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Bidders
Selected AbstractsIdentification of Standard Auction ModelsECONOMETRICA, Issue 6 2002Susan Athey This paper presents new identification results for models of first,price, second,price, ascending (English), and descending (Dutch) auctions. We consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure, nesting both private values and common values models, and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry. We address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data. The simplest model,symmetric independent private values,is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed. For richer models, identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available: (i) the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders; (ii) one or more bids in addition to the transaction price; (iii) exogenous variation in the number of bidders; (iv) bidder,specific covariates. While many private values (PV) models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data, identification of common values (CV) models requires stringent assumptions. Nonetheless, the PV model can be tested against the CV alternative, even when neither model is identified. [source] Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-border Takeover BidsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2004Marc Goergen G32; G34 Abstract This paper analyses the short-term wealth effects of large intra-European takeover bids. We find announcement effects of 9% for the target firms compared to a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7% for the bidders. The type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects with hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly operations. When a UK firm is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving both a Continental European target and bidder. There is strong evidence that the means of payment in an offer has an impact on the share price. A high market-to-book ratio of the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. We also investigate whether the predominant reason for takeovers is synergies, agency problems or managerial hubris. Our results suggest that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and that targets and bidders share the wealth gains. [source] Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish CorporationsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2002John A. Doukas We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra-group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra-group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra-conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm. [source] The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the UKEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2000Philippe Cornu The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analysed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirements for a signalling game. The model predicts notably that cash offers signal a high-valuing bidder, strongly determined to acquire the target firm. Moreover, cash offers deter competition better than debt or equity offers. The theoretical results are validated with data from the UK over 1995,96. [source] Capital gains taxation and shareholder wealth in takeoversACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2010Martin Bugeja H24; G32; G34 Abstract Before December 1999, the capital gains of shareholders who sold their shares into Australian takeovers have been taxable irrespective of payment method. Subsequently, shareholders can elect to rollover capital gains in equity takeovers. We examine the effect of this change on the association between target shareholder capital gains and bidder and target firm shareholder wealth. The results indicate that prior to the regulatory change, cash consideration results in higher target shareholder returns for non-taxation reasons. After the introduction of capital gains tax rollover relief, we find that target and acquiring firm shareholders earn lower returns when cash consideration is offered to shareholders with greater capital gains. [source] Effect of independent expert reports in Australian takeoversACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 4 2005Martin Bugeja G30; G34; K22 Abstract The Corporations Law 2001 mandates the preparation of an expert report in circumstances where the bidder is perceived to have a superior bargaining position. The present study tests whether the findings in Eddey (1993) can be extrapolated to all bids, irrespective of payment method. Inconsistent with Eddey, the results indicate that target premiums are lower where an expert report is required. The results confirm a higher frequency of price revisions where an expert indicates that the offer is ,not fair'. However, this increased offer is insufficient to raise the price to the level in takeovers without expert reports. [source] Cross-Border Bank M&As and Risk: Evidence from the Bond MarketJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 4 2010SUNGHO CHOI bank risk; cross-border; M&A; yield spreads The impact of cross-border bank M&As on bank risk remains an open question. Though geographically diversifying bank M&As have the potential to reduce the risk of bank insolvency, they also have the potential to increase that risk due to the increase in risk-taking incentives by bank managers and stockholders following these transactions. This paper empirically investigates whether cross-border bank M&As increase or decrease the risk of acquiring banks as captured by changes in acquirers' yield spreads. This paper also investigates how differences in the institutional environments between bidder and target countries affect changes in yield spreads following M&A announcements. The study finds that bondholders, in general, perceive cross-border bank M&As as risk-increasing activities, unlike domestic bank mergers. Specifically, on average, yield spreads increase by 4.13 basis points following the announcement of cross-border M&As. This study also finds that these yield spreads are significantly affected by the differences in investor-protection and deposit insurance environments between the transacting countries. However, the study does not find that the regulatory and supervisory environment in the home countries of the transacting parties significantly affects the changes in yield spreads. The overall evidence suggests that regulators should judge the relative environment in both the home and the host countries in evaluating the associated risks of an active multinational financial institution and in setting the sufficiency of the banks' reserve positions. [source] Price Formation Under Small Numbers Competition: Evidence from Land Auctions in SingaporeREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2006Joseph