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Capital Structure (capital + structure)
Kinds of Capital Structure Terms modified by Capital Structure Selected AbstractsTOWARD A MORE COMPLETE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTUREJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2002Roger Heine Most corporate finance practitioners understand the trade-off involved in making effective use of debt capacity while safeguarding the firm's ability to execute its business strategy without disruption. But quantifying that trade-off to arrive at an optimal level of debt can be a complicated and challenging task. This paper develops a simulation model of capital structure that starts by generating multiple estimates of market rates (LIBOR, currency rates) and corresponding company operating cash flows. To arrive at an optimal capital structure, the model then incorporates the shareholder value effects of alternative financing decisions by directly measuring the costs of financial distress, including the costs of missed investment opportunities and higher working capital requirements. The model generates both a target credit rating and a lower fallback rating that permits a higher level of debt to maintain investments and dividends when operating cash flows are weak. As the model shows, companies with volatile cash flows and significant investment opportunities can add substantial shareholder value by establishing a fallback credit rating that is one or two notches below the target rating. The model also optimizes the mix of fixed versus floating debt, the maturity structure, and the currency composition. Another distinctive feature of the model is its ability to estimate the expected cost of alternative liability structures that can provide the liquidity insurance necessary to sustain the firm through periods of severe stress. This cost turns out to be quite small relative to the total market capitalization of the average firm. [source] CAPITAL STRUCTURE, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCETHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2007Pornsit Jiraporn Abstract We show how capital structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our empirical evidence shows an inverse relation between leverage and shareholder rights, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt ratios where shareholder rights are more restricted. This is consistent with agency theory, which predicts that leverage helps alleviate agency problems. This negative relation, however, is not found in regulated firms (i.e., utilities). We contend that this is because regulation already helps alleviate agency conflicts and, hence, mitigates the role of leverage in controlling agency costs. [source] Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure: Bank Versus Internal DebtEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2010Nico Dewaelheyns G32; G21 Abstract We argue that domestic business groups are able to actively optimise the internal/external debt mix across their subsidiaries. Novel to the literature, we use bi-level data (i.e. data from both individual subsidiary financial statements and consolidated group level financial statements) to model the bank and internal debt concentration of non-financial Belgian private business group affiliates. As a benchmark, we construct a size and industry matched sample of non-group affiliated (stand-alone) companies. We find support for a pecking order of internal debt over bank debt at the subsidiary level which leads to a substantially lower bank debt concentration for group affiliates as compared to stand-alone companies. The internal debt concentration of a subsidiary is mainly driven by the characteristics of the group's internal capital market. The larger its available resources, the more intra-group debt is used while bank debt financing at the subsidiary level decreases. However, as the group's overall debt level mounts, groups increasingly locate bank borrowing in subsidiaries with low costs of external financing (i.e. large subsidiaries with important collateral assets) to limit moral hazard and dissipative costs. Overall, our results are consistent with the existence of a complex group wide optimisation process of financing costs. [source] How To Choose a Capital Structure: Navigating the Debt-Equity DecisionJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2005Anil Shivdasani In corporate offices as well as the classroom, there continues to be significant debate about the costs and benefits of debt financing. There is also considerable variation in corporate credit ratings, even among companies as large and successful as those that make up the S&P 500. Many companies have been reassessing how they manage their balance sheet and their rating agency relationships; and with the market's generally favorable response to recapitalizations and dividend increases, such financing issues are likely to receive even more attention. Underlying the diversity of corporate credit ratings is widespread disagreement about the "right" credit rating,a matter that is complicated by the fact that the cost of debt varies widely among companies with the same rating. Although credit ratings are clearly tied to measures of indebtedness such as leverage and coverage ratios, the most important factor in most industries is a company's size. For many mid-sized companies, an investment-grade rating can be attained only by making a large, equity-financed acquisition,or by making minimal use of debt. In this sense, the corporate choice of credit rating can be as much a strategic issue as a financial decision. Maintaining the right amount of financial fl exibility is a key consideration when determining the right credit rating for a given company (although what management views as value-preserving flexibility may be viewed by the market as value-reducing financial "slack"). A BBB rating will accommodate considerably more leverage (30,60%) in companies with fairly stable cash flows and