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Bid Prices (bid + price)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	66%

Selected Abstracts

Price elasticity of water allocations demand in the Goulburn,Murray Irrigation District,

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2008
Sarah Wheeler
Bid prices for the demand and supply of water allocations between 2001 and 2007, and average monthly prices paid for water allocations from 1997 to 2007 in the Goulburn,Murray Irrigation District are analysed to estimate price elasticities. Based on bid prices, the price elasticity of demand for water allocations appears highly elastic, with elasticities strongly influenced by the season and drought. The price elasticity of supply for water allocations is also elastic, albeit less elastic than demand. Using actual prices paid, water demand is negatively related to price and is inelastic, and appears to be most influenced by demand the previous month, drought and seasonality factors. [source]

The urban market for farmers' water rights,

IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE, Issue 4 2003
Stephen Merrett
stress de répartition; irrigation; droits à l'eau; provision urbaine Abstract Allocation stress, that is, access conflicts between the agricultural, domestic, industrial, urban service and environmental uses of water, is set to become more intense in the future because of global population growth and climate change. Because of the dominant role of irrigation water use at the global level, it is imperative to explore the possibilities of reducing farmers' use of water or, at the very least, of slowing its growth. One process by which the scale of irrigation is reduced occurs when farmers choose to sell their water rights to actors that apply these released flows in towns and cities for household, manufacturing and urban service uses. In this paper a theory of price and volume determination of such markets is presented, using concepts of urban actors' maximum bid price and farmers' minimum release price for water rights. The limits of the theory are then discussed with respect to timescale, water concessions, part-sales, sales of land, the legal context, third-party effects, market structure and transaction costs. The main conclusion is that the market equilibrium approach is rarely applicable and that fieldwork will in general have to deal with arcane, one-off bilateral trades. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Les contraintes d'allocation de l'eau, c'est-a-dire, les conflits d'accès à l'eau entre secteurs agricole, domestique, industriel, urbain et de l'environnment, vont augmenter dans le futur, à cause du changement du climat et de la croissance de la population mondiale. Le rôle dominant de l'irrigation tend de réduire l'usage de l'eau dans la secteur agricole. Cette réduction se produit quand les fermiers vendent leur droits à l'eau aux acteurs urbains. Dans cet article on présente une théorie des prix et quantités de ces marchés. On présente aussi les limites de la théorie et on conclut que l'approche par équilibre du marché s'applique rarement et qu'il faut en pratique considerer egalement des transactions obscures et bilatérals. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Reverse Auctions with Multiple Reinforcement Learning Agents,

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 1 2008
Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay
ABSTRACT Reverse auctions in business-to-business (B2B) exchanges provide numerous benefits to participants. Arguably the most notable benefit is that of lowered prices driven by increased competition in such auctions. The competition between sellers in reverse auctions has been analyzed using a game-theoretic framework and equilibria have been established for several scenarios. One finding of note is that, in a setting in which sellers can meet total demand with the highest-bidding seller being able to sell only a fraction of the total capacity, the sellers resort to a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Although price randomization in industrial bidding is an accepted norm, one might argue that in reality managers do not utilize advanced game theory calculations in placing bids. More likely, managers adopt simple learning strategies. In this situation, it remains an open question as to whether the bid prices converge to the theoretical equilibrium over time. To address this question, we model reverse-auction bidding behavior by artificial agents as both two-player and n -player games in a simulation environment. The agents begin the game with a minimal understanding of the environment but over time analyze wins and losses for use in determining future bids. To test for convergence, the agents explore the price space and exploit prices where profits are higher, given varying cost and capacity scenarios. In the two-player case, the agents do indeed converge toward the theoretical equilibrium. The n -player case provides results that reinforce our understanding of the theoretical equilibria. These results are promising enough to further consider the use of artificial learning mechanisms in reverse auctions and other electronic market transactions, especially as more sophisticated mechanisms are developed to tackle real-life complexities. We also develop the analytical results when one agent does not behave strategically while the other agent does and show that our simulations for this environment also result in convergence toward the theoretical equilibrium. Because the nature of the best response in the new setting is very different (pure strategy as opposed to mixed), it indicates the robustness of the devised algorithm. The use of artificial agents can also overcome the limitations in rationality demonstrated by human managers. The results thus have interesting implications for designing artificial agents in automating bid responses for large numbers of bids where human intervention might not always be possible. [source]

A refined deterministic linear program for the network revenue management problem with customer choice behavior

NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 6 2008
Sumit Kunnumkal
Abstract We present a new deterministic linear program for the network revenue management problem with customer choice behavior. The novel aspect of our linear program is that it naturally generates bid prices that depend on how much time is left until the time of departure. Similar to the earlier linear program used by van Ryzin and Liu (2004), the optimal objective value of our linear program provides an upper bound on the optimal total expected revenue over the planning horizon. In addition, the percent gap between the optimal objective value of our linear program and the optimal total expected revenue diminishes in an asymptotic regime where the leg capacities and the number of time periods in the planning horizon increase linearly with the same rate. Computational experiments indicate that when compared with the linear program that appears in the existing literature, our linear program can provide tighter upper bounds, and the control policies that are based on our linear program can obtain higher total expected revenues. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008 [source]

Price Formation Under Small Numbers Competition: Evidence from Land Auctions in Singapore

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2006
Joseph T.L. Ooi
This article examines the price formation process under small numbers competition using data from Singapore land auctions. The theory predicts that bid prices are less than the zero-profit asset value in these first-price sealed-bid auctions. The model also shows that expected sales price increases with the number of bidders both because each bidder has an incentive to offer a higher price and because of a greater likelihood that a high-value bidder is present. The empirical estimates are consistent with auction theory and show that the standard land attributes are reflected in auction prices as expected. [source]