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Business Plan (business + plan)
Selected AbstractsTeaching the Fuzzy Front End of Innovation: Experimenting with Team Learning and Cross-Organizational IntegrationCREATIVITY AND INNOVATION MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009Miia Martinsuo How can the extremely uncertain front end of innovation , managing the fuzzy front end , be taught to graduate students? This paper describes and analyses experiments with experiential, problem-based learning focused on the front end of innovation. The focus is on the learning and cross-organizational integration of student teams; factors that have been identified as central to the success of teams involved in the front end of innovation. An experiential course, ,From an idea to a business plan in product development', was developed in conjunction with an actual company, and piloted with four student groups in 2007 and 2008. Data on this novel course were collected through participant observation, team self-assessment and questionnaires. This paper reports favourable results for the effectiveness of the course design; it discusses the impact of team size and cross-organizational team composition on team performance; and identifies the implications for teaching the front end of innovation. [source] Using performance management to support an organization's strategic business planEMPLOYMENT RELATIONS TODAY, Issue 4 2002Kathy Gagne First page of article [source] Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and PracticeJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2006Brian W. Nocco The Chief Risk Officer of Nationwide Insurance teams up with a distinguished academic to discuss the benefits and challenges associated with the design and implementation of an enterprise risk management program. The authors begin by arguing that a carefully designed ERM program,one in which all material corporate risks are viewed and managed within a single framework,can be a source of long-run competitive advantage and value through its effects at both a "macro" or company-wide level and a "micro" or business-unit level. At the macro level, ERM enables senior management to identify, measure, and limit to acceptable levels the net exposures faced by the firm. By managing such exposures mainly with the idea of cushioning downside outcomes and protecting the firm's credit rating, ERM helps maintain the firm's access to capital and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plan. At the micro level, ERM adds value by ensuring that all material risks are "owned," and risk-return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating managers and employees throughout the firm. To this end, business unit managers at Nationwide are required to provide information about major risks associated with all new capital projects,information that can then used by senior management to evaluate the marginal impact of the projects on the firm's total risk. And to encourage operating managers to focus on the risk-return tradeoffs in their own businesses, Nationwide's periodic performance evaluations of its business units attempt to refl ect their contributions to total risk by assigning risk-adjusted levels of "imputed" capital on which project managers are expected to earn adequate returns. The second, and by far the larger, part of the article provides an extensive guide to the process and major challenges that arise when implementing ERM, along with an account of Nationwide's approach to dealing with them. Among other issues, the authors discuss how a company should assess its risk "appetite," measure how much risk it is bearing, and decide which risks to retain and which to transfer to others. Consistent with the principle of comparative advantage it uses to guide such decisions, Nationwide attempts to limit "non-core" exposures, such as interest rate and equity risk, thereby enlarging the firm's capacity to bear the "information-intensive, insurance- specific" risks at the core of its business and competencies. [source] CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ETHICS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTUREJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2003James A. Brickley Effective corporate leadership involves more than developing a good strategic plan and setting high ethical standards. It also means coming up with an organizational design that encourages the company's managers and employees to carry out its business plan and maintain its ethical standards. In this article, the authors use the term organizational architecture to refer to three key elements of a company's design: ,the assignment of decision-making authority,who gets to make what decisions; ,performance evaluation,the key measures of performance for evaluating business units and individual employees; and ,compensation structure,how employees are rewarded for meeting performance goals. In well-designed companies, each of these elements is mutually reinforcing and supportive of the company's overall business strategy. Decision-making authority is assigned to managers and employees who have the knowledge and experience needed to make the best investment and operating decisions. And to ensure that those decision makers have the incentive as well as the knowledge to make the best decisions, the corporate systems used to evaluate and reward their performance are based on measures that are linked as directly as possible to the corporate goal of creating value. Some of the most popular management techniques of the past two decades, such as reengineering, TQM, and the Balanced Scorecard, have often had disappointing results because they address only one or two elements of organizational architecture, leaving the overall structure out of balance. What's more, a flawed organizational design can lead to far worse than missed opportunities to create value. As the authors note, the recent corporate scandals involved not just improper behavior by senior executives, but corporate structures that, far from safeguarding against such behavior, in some ways encouraged it. In the case of Enron, for example, top management's