limited investment requirements than in more cyclical or growth-oriented companies (10,20%). When contemplating taking on more leverage, companies should examine all major operating risks and view their capital structure in the context of an enterprisewide risk management framework. [source] Capital Structure and Firm EfficiencyJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 9-10 2007Dimitris Margaritis Abstract:, This paper investigates the relationship between firm efficiency and leverage. We consider both the effect of leverage on firm performance as well as the reverse causality relationship. In particular, we address the following questions: Does higher leverage lead to better firm performance? Does efficiency exert a significant effect on leverage over and above that of traditional financial measures of capital structure? Is the effect of efficiency on leverage similar across different capital structures? What is the signalling role of efficiency to creditors or investors? Using a sample of 12,240 New Zealand firms we find evidence supporting the theoretical predictions of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Efficiency measured as the distance from the industry's ,best practice' production frontier is positively related to leverage over the entire range of observed data. The frontier is constructed using the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. Using quantile regression analysis we show that the reverse causality effect of efficiency on leverage is positive at low to mid-leverage levels and negative at high leverage ratios. Firm size also has a non-monotonic effect on leverage: negative at low debt ratios and positive at mid to high debt ratios. The effect of tangibles and profitability on leverage is positive while intangibles and other assets are negatively related to leverage. [source] Managerial Compensation and Capital StructureJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2000Elazar Berkovitch We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows. [source] Risk Shifting through Nonfinancial Contracts: Effects on Loan Spreads and Capital Structure of Project Finance DealsJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 7 2010FRANCESCO CORIELLI project finance; contractual arrangements; long-term contracts; loan pricing; capital structure We study capital structure negotiation and cost of debt financing between sponsors and lenders using a sample of more than 1,000 project finance loans worth around US$195 billion closed between 1998 and 2003. We find that lenders: (i) rely on the network of nonfinancial contracts as a mechanism to control agency costs and project risks, (ii) are reluctant to price credit more cheaply if sponsors are involved as project counterparties in the relevant contracts, and finally (iii) do not appreciate sponsor involvement as a contractual counterparty of the special purpose vehicle when determining the level of leverage. [source] Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective BargainingTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010DAVID A. MATSA ABSTRACT I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier,organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm-level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions. [source] Capital Structure and Financial Risk: Evidence from Foreign Debt Use in East AsiaTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2003George Allayannis Using a data set of East Asian nonfinancial companies, we examine a firm's choice between local, foreign, and synthetic local currency (hedged foreign currency) debt. We find evidence of unique as well as common factors that determine each debt type's use, indicating the importance of examining debt at a disaggregated level. We exploit the Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment to investigate the role of debt type in firm performance. Surprisingly, we find that the use of synthetic local currency debt is associated with the biggest drop in market value, possibly due to currency derivative market illiquidity during the crisis. [source] Market Timing and Capital StructureTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2002Malcolm Baker It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence, current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. The results suggest the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market. [source] Dynamics of Capital Structure: The Case of Korean Listed Manufacturing Companies,ASIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 3 2006Hyesung Kim C33; D21; G32 In this paper, we develop a model of dynamic capital structure choice based on a sample of Korean manufacturing firms and estimate the unobservable optimal capital structure using a wide range of observable determinants. Unbalanced panel data of Korean listed firms for the period 1985,2002 is used. In addition to identifying and estimating the effects of the determinants of capital structure, we take into consideration some Korea-specific features, such as the structural break before and after the financial crisis and firms' affiliation to chaebol business groups. Our results indicate that the optimal capital structure has been affected by the financial crisis. Although the results suggest that chaebol-affiliated firms have higher optimal level of leverage and adjust their capital structure faster than non-chaebol firms, firms' leverage might be associated with factors other than chaebol-affiliation, such as size, profitability and growth opportunity. [source] Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2005MARK T. LEARY ABSTRACT We empirically examine whether firms engage in a dynamic rebalancing of their capital structures while allowing for costly adjustment. We begin by showing that the presence of adjustment costs has significant implications for corporate financial policy and the interpretation of previous empirical results. After confirming that financing behavior is consistent with the