T.L. Ooi This article examines the price formation process under small numbers competition using data from Singapore land auctions. The theory predicts that bid prices are less than the zero-profit asset value in these first-price sealed-bid auctions. The model also shows that expected sales price increases with the number of bidders both because each bidder has an incentive to offer a higher price and because of a greater likelihood that a high-value bidder is present. The empirical estimates are consistent with auction theory and show that the standard land attributes are reflected in auction prices as expected. [source] Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions,THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 534 2009Jan Boone This article explores use of auctions for privatising public assets. In our model, a single ,insider' bidder possesses information about the asset's common value. Bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider's presence, uninformed bidders face a strong winner's curse in standard auctions. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder. It can be implemented via a two-stage ,qualifying auction'. In the first stage, non-binding bids are submitted to determine who enters the second stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction augmented with a reserve price. [source] CLUSTERED SYNERGIES IN THE TAKEOVER MARKETTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2008Jeff Madura Abstract In a competitive market for takeover bids, the takeover premium serves as an effective proxy for the expected synergy. We find that the expected synergy is primarily related to the premiums paid in other recent takeovers in the same industry. This relation is even stronger when considering previous takeovers (especially over the previous three-month horizon) in the same industry that have the same payment method (cash versus stock) or form of takeover (tender offer versus merger). More of the variation in expected synergies among takeovers can be explained by the premiums derived from recent takeovers in the same industry than by all bidder- and target-specific characteristics combined. We also find that the bidder valuation effects are inversely related to the premium paid for targets, implying that abnormally high premiums may reflect overpayment rather than abnormally high synergies. [source] ARE DISADVANTEGED BIDDERS DOOMED IN ASCENDING AUCTIONS?THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2008MARCO PAGNOZZI A bidder is said to be advantaged if she has a higher expected valuation of the auction prize than her competitor. When the prize has a common-value component, a bidder competing in an ascending auction against an advantaged competitor bids especially cautiously and, hence, the advantaged bidder wins most of the time. However, contrary to what is often argued, a disadvantaged bidder still wins with positive probability, even if his competitor's advantage is very large and even if the disadvantaged bidder has the lowest actual valuation ex-post. Therefore, the disadvantaged bidder has an incentive to participate in the auction, and the presence of a bidder with a small advantage does not have a dramatic effect on the seller's revenue. [source] JOINT BIDDING, GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT COSTS:A CASE OF ROAD PROJECTS,ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009Antonio Estache ABSTRACT§:,To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices. [source] Sacrificing the WHO to the highest bidderAUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Issue 2 2010Article first published online: 8 APR 2010 No abstract is available for this article. [source] Are Friendly Acquisitions Too Bad for Shareholders and Managers?BRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, Issue S1 2006Friendly Acquirers, Long-Term Value Creation, Top Management Turnover in Hostile The well-documented failure of the majority of acquisitions to create value is often identified in popular discussion with hostile acquisitions, whereas friendly acquirers seem to get a friendly press. The relative performance of friendly and hostile acquirers therefore warrants a rigorous empirical investigation. Clear evidence of superior value creation in hostile over friendly acquisitions allows us to judge the efficacy of the market for corporate control. In this article we examine the long-term shareholder wealth performance of four types of acquirers , friendly bidder, hostile bidder, white knight and hostile bidder facing a white knight or another hostile bidder. For a sample of 519 acquisitions of UK target firms during 1983,1995, we estimated the three-year post-acquisition gains to acquirer shareholders and found that hostile acquirers deliver significantly higher shareholder value than friendly acquirers. We found that friendly acquirers with high stock-market ratings destroyed more value than hostile acquirers with a similar rating. Friendly acquirer top managers suffered greater job losses than those of hostile acquirers, perhaps paying the price for their inferior value-creation performance. Our study provides evidence of the superior value-creation performance of hostile acquirers and makes the case against takeover regulatory rules that may impede hostile takeovers. [source] The Impact of Country Diversification on Wealth Effects in Cross-Border MergersFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 2 2000Halil Kiymaz G14/G34 Abstract We posit that country diversification via cross-border mergers creates wealth by providing benefits for firms that are not available to their shareholders. We hypothesize that these benefits are inversely related to the extent of co-movement in the economies of the bidder's and target's countries. We examine the wealth effects of U.S. targets and bidders involved in cross-border mergers with firms in other countries during 1982,1991. We show that wealth effects vary, depending on country affiliations of two merging firms, and are inversely related to the degree of economic co-movement between the two countries. [source] All,Pay Auctions with Variable RewardsTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2002Todd Kaplan We study all,pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid. [source] Optimal Design of the Online Auction Channel: Analytical, Empirical, and Computational Insights,DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 4 2002Ravi Bapna ABSTRACT The focus of this study is on business-to-consumer (B2C) online auctions made possible by the advent of electronic commerce over an open-source, ubiquitous Internet Protocol (IP) computer network. This work presents an analytical model that characterizes the revenue generation process for a popular B2C online auction, namely, Yankee auctions. Such auctions sell multiple