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Weak Arguments (weak + argument)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Psychology	83%

Selected Abstracts

Majority versus minority influence: the role of message processing in determining resistance to counter-persuasion

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2008
Robin Martin
Two experiments examined the extent to which attitudes changed following majority and minority influence are resistant to counter-persuasion. In both experiments participants' attitudes were measured after being exposed to two messages, delayed in time, which argued opposite positions (initial message and counter-message). In the first experiment, attitudes following minority endorsement of the initial message were more resistant to a second counter-message only when the initial message contained strong versus weak arguments. Attitudes changed following majority influence did not resist the second counter-message and returned to their pre-test level. Experiment 2 varied whether memory was warned (i.e., message recipients expected to recall the message) or not, to manipulate message processing. When memory was warned, which should increase message processing, attitudes changed following both majority and minority influence resisted the second counter-message. The results support the view that minority influence instigates systematic processing of its arguments, leading to attitudes that resist counter-persuasion. Attitudes formed following majority influence yield to counter-persuasion unless there is a secondary task that encourages message processing. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Is politician A or politician B more persuasive? recipients' source preference and the direction of biased message processing

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2003
René Ziegler
Participants' preference for one of two politicians running for the post of Chancellor in Germany was measured. Under conditions conducive to effortful processing, participants were then presented with a persuasive message ascribed to one of these two sources. The message was either unambiguous strong, unambiguous weak, or ambiguous. Different from previous research on the role of message ambiguity for attitude change, the ambiguous message consisted of arguments rated as moderately convincing in a pretest rather than of a mixture of strong and weak arguments. The results were in line with predictions derived from the heuristic-systematic model (HSM). Indicating unbiased systematic processing, an unambiguous strong message led to more agreement than an unambiguous weak message. In the case of an ambiguous message, in line with the HSM's bias hypothesis, more agreement was found among participants preferring the source politician as compared to participants preferring the other politician. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Majority versus minority influence: when, not whether, source status instigates heuristic or systematic processing

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2003
Robin Martin
Two experiments investigated the extent of message processing of a persuasive communication proposed by either a numerical majority or minority. Both experiments crossed source status (majority versus minority) with message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to determine which source condition is associated with systematic processing. The first experiment showed a reliable difference between strong and weak messages, indicating systematic processing had occurred, for a minority irrespective of message direction (pro- versus counter-attitudinal), but not for a majority. The second experiment showed that message outcome moderates when a majority or a minority leads to systematic processing. When the message argued for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the majority source; but when the message did not argue for a negative personal outcome, there was systematic processing only for the minority source. Thus one key moderator of whether a majority or minority source leads to message processing is whether the topic induces defensive processing motivated by self-interest. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Levels of consensus and majority and minority influence

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2002
Robin Martin
Three experiments are reported which examine the effects of consensus information on majority and minority influence. In all experiments two levels of consensus difference were examined; large (82% versus 18%) and small (52% versus 48%). Experiment 1 showed that a majority source had more influence than a minority source, irrespective of consensus level. Experiment 2 examined the cause of this effect by presenting only the source label (,majority' versus ,minority'), only the consensus information (percentages) or both. The superior influence of the majority was again found when either (a) both source label and consensus information were given (replicating Experiment 1) and (b) only consensus information was given, but not when (c) only the source label was given. The results showed majority influence was due to the consensus information indicating more than 50% of the population supported that position. Experiment 3 also manipulated message quality (strong versus weak arguments) to identify whether systematic processing had occurred. Message quality only had an impact with the minority of 18%. These studies show that consensus information has different effects for majority and minority influence. For majority influence, having over 50% support is sufficient to cause compliance while for a minority there are advantages to being numerically small, in terms of leading to detailed processing of its message. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Rumor Has It: The Moderating Effect of Identification on Rumor Impact and the Effectiveness of Rumor Refutation,

JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 9 2008
Sabine A. Einwiller
Two studies were undertaken to examine the moderating effect of identification with a rumor target on rumor impact and refutation effectiveness. We show that identification and its opposite, disidentification, bias the way individuals react to a rumor. That is, as identification with the rumor target increased from disidentification to neutral to identification, belief in an aversive rumor declined. Furthermore, the effectiveness of a refutation was moderated by an individual's level of identification. People with a neutral identification level processed a refutation heuristically and were persuaded by it, whether it contained strong or weak arguments. Disidentifiers, who engaged in systematic processing, believed the rumor less only when the refutation contained strong arguments. Identifiers, processing heuristically, remained unbelieving in the rumor. [source]

The effects of structural and grammatical variables on persuasion: An elaboration likelihood model perspective

PSYCHOLOGY & MARKETING, Issue 4 2003
Charles S. Areni
In research examining the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), argument quality has generally been treated as an expedient methodological tool rather than a conceptually meaningful construct. Differences between strong and weak arguments have typically been cast in terms of pretest results and/or the ad hoc interpretations of researchers. Given the importance of creating effective verbal arguments in marketing communications, a stronger theoretical rationale is needed to establish why, exactly, some verbal arguments are more persuasive than others. Drawing on the literature in logic, social psychology, jurisprudence, and sociolinguistics, this research examines various structural and grammatical elements of verbal arguments in order to develop conceptually meaningful definitions of argument quality and more rigorous theoretical accounts of argument-driven persuasion within the ELM. Several research propositions are derived in order to suggest directions for future research on argument-driven persuasion. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source]