|
| ||
|
|
||
British Policy (british + policy)
Selected Abstracts"Cold Storage": British Policy and the Beginnings of the Irian Barat/West New Guinea DisputeAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 2 2000Nicholas Tarling During the struggle for independence, the British had sought to bring the Dutch and the Indonesians together: they wanted the friendship of the Dutch, their neighbours in Europe, but also believed that the Western powers could stay in Southeast Asia only if they came to terms with nationalism. The 1949 agreement that transferred sovereignty postponed the question of Irian Barat/West New Guinea. The British rather hoped that the Dutch would stay but,particularly as the Cold War intensified, did not wish to alienate the Indonesians. If no agreement could be reached on the issue, they wanted to put it into "cold storage" for a number of years. The Australian government was not satisfied with these policies. It opposed an Indonesian takeover, or indeed any Indonesian role in West New Guinea. Its aim was thepreservation of the status quo: even "cold storage" was insufficient. [source] Different routes, common directions?INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE, Issue 3 2004Activation policies for young people in Denmark, the UK This article analyses and compares the development of activation policies for young people in Denmark and the UK from the mid-1990s. Despite their diverse welfare traditions and important differences in the organisation and delivery of benefits and services for the unemployed, both countries have recently introduced large-scale compulsory activation programmes for young people. These programmes share a number of common features, especially a combination of strong compulsion and an apparently contradictory emphasis on client-centred training and support for participants. The suggested transition from the ,Keynesian welfare state' to the ,Schumpeterian workfare regime' is used as a framework to discuss the two countries' recent moves towards activation. It is argued that while this framework is useful in explaining the general shift towards active labour-market policies in Europe, it alone cannot account for the particular convergence of the Danish and British policies in the specific area of youth activation. Rather, a number of specific political factors explaining the development of policies in the mid-1990s are suggested. The article concludes that concerns about mass youth unemployment, the influence of the ,dependency culture' debate in various forms, cross-national policy diffusion and, crucially, the progressive re-engineering of compulsory activation by strong centre-left governments have all contributed to the emergence of policies that mix compulsion and a commitment to the centrality of work with a ,client-centred approach' that seeks to balance more effective job seeking with human resource development. However, attempts to combine the apparently contradictory concepts of ,client-centredness' and compulsion are likely to prove politically fragile, and both countries risk lurching towards an increasingly workfarist approach. [source] Britain and its Armed Forces TodayTHE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2007ANDREW DORMAN As defence becomes a political football once again this article examines the relationship of the UK's military with the country from which it is drawn and which it serves. It argues that all three elements of the classic Clausewitzian trinity: the state, the people and the military, there are major problems. These are undermining the capabilities of the armed forces and will ultimately place far greater limitations on future government's use of the armed forces in support of British policies overseas. This will have significant implications for Britain in the future if it wishes to continue to "punch above its weight". [source] Does an employer training levy work?FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2002Britain, The incidence of, returns to adult vocational training in France Abstract We examine two different policy regimes towards continuing vocational training for the adult workforce: policy in France has been interventionist, using an employer training levy since the 1970s, whereas British policy has relied largely on individual initiatives for training investment by employers and workers. We begin with a review of the theory of vocational training, indicating why market failure and underprovision are the likely outcome and signalling types of corrective policy that might be adopted. We set up hypotheses about the likely impact of policy in France relative to Britain to provide a framework for evaluation. We present a detailed comparison of the two systems in observed training incidence and the returns to training captured by workers and employers, drawing on a wide range of econometric studies. We conclude with an assessment of the employer training levy in France and suggest ways it could be modified if adopted in Britain. [source] Sir Robert Walpole and Hanover*HISTORICAL RESEARCH, Issue 192 2003Nick Harding Historical commonplace notwithstanding, Sir Robert Walpole was not instinctively hostile to Hanover. On the contrary, he consistently argued that Britain's dynastic union with the Electorate should hurt neither country. Walpole and his surrogates formulated this policy to reconcile his early misgivings about Hanoverian influence during the Northern War with his later support for Hanover when endangered by British policy after 1725. Hanover's exposure to Britain's enemies and the accession of George II, whose German sentiments were initially less pronounced than his father's, temporarily combined to make the Electorate more popular. Walpole's policy served him well until the War of Austrian Succession, when the British public cared less for equity than for Hanoverian submission within dynastic union. A survey of his career, however, shows Sir Robert Walpole and British public opinion to have been more charitable towards Hanover than previously thought. [source] Parliament and the Problem of China, 1925,7: Priorities, Preoccupations and StereotypesPARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, Issue 3 2010PHOEBE CHOW Though China had never