identical units of a good to multiple buyers using an ascending and open auction mechanism. The methodologies used to validate the analytical model range from empirical analysis to simulation. A key contribution of this study is the design of a partitioning scheme of the discrete valuation space of the bidders such that equilibrium points with higher revenue structures become identifiable and feasible. Our analysis indicates that the auctioneers are, most of the time, far away from the optimal choice of key control factors such as the bid increment, resulting in substantial losses in a market with already tight margins. With this in mind, we put forward a portfolio of tools, varying in their level of abstraction and information intensity requirements, which help auctioneers maximize their revenues. [source] On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price AuctionsECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2004Philip J. Reny We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one-dimensional signals. By extending a monotonicity result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational. We avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid, and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids. Two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second-price auctions. [source] Precautionary Bidding in AuctionsECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2004Péter Esö We analyze bidding behavior in auctions when risk-averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky. We show that when the risk in the valuations increases, DARA bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium. Ceteris paribus, buyers will be better off bidding for a more risky object in first price, second price, and English auctions with affiliated common (interdependent) values. This "precautionary bidding" effect arises because the expected marginal utility of income increases with risk, so buyers are reluctant to bid so highly. We also show that precautionary bidding behavior can make DARA bidders prefer bidding in a common values setting to bidding in a private values one when risk-neutral or CARA bidders would be indifferent. Thus the potential for a "winner's curse" can be a blessing for rational DARA bidders. [source] Identification of Standard Auction ModelsECONOMETRICA, Issue 6 2002Susan Athey This paper presents new identification results for models of first,price, second,price, ascending (English), and descending (Dutch) auctions. We consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure, nesting both private values and common values models, and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry. We address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data. The simplest model,symmetric independent private values,is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed. For richer models, identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available: (i) the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders; (ii) one or more bids in addition to the transaction price; (iii) exogenous variation in the number of bidders; (iv) bidder,specific covariates. While many private values (PV) models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data, identification of common values (CV) models requires stringent assumptions. Nonetheless, the PV model can be tested against the CV alternative, even when neither model is identified. [source] Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete InformationECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2001Susan Athey This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has private information about her own type, and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution. The main result establishes existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) under a condition we call the single crossing condition (SCC), roughly described as follows: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (in the sense that higher types choose higher actions), a player's best response strategy is also nondecreasing. When the SCC holds, a PSNE exists in every finite-action game. Further, for games with continuous payoffs and a continuum of actions, there exists a sequence of PSNE to finite-action games that converges to a PSNE of the continuum-action game. These convergence and existence results also extend to some classes of games with discontinuous payoffs, such as first-price auctions, where bidders may be heterogeneous and reserve prices are permitted. Finally, the paper characterizes the SCC based on properties of utility functions and probability distributions over types. Applications include first-price, multi-unit, and all-pay auctions; pricing games with incomplete information about costs; and noisy signaling games. [source] Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price AuctionsECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2000Emmanuel Guerre This paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auction data. Considering first-price sealed-bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm, we show that the underlying distribution of bidders' private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions. Using the theory of minimax, we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data. We then propose a two-step kernel-based estimator that converges at the optimal rate. [source] Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-border Takeover BidsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2004Marc Goergen G32; G34 Abstract This paper analyses the short-term wealth effects of large intra-European takeover bids. We find announcement effects of 9% for the target firms compared to a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7% for the bidders. The type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects with hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly operations. When a UK firm is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving both a Continental European target and bidder. There is strong evidence that the means of payment in an offer has an impact on the share price. A high market-to-book ratio of the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. We also investigate whether the predominant reason for takeovers is synergies, agency problems or managerial hubris. Our results suggest that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and that targets and bidders share the wealth gains. [source] Diversification, Ownership and Control of Swedish CorporationsEUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2002John A. Doukas We study the short- and long-term valuation effects of Swedish takeovers. Using a sample of 93 bidding firms that acquired 101 targets between 1980 and 1995, we find that diversifying acquisitions lead to a