Bidding Behaviour (bidding + behaviour)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 505 2005
Tilman Börgers
This article studies bidding behaviour in the auction of radio spectrum for third generation mobile telephone services which took place in the UK in the Spring of 2000. We show that several companies' bidding behaviour deviates strongly from straightforward bidding with private values. In particular some companies' evaluation of the added advantage of having a large licence rather than a small licence seemed to change dramatically during the auction. No compelling explanation of this phenomenon seems available at this stage. We conclude that it is less well understood than previously believed how spectrum auctions work. [source]


A Comment on ,Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction' by Tilman Borgers and Christian Dustmann

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 505 2005
Dan Maldoom
First page of article [source]


Bidding behaviour and electricity market simulation

EUROPEAN TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRICAL POWER, Issue 4 2007
T. Chandarasupsang
Abstract To trade effectively and profitably in new electricity market structures, participants need to identify how best to use information available to them. In many cases only incomplete information will be available for short-term planning, trading and decision-making. This paper simulates a group of generators who adapt bidding behaviours in different segments of liberalised electricity markets based on historic market information, observed strategies and their view of other market participants. Results show that even in the incomplete information case efficient bidding strategy for market participants can be identified. Specifically, this paper presents some key findings from an active electricity market and utilises them within an electricity market simulation. The benefit of market simulation for participants is identified and reported. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


Predicting and explaining the propensity to bid in online auctions: a comparison of two action-theoretical models

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR, Issue 2 2006
Michael Bosnjak
The literature on the willingness to bid and the actual bidding behaviour of consumers in online auctions is currently dominated by approaches based on the economic decision-making and information processing paradigm and are primarily focused on what influences auction outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, no serious attempts have been undertaken to stringently test and compare existing models derived from an action-theoretical perspective to predict and explain consumers´ propensity to use online auctions as well as their actual usage. Two theoretical models seem most promising in this context: The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen I, 1985, 1991) and a derivative of the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein M and Ajzen I, 1975) tailored towards using computer technologies, the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis FD, 1989). In both theories, intentions play a central role in predicting behaviour. The models differ in their descriptions of the factors that determine behavioural intentions. In the Theory of Planned Behaviour, attitudes towards the behaviour, perceived behavioural control and subjective norms are assumed to influence intentions. In contrast, the Technology Acceptance Model suggests that intentions and attitudes are influenced by the perceived usefulness of a certain technological tool to improve shopping productivity (e.g. by enabling the consumer to obtain a better price or save time) and the tools´ perceived ease of use. In principle, both theories can be used to predict and explain technology-dependent consumer behaviour, but which one is more suited to online auctions? We compared both theories in terms of their predictive power and their practical utility. Although both models explain the propensity to bid in online auctions very well, the Technology Acceptance Model provides more specific recommendations for facilitating the use of online auctions. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction,

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 505 2005
Tilman Börgers
This article studies bidding behaviour in the auction of radio spectrum for third generation mobile telephone services which took place in the UK in the Spring of 2000. We show that several companies' bidding behaviour deviates strongly from straightforward bidding with private values. In particular some companies' evaluation of the added advantage of having a large licence rather than a small licence seemed to change dramatically during the auction. No compelling explanation of this phenomenon seems available at this stage. We conclude that it is less well understood than previously believed how spectrum auctions work. [source]


JOINT BIDDING, GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT COSTS:A CASE OF ROAD PROJECTS,

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009
Antonio Estache
ABSTRACT§:,To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices. [source]


Bidding behaviour and electricity market simulation

EUROPEAN TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRICAL POWER, Issue 4 2007
T. Chandarasupsang
Abstract To trade effectively and profitably in new electricity market structures, participants need to identify how best to use information available to them. In many cases only incomplete information will be available for short-term planning, trading and decision-making. This paper simulates a group of generators who adapt bidding behaviours in different segments of liberalised electricity markets based on historic market information, observed strategies and their view of other market participants. Results show that even in the incomplete information case efficient bidding strategy for market participants can be identified. Specifically, this paper presents some key findings from an active electricity market and utilises them within an electricity market simulation. The benefit of market simulation for participants is identified and reported. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]