near-total focus on boosting reported earnings (a questionable corporate goal to begin with) combined with decentralized decision making and loose oversight at all levels of the company to produce an enormously risky high-leverage strategy that ended up bringing down the firm. [source] The Multiple Effects of Business Planning on New Venture PerformanceJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 3 2010Andrew Burke abstract We investigate the multiple effects of writing a business plan prior to start-up on new venture performance. We argue that the impact of business plans depends on the purpose for and circumstances in which they are being used. We offer an empirical methodology which can account for these multiple effects while disentangling real impact effects from selection effects. We apply this to English data where we find that business plans promote employment growth. This is found to be due to the impact of the plan and not selection effects. [source] Financial Impact of Emergency Department UltrasoundACADEMIC EMERGENCY MEDICINE, Issue 7 2009Olanrewaju A. Soremekun MD Abstract Objectives:, There is limited information on the financial implications of an emergency department ultrasound (ED US) program. The authors sought to perform a fiscal analysis of an integrated ED US program. Methods:, A retrospective review of billing data was performed for fiscal year (FY) 2007 for an urban academic ED with an ED US program. The ED had an annual census of 80,000 visits and 1,101 ED trauma activations. The ED is a core teaching site for a 4-year emergency medicine (EM) residency, has 35 faculty members, and has 24-hour availability of all radiology services including formal US. ED US is utilized as part of evaluation of all trauma activations and for ED procedures. As actual billing charges and reimbursement rates are institution-specific and proprietary information, relative value units (RVUs) and reimbursement based on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 2007 fee schedule (adjusted for fixed diagnosis-related group [DRG] payments and bad debt) was used to determine revenue generated from ED US. To estimate potential volume, assumptions were made on improvement in documentation rate for diagnostic scans (current documentation rates based on billed volume versus diagnostic studies in diagnostic image database), with no improvements assumed for procedural ED US. Expenses consist of three components,capital costs, training costs, and ongoing operational costs,and were determined by institutional experience. Training costs were considered sunken expenses by this institution and were thus not included in the original return on investment (ROI) calculation, although for this article a second ROI calculation was done with training cost estimates included. For the purposes of analysis, certain key assumptions were made. We utilized a collection rate of 45% and hospitalization rates (used to adjust for fixed DRG payments) of 33% for all diagnostic scans, 100% for vascular access, and 10% for needle placement. An optimal documentation rate of 95% was used to estimate potential revenue. Results:, In FY 2007, 486 limited echo exams of abdomen (current procedural terminology [CPT] 76705) and 480 limited echo cardiac exams were performed (CPT 93308) while there were 78 exams for US-guided vascular access (CPT 76937) and 36 US-guided needle placements when performing paracentesis, thoracentesis, or location of abscess for drainage (CPT 76492). Applying the 2007 CMS fee schedule and above assumptions, the revenue generated was 578 RVUs and $35,541 ($12,934 in professional physician fees and $22,607 in facility fees). Assuming optimal documentation rates for diagnostic ED US scans, ED US could have generated 1,487 RVUs and $94,593 ($33,953 in professional physician fees and $60,640 in facility fees). Program expenses include an initial capital expense (estimated at $120,000 for two US machines) and ongoing operational costs ($68,640 per year to cover image quality assurance review, continuing education, and program maintenance). Based on current revenue, there would be an annual operating loss, and thus an ROI cannot be calculated. However, if potential revenue is achieved, the annual operating income will be $22,846 per year with an ROI of 4.9 years to break even with initial investment. Conclusions:, Determining an ROI is a required procedure for any business plan for establishing an ED US program. Our analysis demonstrates that an ED US program that captures charges for trauma and procedural US and achieves the potential billing volume breaks even in less than 5 years, at which point it would generate a positive margin. [source] Decision-making Autonomy in UK International Equity Joint VenturesBRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2003Keith W. Glaister This paper investigates approaches to decision making in international joint ventures (IJVs) from the perspectives of the transactions cost and resource-based theories of the firm. In particular, the concept of autonomy in decision-making in a sample of UK-European equity joint ventures is examined. The study adopts a multi-method personal interview and self-administered questionnaire approach to examine managerial perceptions of decision-making and autonomy in the parent firms and the joint venture. The findings show that there are differences in the perception of autonomy between each of the parent firms, and between the parent firms and the IJV management. When we unpack the nature of autonomy in detail, it is found that IJV managers have greater degrees of operational autonomy than strategic autonomy and that decision making by IJV managers takes place within the context of constraints set within the IJV's business plan. This confirms the transaction cost theory which posits that key internal markets (for management, technology and capital) will be under parent control and also supports the resource based view that key capabilities are protected under the business plan established by the parent firms. The influence on IJV autonomy of the moderating variables IJV performance and IJV duration are also examined. [source] |