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Bidding Strategies (bidding + strategy)
Selected AbstractsA risk-based approach for bidding strategy in an electricity pay-as-bid auctionEUROPEAN TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRICAL POWER, Issue 1 2009Javad Sadeh Abstract With the reform of electric power industry and the development of electrical energy markets in many countries, it is of significance to develop bidding strategies for generation companies (GenCos). In this environment, one of the most challenging and important tasks for a GenCo is developing effective strategies to optimize hourly offer curve. In this paper, focusing on Iran's electricity market structure, we model the bidding problem from the viewpoint of a GenCo in a pay-as-bid (PAB) auction. Our goal is to present a tool for determining the optimal bidding strategy of a price-taker producer in an electricity PAB auction taking into account the relevant risks. Due to uncertainties in power market, the market-clearing price (MCP) of each hour is assumed to be known as a probability density function (pdf). The optimal solution of bidding problem is obtained analytically based on the classical optimization theory. Also, the analytical solution for a multi-step bid protocol is generalized and the properties of the generalized solution are discussed. A model is developed to consider concept of risk using two different methods. The two proposed methods are then compared and the results interpreted using numerical examples. In addition, the effect of variation of MCP's pdf parameters on supplier's profit is studied. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Bundling and the Reduction of the Winner's CurseJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2002Indranil Chakraborty The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in an independent-private-values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small. [source] SPECIALIZATION AND TRADE: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACHPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2006Shuntian Yao Different from the classical treatment, we adopt a game theoretical approach. Therefore in our models the prices of traded goods are endogenously formulated according to the bidding strategies of the producer-consumers. Furthermore, we assume that in the beginning individuals randomly choose their professions. As a result, with a short-run Nash equilibrium different types of professionals may have different utility levels; while through a dynamic process, a long-run Nash equilibrium with utility equalization is reached. Besides, we also attempt to provide a new algorithm for the computation of general equilibrium models in the Yang-Ng framework. [source] How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate AuctionsTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2002R. Preston McAfee In a general auction model with affiliated signals, common components to valuations and endogenous entry, we compute the equilibrium bidding strategies and outcomes, and derive a lower bound on the optimal reserve price. This lower bound can be computed using data on past auctions combined with information about the subsequent sales prices of unsold goods. We illustrate how to compute the lower bound using data from real estate auctions. [source] Economic evaluation of demand-side energy storage systems by using a multi-agent-based electricity marketELECTRICAL ENGINEERING IN JAPAN, Issue 3 2009Ken Furusawa Abstract With the wholesale electric power market opened in April 2005, deregulation of the electric power industry in Japan has faced a new competitive environment. In the new environment, Independent Power Producer (IPP), Power Producer and Supplier (PPS), Load Service Entity (LSE), and electric utility can trade electric energy through both bilateral contracts and single-price auction at the electricity market. In general, the market clearing price (MCP) is largely changed by the amount of total load demand in the market. The influence may cause a price spike, and consequently the volatility of MCP will make LSEs and their customers face a risk of higher revenue and cost. DSM is attractive as a means of load leveling, and has an effect on decreasing MCP at peak load period. Introducing Energy Storage systems (ES) is one DSM in order to change demand profile at the customer side. In the case that customers decrease their own demand due to increased MCP, a bidding strategy of generating companies may be changed. As a result, MCP is changed through such complex mechanism. In this paper the authors evaluate MCP by multi-agent. It is considered that customer-side ES has an effect on MCP fluctuation. Through numerical examples, this paper evaluates the influence on MCP by controlling customer-side ES corresponding to variation of MCP. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electr Eng Jpn, 167(3): 36,45, 2009; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/eej.20658 [source] A risk-based approach for bidding strategy in an electricity pay-as-bid auctionEUROPEAN TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRICAL POWER, Issue 1 2009Javad Sadeh Abstract With the reform of electric power industry and the development of electrical energy markets in many countries, it is of significance to develop bidding strategies for generation companies (GenCos). In this environment, one of the most challenging and important tasks for a GenCo is developing effective strategies to optimize hourly offer curve. In this paper, focusing on Iran's electricity market structure, we model the bidding problem from the viewpoint of a GenCo in a pay-as-bid (PAB) auction. Our goal is to present a tool for determining the optimal bidding strategy of a price-taker producer in an electricity PAB auction taking into account the relevant risks. Due to uncertainties in power market, the market-clearing price (MCP) of each hour is assumed to be known as a probability density function (pdf). The optimal solution of bidding problem is obtained analytically based on the classical optimization theory. Also, the analytical solution for a multi-step bid protocol is generalized and the properties of the generalized solution are discussed. A model is developed to consider concept of risk using two different methods. The two proposed methods are then compared and the results interpreted using numerical examples. In addition, the effect of variation of MCP's pdf parameters on supplier's profit is studied. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Bidding behaviour and electricity market simulationEUROPEAN TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRICAL POWER, Issue 4 2007T. Chandarasupsang Abstract To trade effectively and profitably in new electricity market structures, participants need to identify how best to use information available to them. In many cases only incomplete information will be available for short-term planning, trading and decision-making. This paper simulates a group of generators who adapt bidding behaviours in different segments of liberalised electricity markets based on historic market information, observed strategies and their view of other market participants. Results show that even in the incomplete information case efficient bidding strategy for market participants can be identified. Specifically, this paper presents some key findings from an active electricity market and utilises them within an electricity market simulation. The benefit of market simulation for participants is identified and reported. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] |