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Campaign Contributions (campaign + contribution)
Selected AbstractsDO STOCK RETURNS VARY WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2010BUSH VS. I examine the relation between campaign contributions and stock returns during the Florida recount period of the 2000 presidential elections. Using the full population of publicly traded firms, I find an economically significant positive (negative) relation between pre-election campaign contributions to Bush (Gore) and stock returns during the 37-day election recount period. This relation exists for both the level and partisanship of contributions, and exists incrementally at both the firm and industry levels. These relations are robust to several different specifications, including alternative event windows that exclude the potentially confounding House/Senate races. The firm-level analysis is consistent with contributions being influence-motivated. [source] CAFTA, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTERESTSECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2010JAMES M. DEVAULT This paper analyzes the passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2005, paying particular attention to the role of campaign contributions. The CAFTA vote is significant in that the context in which it occurred was one in which campaign contributions were more likely to influence votes. By more carefully identifying the special interest groups actively involved in the CAFTA debate, I provide a more accurate assessment of the impact of the contributions made by these groups. I use instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of campaign contributions and find that these contributions played at best a secondary role in determining the outcome of the CAFTA vote in the U.S. House of Representatives. [source] Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Policy PreferencesECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2004Eugene Beaulieu This paper uses campaign contribution data to examine trade policy preferences among political action committees. With perfect factor mobility, as the Heckscher,Ohlin (HO) model assumes, interest group trade positions should depend on their factor of production but not on their industry. We show, consistent with the 2 × 2 HO model, that capital groups consistently back representatives supporting trade liberalization while labor groups favor protectionists. Unlike previous work, we also measure the variation in trade policy preferences within capital and labor groups. We find evidence that the industry net export position significantly affects labor unions' trade policy preferences. Industry characteristics have no impact on capital group lobbying. The former result suggests that empirical analyses of labor PAC contributions that exclude industry characteristics may be misspecified. [source] Campaign Contributions with Swing VotersECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2003Manfred Dix We analyze contributor behavior when there are two types of voters: positioned voters, who care about the ideological positions of candidates, and swing voters, who care about only the leadership abilities of candidates. Campaign expenditures, which are funded by contributions, are assumed to influence voters' perceptions of a candidate's ability. We find that the number of swing voters may have unexpected consequences on equilibrium campaign contributions. In particular, total contributions may increase as the number of swing voters decreases. Elections are won by doing two things: mobilizing your base and winning the independent swing voters. (Karl Rove, campaign strategist for George W. Bush) [source] Campaign Contributions and Agricultural SubsidiesECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2001Rigoberto A. Lopez This article examines the influence of campaign contributions on agricultural subsidies. Empirical results revealed that rent-seeking works, i.e. contributions, influence agricultural subsidies in the manner they best serve contributors' economic interests. Eliminating campaign contributions would significantly decrease agricultural subsidies, hurt farm groups, benefit consumers and taxpayers, and increase social welfare by approximately $5.5 billion. Although contributions are not the only determinants of agricultural subsidies, investment returns to farm PAC contributors are quite high ($1 in contributions brings about $2,000 in policy transfers). In fact, the results are in sharp contrast to the "truthful contributions" assumption of the Grossman,Helpman model. [source] DO STOCK RETURNS VARY WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2010BUSH VS. I examine the relation between campaign contributions and stock returns during the Florida recount period of the 2000 presidential elections. Using the full population of publicly traded firms, I find an economically significant positive (negative) relation between pre-election campaign contributions to Bush (Gore) and stock returns during the 37-day election recount period. This relation exists for both the level and partisanship of contributions, and exists incrementally at both the firm and industry levels. These relations are robust to several different specifications, including alternative event windows that exclude the potentially confounding House/Senate races. The firm-level analysis is consistent with contributions being influence-motivated. [source] CAFTA, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTERESTSECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2010JAMES M. DEVAULT This paper analyzes the passage of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2005, paying particular attention to the role of campaign contributions. The CAFTA vote is significant in that the context in which it occurred was one in which campaign contributions were more likely to influence votes. By more carefully identifying the special interest groups actively involved in the CAFTA debate, I provide a more accurate assessment of the impact of the contributions made by these groups. I use instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of campaign contributions and find that these contributions played at best a secondary role in determining the outcome of the CAFTA vote in the U.S. House of Representatives. [source] SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHENING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRYECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2008ANGUS C. CHU Since the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry's political influence. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder model to analyze the policy-makers' tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi-country setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and international free riding on innovations. [source] CONTRIBUTIONS AND ELECTIONS WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIESECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2005Adam Meirowitz This paper develops a model of campaign contributions and electoral competition. Contributors have separable preferences over policy and the electoral success of the candidate they support, as in influence buying. Policy preferences are single peaked over a single policy dimension. A candidate's chances of victory are increasing in the relative size of her war chest. In equilibrium, potential contributors balance incentives to donate to a candidate that is desirable on policy grounds and ensuring that they back the likely winner. With exogenous candidate positions, we find conditions under which, in equilibrium, contributors donate to the candidate that is less desirable on policy grounds solely because they consider the candidate viable. We also find that there is a degree of indeterminacy, wherein multiple equilibria inducing different lotteries over the final policy often exist. With endogenous candidate locations, we find that while median policies are always supportable as equilibrium, it is often the case that any pair of candidate locations is supportable in equilibrium. These results suggest that in settings with substantial influence buying, median policy interests may not be represented. [source] Campaign Contributions with Swing VotersECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2003Manfred Dix We analyze contributor behavior when there are two types of voters: positioned voters, who care about the ideological positions of candidates, and swing voters, who care about only the leadership abilities of candidates. Campaign expenditures, which are funded by contributions, are assumed to influence voters' perceptions of a candidate's ability. We find that the number of swing voters may have unexpected consequences on equilibrium campaign contributions. In particular, total contributions may increase as the number of swing voters decreases. Elections are won by doing two things: mobilizing your base and winning the independent swing voters. (Karl Rove, campaign strategist for George W. Bush) [source] Campaign Contributions and Agricultural SubsidiesECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2001Rigoberto A. Lopez This article examines the influence of campaign contributions on agricultural subsidies. Empirical results revealed that rent-seeking works, i.e. contributions, influence agricultural subsidies in the manner they best serve contributors' economic interests. Eliminating campaign contributions would significantly decrease agricultural subsidies, hurt farm groups, benefit consumers and taxpayers, and increase social welfare by approximately $5.5 billion. Although contributions are not the only determinants of agricultural subsidies, investment returns to farm PAC contributors are quite high ($1 in contributions brings about $2,000 in policy transfers). In fact, the results are in sharp contrast to the "truthful contributions" assumption of the Grossman,Helpman model. [source] Office-seeking politicians, interest groups and split contributions in a campaign finance modelINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2007Shino Takayama D72; D82; M37 The present paper investigates an extended version of Prat's campaign finance models. In this model, interest groups make contributions to politicians to influence policy decisions. Voters are assumed to judge candidates on two aspects: policy promises and nonpolicy personal qualities referred to as valence. There are two types of voters. Among these, uninformed voters only observe campaign contributions that take the role of a signaling medium. We solve the equilibrium of the game between politicians and interest groups. We then specify conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists and study the effect of split contributions on the welfare of the median voter. [source] Does ,Protection for Sale' Apply to the US Food Industries?JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2008Rigoberto A. Lopez Abstract This paper tests the Protection for Sale model in terms of the structure of protection and how realistic the estimated domestic welfare weight is relative to campaign contributions. Using data from US food manufacturing, empirical results support the key predictions for the structure of protection when either all food manufacturing industries or most of the general population is assumed to be politically organised. The domestic welfare weight is estimated as low as 0.837, the lowest econometric estimate to date, underlining that protection is for sale and that, with a qualified ,yes', the model fits the data for these industries. [source] Does Private Money Buy Public Policy?JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 3 2007Campaign Contributions, Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications To what extent can market participants affect the outcomes of regulatory policy? In this paper, we study the effects of one potential source of influence,campaign contributions,from competing interests in the local telecommunications industry, on regulatory policy decisions of state public utility commissions. Our work is unique in that we test the effects of campaign contributions on measurable policy outcomes. This stands in stark relief against most of the existing literature, which examines potentially noisier measures of policy outcomes,such as the roll-call votes of legislators, to examine how private money may influence public policy. By moving to more direct measures of policy effects, and using a unique new dataset, we find, in contrast to much of the literature on campaign contributions, that there is a significant effect of private money on regulatory outcomes. This result is robust to numerous alternative model specifications. We also assess the extent of omitted variable bias that would have to exist to obviate the estimated result. We find that for our result to be spurious, omitted variables would have to explain more than five times the variation in the mix of private money as is explained by the variables included in our analysis. We consider this to be very unlikely. [source] Money, Elections, and Democracy in BrazilLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2001David Samuels ABSTRACT Brazil,s 1993 law requiring candidates to report their campaign contributions has generated a new source of data to explore the supposition that Brazilian elections are extraordinarily expensive. An examination of these data from Brazil,s 1994 and 1998 general elections reveals that most money for Brazilian electoral campaigns comes from business sources and that leftist candidates have extremely limited access to such financing. The effect on democracy is that Brazil,s largely unregulated campaign finance system tends to decrease the scope of interest representation. [source] Contagion Effects and Ethnic Contribution NetworksAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2003Wendy K. Tam Cho Many political behavior theories explicitly incorporate the idea that context matters in politics. Nonetheless, the concept of spatial dependence,in particular, that behavior in geographic units is somehow related to and affected by behavior in neighboring areas,is not extensively explored. The study of campaign finance is no exception. Research in this area concentrates on the attributes of the individual donor, leaving context underexplored. Concepts such as contribution networks, for instance, are not rigorously tested. This article reexamines the impact of conventional socio-demographic covariates on campaign donation behavior by ethnic contributors and explicitly models spatial effects. The spatial analysis reveals that patterns of campaign donations are geographically clustered (exhibiting both spatial dependence, implying a neighborhood effect, and spatial heterogeneity, implying a regional effect), and that this clustering cannot be explained completely by socio-economic and demographic variables. While socio-demographic characteristics are important components of the dynamic underlying campaign contributions, there is also evidence consistent with a contagion effect whereby ethnic contribution networks are fueling funds to candidate coffers. [source] | |||||||||||||