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Business Regulation (business + regulation)
Selected AbstractsCOMPETITION AMONG STAKEHOLDER GROUPS FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE OVER BUSINESS REGULATION: THE CASE OF THE UK PENSIONS INDUSTRYECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2003Paul Klumpes This paper applies a stakeholder perspective to estimate various types of costs (taxes) and benefits (subsidies) affecting stakeholder groups whose constituents are most affected by recent, major reforms to the public regulation of the UK pensions industry. Both direct and indirect subsidies and taxes arising from regulation distinguishes groups representing both sophisticated and vulnerable investors. The analysis suggests that financial intermediaries, and industry regulators, are all effectively subsidised by other stakeholder groups. [source] Restorative Justice in Business Regulation?THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Consumer Commission's Use of Enforceable Undertakings, The Australian Competition Enforceable undertakings are now used extensively by both the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and other Australian regulators to formalise decisions to forego enforcement litigation on the basis that offenders will correct their misconduct and comply in the future. A ,fairness' critique warns that regulators might exert undue pressure in negotiating enforceable undertakings and that the terms agreed might be inappropriately broad and not legally authorised. A ,bias' critique argues that enforceable undertakings favour business above the public interest in taking tough court action against business offences. The article draws on empirical research into the ACCC's use of enforceable undertakings to show how they are used in practice, and argues that, if appropriately implemented, enforceable undertakings can be a valuable ,restorative justice' alternative to traditional regulatory enforcement action, simultaneously addressing both fairness and bias concerns. [source] LIFE INSURANCE: REGULATION AS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT,ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2004Alan D. MorrisonArticle first published online: 28 JUN 200 Debating the minutiae of insurance regulation without a clear understanding of why insurance companies are regulated is futile. In this article I discuss the economic rationale for insurance business regulation and conclude that the appropriate role of the regulator is to enforce contracts which might otherwise be broken. I argue that if this is the case, regulation should be optional, and that it need not be a monopoly activity. [source] Regulation Inside Government: Public Interest Justifications and Regulatory FailuresPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2 2000Oliver James Regulation is normally thought of as government regulation of the private sector, particularly business. However, there is a developing literature on regulation inside government, exploring the ways in which government regulates itself through a range of bodies which set standards for public sector organizations, monitor them and seek to bring about compliance with those standards. Reading across economic theories of business regulation to regulation inside government, this article suggests that the current wave of reform inside the UK public sector implicitly reflects a public interest view of regulation. However, the analogous public interest justification for the regulation of business has been heavily criticized and regulatory failures have been suggested including regulation in the interest of regulated bodies, regulation in the interest of regulators and the high costs of operating regulatory systems. [source] |