been part of Britain's formal empire, a century of trade and warfare had caused China to cede trading and territorial rights to Britain. But from 1925 to 1927 the rise of the Kuomintang and the anti-imperialistic movement began to threaten British interests in China, alarming policy makers in London. At the same time, the China issue also captured the attention of MPs, who spent long sessions debating British policy towards China. These debates reveal much about MPs' perceptions of China, and can be seen as a microcosm of the British public sphere, encapsulating the multivalent British opinions on the world around them. Discussions of the ,China Situation' became an opportunity to express opinions on most of the important topics of the day , the economy, the General Strike, the Red Scare, disarmament, and the future of empire. A close reading of these debates can tell us much, not only about assumptions MPs held about China and the Chinese people, but also about issues closer to home. Three major events in China grabbed the attention of parliament in the period 1925,7. They were: (1) the May 30th Movement and the subsequent anti-British boycott in 1925; (2) the decision to send troops to Shanghai in January 1927; and (3) the so-called Nanking outrages, when British subjects in China were killed by Nationalist Army troops. What follows is a description and analysis of the debates over these three episodes. [source] The Politics of Economic Policy Making in Britain: A Re-assessment of the 1976 IMF CrisisPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 5 2009CHRIS ROGERS Many accounts of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis argue that British policy was determined by the exercise of structural power by markets, either through the creation of currency instability and the application of loan conditionality, or by acting as a catalyst for policy learning. This article reassesses economic policy making in Britain during the 1976 IMF crisis to show that policy change did not occur as a result of disciplinary market pressure or a process of social learning. It argues that state managers have to manage the contradictions between the imperatives of accumulation and legitimation, and can do so through the politics of depoliticization. It shows, via archival sources, how elements of the core-executive had established preferences for deflationary policies, which were implemented in 1976 using market rhetoric and Fund conditionality to shape perceptions about the issues within the government's discretionary control. Muchas explicaciones sobre la crisis del FMI sostienen que la política británica fue determinada, o bien, por el ejercicio de poder estructural vía el mercado a través de la creación de la inestabilidad cambiaria y la aplicación de préstamos condicionados, o por el intento de demostrar que sólo las políticas monetarias mantendrían la confianza, un reconocimiento que se espera alcanzar a través de un proceso de aprendizaje político. Este artículo reevalúa el diseño de políticas económicas en Gran Bretaña durante la crisis del FMI de 1976 para demostrar que el cambio en la política no ocurrió como resultado de una presión constante del mercado o un proceso de aprendizaje social. Argumenta que los administradores del estado deben manejar las contradicciones entre los fundamentos de la acumulación y legitimación y pueden hacer eso a través de la depolitización. Señala, como, en base a fuentes provenientes de archivos, los elementos del poder ejecutivo habían establecido preferencias por las políticas deflacionarias, las cuales fueron implementadas en 1976 utilizando la retórica del mercado y la condicionalidad del FMI para ubicar dentro del control discrecional del gobierno las percepciones acerca de asuntos públicos importantes. [source] Europeanising Antitrust: British Competition Policy Reform and Member State ConvergenceBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 4 2006Gregory Baldi This article argues that the patterns of competition policy convergence in EU member states challenge formulations of the process of Europeanisation and specifically the notion that the likelihood of policy harmonisation is a function of the pre-existing compatibility or ,fit' between national and supranational policies. In the case of antitrust, the member states in which existing arrangements were least compatible with the European policy were generally the first to adopt the European competition enforcement regime, while Britain, in spite of having an established,albeit dysfunctional,competition regime since the 1940s, was the last of the medium- and large-sized members to move towards harmonising its antitrust rules. The article finds that the pre-existence of an antitrust system actually made harmonisation more difficult for Britain by allowing British industrial interests to develop preferences for the domestic system, which stymied attempts to Europeanise British policy. [source] British policy towards Northern Ireland 1969,2000: continuity, tactical adjustment and consistent ,inconsistencies'BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2001Paul Dixon This article argues that British power in Northern Ireland has been subject to considerable constraints throughout the conflict and its policy has been marked more by continuity than is usually acknowledged. The survival of bipartisanship is an indication that such constraints affect governments of both major parties and result in a tendency towards continuity in government policy between the parties. There have been changes and short-term shifts in policy, or ,tactical adjustments', but the trajectory of British policy has been relatively consistent since at least 1972. Since the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in 1974, the thrust of British policy towards Northern Ireland has been directed at reconstructing that settlement. The continuity of British policy is also apparent in the consistency of its apparent ,inconsistencies and contradictions'. These ,contradictions' arise, first, out of the recognition of Northern Ireland's exceptional position in British politics and, secondly, out of the perceived requirements of the ,propaganda war' that has been waged over the conflict. [source] | ||||||||||