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Voluntary Codes (voluntary + code)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	75%

Selected Abstracts

The effectiveness of NGO self-regulation: theory and evidence from Africa

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 2 2008
Mary Kay Gugerty
Abstract Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an increasingly important role in public service provision and policy making in sub-Saharan Africa, stimulating demand for new forms of regulatory oversight. In response, a number of initiatives in NGO self-regulation have emerged. Using cross-national data on 20 African countries, the article shows that self-regulation in Africa falls into three types: national-level guilds, NGO-led clubs and voluntary codes of conduct. Each displays significant weaknesses from a regulatory policy perspective. National guilds have a broad scope, but require high administrative oversight capacity on the part of NGOs. Voluntary clubs have stronger standards but typically have much weaker coverage. Voluntary codes are the most common form of self-regulation, but have the weakest regulatory strength. This article argues that the weakness of current attempts to improve the accountability and regulatory environment of NGOs stems in part from a mismatch between the goals of regulation and the institutional incentives embedded in the structure of most self-regulatory regimes. The article uses the logic of collective action to illustrate the nature of this mismatch and the tradeoffs between the potential breadth and strength of various forms of NGO self-regulation using three detailed case studies. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Cricket: notching up runs for food and alcohol companies?

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Issue 1 2010
Jill Sherriff
Abstract Objective: To analyse sports sponsorship by food and alcohol companies by quantifying the proportion of time that the main sponsor's logo was seen during each of three cricket telecasts, the extent of paid advertising during the telecast and the contribution by the main sponsor to this, and to describe the associated ground advertising. Methods: DVD recordings of the three telecasts were analysed for visibility of the main sponsor's logo during actual playing time and for each sponsor's proportion of the advertising time during breaks in telecast. Results: The main sponsor's logo was visible on a range of equipment and clothing that resulted in it being clearly identifiable from 44% to 74% of the game time. The proportion of paid advertising time in these three telecasts varied from 3% to 20%, reflecting the difference in advertising content of paid television versus free-to-air. Implications: While television food advertising to children is under review, sporting telecasts also reach children and, until recently, have avoided scrutiny. This content analysis of three recent cricket telecasts reveals an unacceptable level of exposure to food and alcohol marketing, particularly in the form of the main sponsor's logo. Sponsorship is not covered by the voluntary codes of practice that address some forms of advertising. A new system of regulation is required to reduce this unacceptable level of exposure. [source]

Policy modes, firms and the natural environment

BUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Issue 2 2004
Aseem Prakash
This paper examines how different environmental policy types differentially impact firms and why firms vary in their responses to such policies. Based on the mechanisms embedded in policy instruments to create incentives for firms to comply, the characteristics of benefits/costs that policies impose on firms and the institutional context in which policy instruments were created and are sustained, the paper identifies five policy categories. These are category I (command and control), category II (market based), category III (mandatory information disclosures), category IV (business,government partnerships) and category V (private voluntary codes). Different policy types often bestow asymmetrical benefits/costs on firms. Some benefits/costs may constitute ,private/club goods' while others may constitute ,public goods'. Drawing insights from public policy literature, the paper argues that firms can be expected to favor policies whose benefits have the characteristics of private/club goods but the costs of public goods. Thus, understanding the nature of benefits/costs (private/club versus public) and the magnitude of their excludability is critical in explaining the variations in firms' responses. To understand how managers perceive the nature of benefits/costs (monetary as well as non-monetary), the paper draws on theories and perspectives in the business and public policy field. In doing so, the paper examines the ,demand' and the ,supply' sides as well as the market and non-market environments of a given policy. Thus, the paper makes a case for a multi-theoretic approach to understand variations in managerial assessments of benefits/costs, and consequently variations in their responses to various policy types. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source]