negative market reaction and deterioration of the operating performance of the bidder. Announcement and performance gains in each of the three years following the acquisition occur only when bidders expand their core rather than their peripheral lines of business. Our findings suggest that focused acquisitions lead to greater synergies and operating efficiencies than diversifying acquisitions. Intra-group acquisitions, however, show that bidders do not realise significant gains whether they adopt diversifying or focusing investment strategies by purchasing firms controlled by the Wallenberg and SHB conglomerate groups. Intra-group targets realize significant gains regardless bidder's investment strategy. Finally, the evidence does not support the view that intra-conglomerate acquisitions are associated with expropriation of minority shareholders. However, they appear to enhance the control rights of large shareholders of the bidding firm. [source] The Impact of Country Diversification on Wealth Effects in Cross-Border MergersFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 2 2000Halil Kiymaz G14/G34 Abstract We posit that country diversification via cross-border mergers creates wealth by providing benefits for firms that are not available to their shareholders. We hypothesize that these benefits are inversely related to the extent of co-movement in the economies of the bidder's and target's countries. We examine the wealth effects of U.S. targets and bidders involved in cross-border mergers with firms in other countries during 1982,1991. We show that wealth effects vary, depending on country affiliations of two merging firms, and are inversely related to the degree of economic co-movement between the two countries. [source] Multiunit Pay-Your-Bid Auction with One-Dimensional Multiunit Demands*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2003Bernard Lebrun An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two-step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single-unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package. We study the impacts that variations of the "relative" supply have on the equilibrium, on the bidders' average payoffs per unit, and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. [source] TRANSFERABLE STOCK OPTIONS (TSOS) AND THE COMING REVOLUTION IN EQUITY-BASED PAYJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2004Brian J. Hall The dominant form of equity pay in the U.S. will change dramatically when accounting rules are changed (most likely in 2005) to require companies to charge the cost of their stock option plans on their income statements. Many companies are already switching from stock options to other forms of equity pay, especially restricted stock. The most notable switcher was Microsoft, the world's largest user of stock option pay. In July 2003, partnering with J.P. Morgan, Microsoft created a onetime transferable stock option (TSO) program that allowed holders of underwater Microsoft options to sell their options to J.P. Morgan in return for restricted shares. But the most important consequence of this transaction may not be a widespread shift by corporate America to restricted shares, but rather the creation of a more costeffective kind of stock option. By clearing the potentially messy hurdles involving taxes, accounting, SEC rules, and "transaction mechanics," Microsoft has opened the door for TSOs to be considered as an ongoing equitypay instrument, perhaps replacing standard stock options (which are not transferable). TSOs share the key advantages of restricted stock in terms of providing robust retention and ownership incentives and higher valuecost efficiency, while maintaining the key "leverage" advantage of options. In so doing, they create significant upside (and downside) while largely avoiding the "pay for pulse" problem of restricted stock. They also introduce the discipline of competitive pricing by third-party bidders. The bid prices of investment banks create nearly all of the information required for accurate estimates of option cost, which should foster greater board accountability and improved corporate governance. [source] Collusive Market Sharing and Corruption in ProcurementJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2006Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky This paper investigates links between corruption and collusion in procurement. A first-price multiple-object auction is administered by an agent who has legal discretion to allow for a readjustment of (all) submitted offers before the official opening. The agent may be corrupt, that is, willing to "sell" his decision in exchange for a bribe. Our main result shows that the corrupt agent's incentives to extract rents are closely linked with that of a cartel of bidders. First, collusive bidding conveys value to the agent's decision power. Second, self-interested abuse of discretion to extract rents (corruption) provides a mechanism to enforce collusion. A second result is that package bidding can facilitate collusion. We also find that with corruption, collusion is more likely in auctions where firms are small relative to the market. Our main message to auction designers, competition authorities and criminal courts is that risks of collusion and of corruption must be addressed simultaneously. Some other policy implications for the design of tender procedures are discussed. [source] The Buyer's Option in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: The Case of Wine Auctions at DrouotJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2005Philippe Février This paper studies multi-unit ascending (English) auctions with a buyer's option. The buyer's option gives the winner of an auction the right to purchase any number of units at the winning price. We develop a theoretical model and derive the optimal strategies for the bidders. The model predicts various behavioral implications (e.g., the winner never exercises the option, the price declines,) that are tested using a unique data set on wine auctions held at the Paris-based auction house Drouot. We also analyze why the buyer's option is used. Estimating the model in a structural econometric way, and using counterfactual comparisons, we find that the buyer's option does not affect the seller's revenue (relative to a system where the units are auctioned sequentially without the option). Drouot, however, saves a lot of time with the option and this effect represents a considerable amount of money. The time-saving effect seems thus to be the primary purpose of the buyer's option. [source] Bundling and the Reduction of the Winner's CurseJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2002Indranil Chakraborty The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in an independent-private-values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||