presence of adjustment costs, we find that firms actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range. Our evidence suggests that the persistent effect of shocks on leverage observed in previous studies is more likely due to adjustment costs than indifference toward capital structure. [source] Life Sciences Roundtable: Strategy and FinancingJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 2 2009Judy Lewent In light of the challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry, a distinguished group of pharma executives and strategic and financial advisers discusses the following corporate decisions: Strategy: What business model is most likely to maximize long-term shareholder value? For example, is diversification by big pharma into areas like consumer healthcare and generics a reliable way to create sustainable value? Capital allocation: What are the best methods for evaluating investments in pharma R&D, and for deciding which programs should be terminated and which assets divested? If conventional DCF isn't much help in a world where R&D outcomes are so uncertain, what about proposed models like real options? Corporate governance and incentive systems: Should big pharma continue to outsource ever more of its R&D functions to biotech and venture capital? Or can it overcome the problems associated with size by creating more decentralized business units and trying to replicate the accountability and incentives of smaller biotech firms? Capital structure and payout policy: Are the large cash and equity positions and minimal payouts of big pharma, typically justified as cushioning the uncertainties associated with pharma R&D, likely to be the value-maximizing capital structure in the future? With many biotechs struggling and venture capital scarce, where are the new sources of capital for the industry? And can future deals be structured in ways that help bring about higher returns for big pharma as well as the R&D providers? Disclosure: What should management tell investors to help ensure that their companies' policies and promising investments are reflected in their stock prices? [source] Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed FirmsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2002Yu Wen This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm's capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. [source] Examining the Link Between "Familiness" and Performance: Can the F-PEC Untangle the Family Business Theory Jungle?ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 6 2008Matthew W. Rutherford Family business research appears to be caught in a "jungle" of competing theories in regards to familiness and performance. This study provides a further empirical examination into that relationship. We employ a family influence scale (the familiness-power, experience, and culture scale [F-PEC]) presented by Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios in an attempt to assess the relationship between familiness and performance in 831 family businesses. The resulting regression analysis adds to the current state of the literature by demonstrating significant and interesting results. Specifically, familiness showed associations with revenue, capital structure, growth, and perceived performance; however, the relationships were both positive and negative, thus casting doubt upon the F-PEC as a vehicle for untangling the jungle. We conclude with discussion and implications. [source] Are Debt and Incentive Compensation Substitutes in Controlling the Free Cash Flow Agency Problem?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009Yilei Zhang This paper investigates the governance implications of a firm's capital structure and managerial incentive compensation in controlling the free cash flow agency problem. The results suggest: debt and executive stock options act as substitutes in attenuating a firm's free cash flow problem; failure to incorporate the substitutability and endogeneity leads to underestimates of the magnitude and economic implication of the disciplinary role of both mechanisms; firm characteristics differ across the prevalence of debt usage versus option usage, suggesting the heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of the monitoring devices; and all the above effects are more pronounced in firms that tend to have more severe agency problem. [source] Effect of diversification on capital structureACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 4 2009Maurizio La Rocca G30; G32 Abstract Previous empirical financial studies have paid little attention to the role of diversification strategy on financial choices. This study analyses the financing strategies of multibusiness firms, suggesting the relevance of sorting the diversification phenomena into its related and unrelated components. The implications of our findings are important because they explain earlier contradictory results on capital-structure determinants and offer an explanation of how the degree of product specialization/diversification and the direction of diversification (related or unrelated) translate into different corporate financial behaviours. [source] Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United KingdomACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2009Chrisostomos Florackis G3; G32 Abstract This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999,2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm-specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non-monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure. [source] An Applied Econometricians' View of Empirical Corporate Governance StudiesGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2002Axel Börsch-Supan The economic analysis of corporate governance is in vogue. In addition to a host of theoretical papers, an increasing number of empirical studies analyze how ownership structure, capital structure, board structure, and the market for corporate control influence firm performance. This is not an