perhaps by shifting the interval in the direction of the causal forces. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]