Book I (book + i)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences87%

Selected Abstracts

Sexual and Religious Politics in Book I of Spenser's Faerie Queene

ENGLISH LITERARY RENAISSANCE, Issue 2 2004
Harry Berger Jr.
Recent criticism that professes to be gender-sensitive and post-new-historicist still refuses to entertain the possibility that The Faerie Queene might distance itself from the misogyny embedded in the spectrum of Reformation discourses from the Puritan to the Papist pole. But Spenser could have found and reacted to misogyny not only in the religious polemics of his century but also in the intertextual archive of precursors to which The Faerie Queene so richly alludes. The problematic treatment of woman in Book 1 is not ingenuous, peripheral, nor accidental. Far from merely participating in the misogynist metaphorics of religious polemics, Book 1 performs a critique of it. Spenser shows how the male protagonist's fear and loathing of himself gets displaced to female scapegoats,Error, Duessa, Lucifera, Night,and how Una reinforces this evasive process of self-correction. In the episodes of Una's adventure with the lion (canto 3) and the house of Pride (canto 4), Book 1 interrogates both romance conventions and anti-papist allegory. [source]

Catharinus versus Luther, 1521

HISTORY, Issue 291 2003
Patrick Preston
In 1520 at the instigation of the influential Cardinals Giulio de' Medici and Nicholas von Schönberg, Ambrosius Catharinus Politus was asked to undertake the defence of the Church against Luther. Catharinus wrote the Apologia of 1520 at great speed, but he did not betray the trust that had been placed in him. Indeed, the resulting work may with plausibility be considered the literary origin of the Counter-Reformation. The main argument of this article is that the eleven ways of deceiving the people that Catharinus ascribed to Luther in Book I of the Apologia were tantamount to the claim that Luther was Antichrist. Luther was angered by the innuendo and responded in 1521 by applying the ,Antichrist' description not to any specific individual but to the entire papal church. In reading Daniel 23,5 as a prophecy of a Church that was the instrument of Satan, Luther revealed a remarkable comic gift, but he did not answer the case that Catharinus had made against him in a very different polemical style. [source]

Surprise Endings: Cephalus and the Indispensable Teacher of Republic X1

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, Issue 1 2008
Patrick McKee
Plato imputes an important form of understanding to Cephalus in Book I of the Republic and revisits it at the end of Book X. Plato's astute observations of mental life in old age tie Cephalus' conversation to the concept of "life review" in contemporary geriatric psychology. This provides the basis for an argument that Cephalus exemplifies the indispensable teacher described in Book X, and this raises interesting new epistemological and ethical issues. Finally, I ask why commentaries on the Republic have overlooked this theme, and argue that an ageist bias against Cephalus has distorted commentators' reading of the text. [source]

Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2001
LOUIS E. LOEB
Hume's claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined,though without his remarking on this fact,with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume's view, are steady dispositions (not lively ideas), nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume's epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief's influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise. [source]

The Sentences, Book I: The Mystery of the Trinity , By Peter Lombard

RELIGIOUS STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 4 2009
John T. Slotemaker
No abstract is available for this article. [source]

Aristotle's Introduction to the Problem of Happiness: On Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2008
Robert C. Bartlett
The study of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics is useful today in part because it deals with a question,the nature of human happiness,whose relevance is obvious. But in dealing with that question, Book I compels us to raise difficulties for ourselves that, far from being obvious, are in danger of being forgotten. Chief among these difficulties are, first, the true character of our hope for happiness and, ultimately, the necessity of there being a kind of divine providence if that hope is to be realized. Inasmuch as we still long for happiness, we must still undergo the pull of that necessity, however distant it may appear to us to be. In bringing out our deepest concern in this way, the study of the first book of the Ethics also prepares us to become serious students of Aristotle's "philosophy of human matters" as a whole, which is concerned with the reality of providence because it is concerned with the possibility of philosophy as a way of life. [source]

Justification as a Process of Discovery

RATIO JURIS, Issue 4 2000
Rauno Halttunen
Legal decision-making interests theoreticians in our discipline largely in terms of how a legal decision is justified. In his book, Bruce Anderson (1996) has posited a distinction between how a decision is arrived at, on one hand, and how it is justified, on the other. Anderson seems to be suggesting that legal theory should set out to continue the work of the American realists, that is, to develop legal decision-making as a process of discovery towards a solution. In my presentation, I will be looking at legal decision-making as a process of finding or discovering knowledge. What I mean by "discovery," however, is the discovery of new scientific knowledge. (The theory of science draws a distinction between proving and discovering knowledge.) I submit that for a justification to be valid the arguments comprising it ought to fulfill the logical conditions stipulated for the discovery of knowledge. In the present paper, I also hope to share with you the main ideas of a book I am currently writing on the subject. [source]