easy task, and indeed, for reasons explained in this survey, empirical studies on corporate governance have more than the usual share of econometric problems. This paper is a critical survey of the recent empirical literature on corporate governance , to show which methodological lessons can be learned for future empirical research in the field of corporate governance, paying particular attention to German institutions and data availability. [source] Toward a capabilities perspective of the small firmINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS, Issue 3 2001Tony Fu-Lai Yu This paper attempts to explain the competitive advantages of the small firm in the capabilities perspective. It begins by identifying the kinds of strategic assets possessed by small firms. It argues that entrepreneurship and a simple capital structure are the sources of dynamism for small firms. The relationship between the small firm's resources and its capabilities are then critically examined. In particular, the analysis focuses on the influences of strategic assets on the organizational flexibility , a significant source of competitive advantage enjoyed by small firms. The competitive attributes of small firms are further discussed in terms of firm's internal and external capabilities. Finally, the relationship between the small firm's capabilities and the choice of technology strategies is examined. [source] The Value of Imputation Tax Credits on Australian Hybrid SecuritiesINTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010CLINTON FEUERHERDT ABSTRACT Hybrid securities are becoming an increasingly important component of the capital structure of Australian firms. While displaying characteristics of both debt and equity, one principal equity attribute of hybrids is their ability to pay franked dividends. This enables resident domestic investors to claim corporate tax payments as a credit against personal tax obligations under Australia's dividend imputation tax system. This paper estimates a value for the ,franking credits' that attach to hybrid securities by examining stock price changes around ex-dividend dates. We add to the literature that examines the ex-day price changes of ordinary shares (OS) in that the hybrid securities we examine have high dividend yields and are relatively insensitive to market movements. Therefore the signal-to-noise ratio is much higher than for OS. Our analysis reveals that cum-dividend day prices on hybrid securities do not include any value for franking credits. This result is consistent with the notion that the price-setting investor in the Australian market is a foreign investor who places no value on franking credits. [source] Life Sciences Roundtable: Strategy and FinancingJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 2 2009Judy Lewent In light of the challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry, a distinguished group of pharma executives and strategic and financial advisers discusses the following corporate decisions: Strategy: What business model is most likely to maximize long-term shareholder value? For example, is diversification by big pharma into areas like consumer healthcare and generics a reliable way to create sustainable value? Capital allocation: What are the best methods for evaluating investments in pharma R&D, and for deciding which programs should be terminated and which assets divested? If conventional DCF isn't much help in a world where R&D outcomes are so uncertain, what about proposed models like real options? Corporate governance and incentive systems: Should big pharma continue to outsource ever more of its R&D functions to biotech and venture capital? Or can it overcome the problems associated with size by creating more decentralized business units and trying to replicate the accountability and incentives of smaller biotech firms? Capital structure and payout policy: Are the large cash and equity positions and minimal payouts of big pharma, typically justified as cushioning the uncertainties associated with pharma R&D, likely to be the value-maximizing capital structure in the future? With many biotechs struggling and venture capital scarce, where are the new sources of capital for the industry? And can future deals be structured in ways that help bring about higher returns for big pharma as well as the R&D providers? Disclosure: What should management tell investors to help ensure that their companies' policies and promising investments are reflected in their stock prices? [source] The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance,JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2008Franklin Allen In a 40-plus year career notable for path-breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co-author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories: ,Work on "debt overhang" and the financial "pecking order" that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent "mandatory" infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury. ,Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the "second-order" effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the "option-like" character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing "growth" assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance. ,Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost-of-capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate-setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries. [source] MIT Roundtable on Corporate Risk ManagementJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2008Article first published online: 16 DEC 200 Against the backdrop of financial crisis, a distinguished group of academics and practitioners discusses the contribution of financial management and innovation to corporate growth and value, along with the pitfalls and unintended consequences of such innovation. The main focus of most panelists is the importance of a capital structure and risk management approach that complement the strategy and