Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Voluntary Contributions (voluntary + contribution)
Selected AbstractsPESSIMISM OR OPTIMISM: A JUSTIFICATION TO VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2009JOHANNA ETNER This article analyses the determinants of voluntary contribution to environmental quality by introducing the perception of environmental risk. We consider individuals who are aware both of the impact of their voluntary contributions and of the quality of the current environment on the future quality of environment. Their preferences are represented by the RDU model. We distinguish three kinds of effect: environmental quality, wealth and risk perception. The first effects are not always sufficient to explain agents' implication in the improvement of environmental quality. [source] Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans: Evidence from the British Household Panel SurveyFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2000Alessandra Guariglia Abstract In this paper, we use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 1992 to 1998 to study the determinants of saving in the form of voluntary contributions to personal pension plans (PPPs). We first estimate a probit model with selection for the probability of making these voluntary contributions. We then estimate a random-effects tobit regression for the amounts contributed and compare the results with those of a similar regression for conventional saving. Our findings suggest that voluntary contributions to PPPs are made essentially for retirement purposes, whereas conventional saving is undertaken for precautionary motives. The former type of saving is thus unlikely to offset the latter completely. [source] Voluntary Contributions to Multiple Public ProjectsJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2003M. Koster The problem of financing a set of discrete public goods (facilities, projects) by private contributions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game, is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This contribution game is shown to be a generalized ordinal potential game; a best,response in the contribution game implies a best response in a coordination game in which the payoff to all players is the utilitarian collective welfare function, i.e., the sum of the utility functions of the players. Strategy profiles maximizing utilitarian welfare are strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Each strong Nash equilibrium corresponds in a natural way with a core element of the realization game, and vice versa. Moreover, each strong Nash equilibrium is coalitional proof. [source] PESSIMISM OR OPTIMISM: A JUSTIFICATION TO VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2009JOHANNA ETNER This article analyses the determinants of voluntary contribution to environmental quality by introducing the perception of environmental risk. We consider individuals who are aware both of the impact of their voluntary contributions and of the quality of the current environment on the future quality of environment. Their preferences are represented by the RDU model. We distinguish three kinds of effect: environmental quality, wealth and risk perception. The first effects are not always sufficient to explain agents' implication in the improvement of environmental quality. [source] Voluntary Contributions to Personal Pension Plans: Evidence from the British Household Panel SurveyFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2000Alessandra Guariglia Abstract In this paper, we use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 1992 to 1998 to study the determinants of saving in the form of voluntary contributions to personal pension plans (PPPs). We first estimate a probit model with selection for the probability of making these voluntary contributions. We then estimate a random-effects tobit regression for the amounts contributed and compare the results with those of a similar regression for conventional saving. Our findings suggest that voluntary contributions to PPPs are made essentially for retirement purposes, whereas conventional saving is undertaken for precautionary motives. The former type of saving is thus unlikely to offset the latter completely. [source] A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social PerformanceJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 1 2009David P. Baron This paper provides a theory of firm behavior motivated by moral duty, self-interest, and social pressure. A morally managed and a self-interested firm compete in a market in which their corporate social performance (CSP) provides product differentiation. Some citizens have altruistic or warm glow preferences for products with associated CSP, personal giving to social causes, holding shares in firms providing CSP, and contributing to social pressure to increase CSP. Social pressure is delivered by an activist NGO funded by voluntary contributions by citizens. The model characterizes an equilibrium in the product market, the capital market, and the market for social pressure. The equilibrium establishes a price for CSP and for activist-induced social pressure. The theory provides predictions of the market values of firms, the prices of products, firm profits, target selection, contributions to the activist, and the amount of CSP supplied. For example, if citizens do not distinguish between morally motivated CSP and CSP induced by social pressure, the activist is more likely to target the softer, morally motivated firm. Higher quality activists are better funded, target self-interested firms, and obtain greater corporate social performance. Lower quality activists target morally managed firms. [source] A Case for Bundling Public Goods ContributionsJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2007SUMAN GHOSH We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis-à-vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies. [source] Free Riding on Altruism and Group SizeJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2002Jean Hindriks It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups. The only qualification to our results is when the probability of altruism is so high that it is a dominant strategy for all egoistic players to free ride. In this case, actually, both altruism and the larger group facilitate public good provision. [source] Die Bereitstellung von öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernseh- und Rundfunkprogrammen: Eine Analyse auf Basis der KollektivgütertheoriePERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2007Andreas Hadamitzky Referring to a scheme for the optimal procurement of public goods two solutions are shown to be optimal, depending on the initial situation: Assuming a public service mission, public broadcasting is to be treated as a pure public good. Thus, it should be funded via a compulsory levy. Payers should include total population above a specific age. However, questioning the public service mission, public broadcasting represents a club good, which should be funded via voluntary contributions of actual users. To accomplish this, country-wide digitalization is necessary, which will be realized in Germany not before 2010. [source] THE INFLUENCE OF VOLUNTEERS, DONATIONS AND PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON THE WAGE LEVEL OF NONPROFIT WORKERS: EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRIAN MATCHED DATAANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2010Astrid Haider ABSTRACT,:,In this article we add to the literature analyzing wages in the nonprofit sector by estimating a wage function based on employer-employee matched data for Austria. We concentrate on the influence of voluntary contributions on the wage level of paid workers. By using a quantile regression approach we find that the existence of volunteers reduces the wages of paid employees in nonprofit organizations. The number of volunteers does not have an influence on the wage level. Donations have a small but positive effect for higher income groups only. Public subsidies increase wages of all paid workers in a nonprofit organization. [source] PESSIMISM OR OPTIMISM: A JUSTIFICATION TO VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2009JOHANNA ETNER This article analyses the determinants of voluntary contribution to environmental quality by introducing the perception of environmental risk. We consider individuals who are aware both of the impact of their voluntary contributions and of the quality of the current environment on the future quality of environment. Their preferences are represented by the RDU model. We distinguish three kinds of effect: environmental quality, wealth and risk perception. The first effects are not always sufficient to explain agents' implication in the improvement of environmental quality. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||