operations of the business. Instructive examples are provided by Judy Lewent, former CFO and head of strategic planning at Merck, and Lakshmi Shyam-Sunder, director of finance and risk management at the International Finance Corporation. But if these represent successful applications of finance theory, what about the large number of cases where the use of derivatives and other innovations has led to high leverage and apparent risk management failures? Part of the current trouble, as pointed out by Andrew Lo, can be attributed to the failure of risk managers and their models to account for highly improbable events,the so-called fat tails of the distribution. But, as Robert Merton suggests in closing, there is a more comprehensive explanation for today's problems: the tendency of market participants to respond to potentially risk-reducing financial innovation by increasing their risk-taking in other areas. "What we have here," says Merton, ,are two partly offsetting effects of innovation,one that is reducing the risk of companies and their investors, and another that is encouraging greater risk-taking. From a social or regulatory standpoint, the goal is to find the right balance between these two effects or forces. [source] Corporate Portfolio Management RoundtableJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 2 2008Article first published online: 16 JUL 200 The dean of a top ten business school, the chair of a large investment management firm, two corporate M&A leaders, a CFO, a leading M&A investment banker, and a corporate finance advisor discuss the following questions: ,What are today's best practices in corporate portfolio management? What roles should be played by boards, senior managers, and business unit leaders? ,What are the typical barriers to successful implementation and how can they be overcome? ,Should portfolio management be linked to financial policies such as decisions on capital structure, dividends, and share repurchase? ,How should all of the above be disclosed to the investor community? After acknowledging the considerable challenges to optimal portfolio management in public companies, the panelists offer suggestions that include: ,Companies should establish an independent group that functions like a "SWAT team" to support portfolio management. Such groups would be given access to (or produce themselves) business-unit level data on economic returns and capital employed, and develop an "outside-in" view of each business's standalone valuation. ,Boards should consider using their annual strategy "off-sites" to explore all possible alternatives for driving share-holder value, including organic growth, divestitures and acquisitions, as well as changes in dividends, share repurchases, and capital structure. ,Performance measurement and compensation frameworks need to be revamped to encourage line managers to think more like investors, not only seeking value-creating growth but also making divestitures at the right time. CEOs and CFOs should take the lead in developing a shared value creation model that clearly articulates how capital will be allocated. [source] How To Choose a Capital Structure: Navigating the Debt-Equity DecisionJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2005Anil Shivdasani In corporate offices as well as the classroom, there continues to be significant debate about the costs and benefits of debt financing. There is also considerable variation in corporate credit ratings, even among companies as large and successful as those that make up the S&P 500. Many companies have been reassessing how they manage their balance sheet and their rating agency relationships; and with the market's generally favorable response to recapitalizations and dividend increases, such financing issues are likely to receive even more attention. Underlying the diversity of corporate credit ratings is widespread disagreement about the "right" credit rating,a matter that is complicated by the fact that the cost of debt varies widely among companies with the same rating. Although credit ratings are clearly tied to measures of indebtedness such as leverage and coverage ratios, the most important factor in most industries is a company's size. For many mid-sized companies, an investment-grade rating can be attained only by making a large, equity-financed acquisition,or by making minimal use of debt. In this sense, the corporate choice of credit rating can be as much a strategic issue as a financial decision. Maintaining the right amount of financial fl exibility is a key consideration when determining the right credit rating for a given company (although what management views as value-preserving flexibility may be viewed by the market as value-reducing financial "slack"). A BBB rating will accommodate considerably more leverage (30,60%) in companies with fairly stable cash flows and limited investment requirements than in more cyclical or growth-oriented companies (10,20%). When contemplating taking on more leverage, companies should examine all major operating risks and view their capital structure in the context of an enterprisewide risk management framework. [source] THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODELJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2002Armen Hovakimian Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity. The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios. [source] TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTUREJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2002Roger Heine Most corporate finance practitioners understand the trade-off involved in making effective use of debt capacity while safeguarding the firm's ability to execute its business strategy without disruption. But quantifying that trade-off to arrive at an optimal level of debt can be a complicated and challenging task. This paper develops a simulation model of capital structure that starts by generating multiple estimates of market rates (LIBOR, currency rates) and corresponding company operating cash flows. To arrive at an optimal capital structure, the model then incorporates the shareholder value effects of alternative financing decisions by directly measuring the costs of financial distress, including the costs of missed investment opportunities and higher working capital requirements. The model generates both a target credit rating and a lower fallback rating that permits a higher level of debt to maintain investments and dividends when operating cash flows are weak. As the model shows, companies with volatile cash flows and significant investment opportunities can add substantial shareholder value by establishing a fallback credit rating that is one or two notches below the target rating. The model also optimizes the mix of fixed versus floating debt, the maturity structure, and the currency composition. Another distinctive feature of the model is its ability to estimate the expected cost of alternative liability structures that can provide the liquidity insurance necessary to sustain the firm through periods of severe stress. This cost turns out to be quite small relative to the total market capitalization of the average firm. [source] WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT STOCK REPURCHASES?JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2000Gustavo Grullon Stock repurchases by U.S. companies experienced a remarkable surge in the 1980s and ,90s. Indeed, in 1998, the total value of all stock repurchased by U.S. companies exceeded for the first time the total amount paid out as cash dividends. And the U.S. repurchase movement has gone global in the past few years, spreading not only to Canada and the U.K., but also to countries like Japan and Germany, where such transactions were prohibited until recently. Why are companies buying back their stock in such amounts? After dismissing the popular argument that stock repurchases boost earnings per share, the authors argue that repurchases serve to add value in two main ways: (1) they provide managers with a tax-efficient means of returning excess capital to shareholders and (2) they allow managers to "signal" to investors their view that the firm is undervalued. Returning excess capital is value-adding for two reasons: First, it helps prevent companies from pursuing growth and size at the expense of profitability and value. Second, by returning capital to investors, repurchases (like dividends) play the critically important economic function of allowing investors to channel their investment from mature or declining sectors of the economy to more promising ones. But if stock repurchases and dividends serve the same basic economic function, why are repurchases growing more rapidly? Part of the explanation is that, because repurchases are taxed as capital gains and dividends as ordinary income, repurchases are a more tax-efficient way of distributing excess capital. But perhaps even more important than their tax treatment is the flexibility that (at least) open market repurchases provide corporate managers-flexibility to make small adjustments in capital structure, to exploit (or correct) perceived undervaluation of the firm's shares, and possibly even to increase the liquidity of the stock, which could be particularly valuable in bear markets. For U.S. regulators, the growth in open market stock repurchases raises some interesting issues. Perhaps most important, companies are not required to (and rarely do) furnish their investors with details about a given program's structure, execution method, number of shares repurchased, or even its duration. Policy regulators (and corporate executives as well) should consider some of the benefits provided by other systems, notably Canada's, which provide greater transparency and more guidelines for the repurchase process. [source] FINANCIAL STRATEGY FOR MIDDLE MARKET COMPANIES: a ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2000Article first published online: 5 APR 200 Dennis Soter begins with the provocative observation that "U.S. companies, private as well as public, are systematically underleveraged," and goes on to suggest that debt-financed stock repurchases may help address the current valuation problems faced by many middle market companies (and by many larger firms in basic industries as well). Soter makes his case by presenting two case histories. In the first, Equifax, the Atlanta-based provider of credit information services, combined a leveraged Dutch auction stock repurchase with a multi-year series of open market repurchase programs and an EVA incentive plan to produce large increases in operating efficiency and shareholder value. In the second, FPL Group (the parent of Florida Power and Light) became the first profitable utility to cut its dividend, substituting a policy of ongoing stock repurchase for its 33% reduction in dividend payments. Following Soter, John Brehm, the CFO of IPALCO Enterprises (the parent of Indianapolis Power and Light), explains the rationale for his company's decision to become the first utility to do a leveraged recap (while also cutting its dividend by a third). As in the case of Equifax, IPALCO's dramatic change in capital structure (also combined with an EVA incentive plan) was associated with major operating improvements and a positive stock market response. But, of course, high leverage is not right for all companies. And, to reinforce that point, James Perry, CEO of Argosy Gaming, recounts his harrowing experience of having to raise new equity shortly after taking charge of his overleveraged company. By arranging an infusion of convertible preferred, Argosy was able not only to stave off bankruptcy, but to fund major new investment and engineer a remarkable turnaround of its operations. Finally, William Dutmers, Chairman of Knape & Vogt, a small midwestern manufacturing company, discusses the role of debt-financed stock repurchases and an EVA management approach in his company's recent operating improvements. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||